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Displaying results 1 to 8 of 8.

  1. Organizing for collective action
    olson revisited
    Published: 02 March 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    LZ 161
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17951
    Subjects: Collective Action; Free Riding; Volunteering; Lobbying; Mechanism Design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Shadow lobbyists
    Published: 06 March 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17961
    Subjects: Lobbying; Revolving Door; Political Money
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Shadow lobbyists
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry, United Kingdom

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    VS 623
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Warwick economics research papers ; no: 1449 (January 2023)
    Subjects: Lobbying; Revolving Door; Political Money
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures
    Published: March 2023
    Publisher:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 330
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1418
    Subjects: Pluralistic Politics; Lobbying; Common Agency; Moral Hazard
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten)
  5. Reform for sale: a common agency model with moral hazard frictions
    Published: March 2023
    Publisher:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    VS 330
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1419
    Subjects: Pluralistic Politics; Lobbying; Common Agency; Moral Hazard
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten)
  6. Hiding in the Crowd
    Corporate Climate Lobbying Under Investor and Consumer Pressure
    Published: 2023

    Across the globe, investors and consumers have become concerned about climate change. With this concern comes a heightened interest in the climate conduct of large firms, including their lobbying activities. In this dissertation, I examine how... more

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    Across the globe, investors and consumers have become concerned about climate change. With this concern comes a heightened interest in the climate conduct of large firms, including their lobbying activities. In this dissertation, I examine how companies adjust their lobbying practices to these new pressures. I argue that one important way in which companies react to potential consumer and investor scrutiny is to adjust the observability of their lobbying. Less climate-friendly firms shift away from lobbying by themselves into industry associations. Lobbying through associations complicates the attribution of positions and distributes the potential blame for lobbying activity across all firms in the sector. As a result, stakeholders are more reluctant to punish individual firms for association lobbying on climate change. While this logic makes lobbying through associations a potent tool to obfuscate, it also makes association lobbying a poor strategy for those who want to claim credit for and advertise their green positions. Therefore, companies with greener climate preferences than their competitors will react to consumer and investor pressure by taking more lobbying positions individually. This logic implies that investor and consumer pressure on climate lobbying could lead companies to shift their lobbying strategies rather than their positions. I test this argument by investigating the example of climate lobbying in the European Union. The first set of empirical chapters provides observational and survey experimental evidence of consumer and investor reactions to information on lobbying. The second set of empirical chapters presents quantitative and qualitative evidence of firms’ strategic choice to lobby individually or collectively.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9798379654245
    Series: Dissertations Abstracts International
    Subjects: Bans; Associations; Climate policy; Emissions; Research design; Automobiles; Probability; International organizations; Engines; Paris Agreement; Environmental policy; Lobbying; Climate change; Design; Finance; Transportation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (274 p.)
    Notes:

    Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: A. - Advisor: Scheve, Kenneth F.;Kennard, Amanda;Tomz, Michael;Goldstein, Judith

    Dissertation (Ph.D.), Stanford University, 2023

  7. Essays in productivity
    Published: 2023

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2262/102071
    Subjects: Allocative Efficiency; Labour Share; Productivity Growth; Worker-Embodied Spillovers; Lobbying
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 373 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Dissertation, University of Dublin, 2023

  8. Pollution abatement and lobbying in a Cournot game
    an agent-based modelling approach
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  [Università di Pisa, Dipartimento di Economia e Management], [Pisa]

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    VS 664
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion papers / Dipartimento di Economia e Management, Università di Pisa ; n. 294 (2023)
    Subjects: Agent-Based-Modelling; Environmental Regulation; Industrial Organisation; Lobbying
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen