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  1. Corporate purpose and firm ownership
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Harvard Business School, [Boston, MA]

    Analyzing data from approximately 1.5 million employees across 1,108 established public and private US companies, we find that employee beliefs about their firm's purpose is weaker in public companies. This difference is most pronounced within the... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Keine Rechte
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    Analyzing data from approximately 1.5 million employees across 1,108 established public and private US companies, we find that employee beliefs about their firm's purpose is weaker in public companies. This difference is most pronounced within the salaried middle and hourly ranks, rather than senior executives. Among private firms, purpose is lower in private equity owned firms. Among public companies, purpose is lower for firms with high hedge fund ownership and higher for firms with long-term investors. We interpret our findings as evidence that higher owner commitment is associated with a stronger sense of purpose among employees within the firm

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School ; 20, 024
    Subjects: Corporate Purpose; Ownership; Leadership; Executive Compensation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. CEO investment of deferred compensation plans and firm performance
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  SAFE, Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Frankfurt am Main

    We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 431
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    We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred compensation is to a large extent invested in the company equity in good times and divested from it in bad times. The divestment from company equity in bad times arguably re ects CEOs' incentive to \abandon" the firm and to invest in alternative instruments to preserve the value of their deferred compensation plans. This result suggests that the incentive alignment effects of deferred compensation crucially depend on the firm's health status.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/203305
    Edition: This Draft: January 2019
    Series: SAFE working paper ; no. 160
    Subjects: Executive Compensation; Deferred Compensation; Corporate Distress
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten)