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Displaying results 1 to 14 of 14.

  1. Executive labor market frictions, corporate bankruptcy and CEO careers
    Author: Grindaker, Morten; Kostøl, Andreas R.; Roszbach, Kasper
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Norges Bank, Oslo

    CEOs of large firms filing for bankruptcy are more likely to exit the executive labor market after bankruptcy and experience substantial compensation losses (Eckbo et al., 2016). While the fear of reputational scarring can lead to lower risk-taking... more

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    CEOs of large firms filing for bankruptcy are more likely to exit the executive labor market after bankruptcy and experience substantial compensation losses (Eckbo et al., 2016). While the fear of reputational scarring can lead to lower risk-taking and manifest itself as lower rates of entrepreneurship and job growth, the mechanisms through which bankruptcy affects CEO careers are not well understood. In this paper, we examine the effect of "random bankruptcy" decisions on small and medium-sized business CEOs' careers. By random, we mean job separation for reasons unrelated to a firm or CEO quality but rather through a court's bankruptcy decision. We control for the unobserved ability of bankrupt and non-bankrupt CEOs by using randomly assigned judges' propensity to liquidate firms as an instrument. We then combine our sample of CEOs with administrative records containing granular information on income, wealth, new employers and job titles. Our results show that bankrupt CEOs find new employment quickly, but that a large share exits the executive labor force. On average, bankruptcy reduces CEOs' variable income components. While the net present value of CEOs' loss of future capital income equals more than 60 percent of annual pre-bankruptcy income, we observe no effect on wage income. We find that displaced CEOs are more likely to reallocate to new industries and new geographic areas, suggesting that managerial skills are portable. We explore how the income and employment effects of bankruptcy vary with industry conditions. Consistent with the executive labor market using bankruptcy as a noisy signal of managerial ability, we find the displacement effect is stronger when industry conditions are good. Our evidence is consistent with the presence of information frictions that could entail important social costs.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9788283792140
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 11250/2835492
    hdl: 10419/264936
    Edition: This version: December 16, 2021
    Series: Working paper / Norges Bank ; 2021, 15
    Subjects: Occupational Choice; Bankruptcy; CEO; Organizations; Executive Compensation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Cheap stock options
    antecedents and outcomes
    Author: Badertscher, Brad A.; Jorgensen, Bjorn N.; Katz, Sharon P.; Michels, Jeremy
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  INSEAD, [Fontainebleau]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; 2022, 35
    Subjects: Initial Public Offering; IPO; Cheap Stock; Stock Options; Earnings Management; Executive Compensation; Financial Reporting Quality
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 77 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Executives' short-term and long-term incentives - a distributional analysis
    Author: Haylock, Michael Robert
    Published: February 19, 2020
    Publisher:  Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen, Tübingen

    Executives are often paid for short-term changes in shareholder wealth, but rational shareholders want executives to maximize long-term shareholder wealth. Incentives for short-term and long-term oriented behavior may depend on an executive's level... more

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    Executives are often paid for short-term changes in shareholder wealth, but rational shareholders want executives to maximize long-term shareholder wealth. Incentives for short-term and long-term oriented behavior may depend on an executive's level of pay in the distribution, holding other factors constant. This paper tests for distributional heterogeneity of short-term and long-term incentives in a 12 year cross-country panel of executives. I use the band-pass filter to separate short-term and long-term shareholder wealth changes (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003), and estimate of the shareholder wealth-pay relation using method of moments-quantile regression, developed by Machado and Santos Silva (2019), which accounts for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity of executive-firm pairs across the distribution. When using yearly total compensation to measure pay, executives in the upper tail of the conditional compensation distribution have longer-term oriented incentives. In contrast, when accumulated executive wealth is used to measure pay, executives in the upper tail of the wealth distribution have shorter-term oriented incentives. Since executive wealth encompasses changes to executive utility after pay is granted through accumulated equity-linked pay, it is the preferred measure for evaluating equity-linked pay. Results thus suggest that equity-linked pay should have a longer vesting period for executives in the upper tail than in the lower tail. I find evidence that executives in the upper-tail are evaluated relatively to the industry's short-run and long-run performance.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10900/98337
    hdl: 10419/215410
    Series: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics ; no. 131
    Subjects: Verteilung; Benchmarking; Leistungsvergleich; Executive Compensation; Method of Moments-Quantile Regression; Short-Term Performance; Long-Term Performance; Distribution; Benchmarking
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (35 Seiten), Diagramme
  4. Corporate purpose and firm ownership
    Author: Gartenberg, Claudine; Serafeim, George
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Harvard Business School, [Boston, MA]

    Analyzing data from approximately 1.5 million employees across 1,108 established public and private US companies, we find that employee beliefs about their firm's purpose is weaker in public companies. This difference is most pronounced within the... more

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    Analyzing data from approximately 1.5 million employees across 1,108 established public and private US companies, we find that employee beliefs about their firm's purpose is weaker in public companies. This difference is most pronounced within the salaried middle and hourly ranks, rather than senior executives. Among private firms, purpose is lower in private equity owned firms. Among public companies, purpose is lower for firms with high hedge fund ownership and higher for firms with long-term investors. We interpret our findings as evidence that higher owner commitment is associated with a stronger sense of purpose among employees within the firm

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School ; 20, 024
    Subjects: Corporate Purpose; Ownership; Leadership; Executive Compensation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. The gender gap among top business executives
    Author: Keller, Wolfgang; Molina, Teresa; Olney, William W.
    Published: December 5, 2020
    Publisher:  University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, Department of Economics, Honolulu, HI

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This draft: December 5, 2020
    Series: Working paper series / University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, Department of Economics ; no. 20, 24
    Subjects: Women; Executive Compensation; Gender Pay Gap; Corporate Culture
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. CEO compensation: evidence from the field
    Author: Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; Jenter, Dirk
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  [LSE Financial Markets Group], [London]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: Current draft: June 30, 2021
    Series: Financial Markets Group discussion papers ; DP 836
    Subjects: Executive Compensation; Contract Theory; CEO Incentives; Fairness; Survey
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten)
  7. Trading away incentives
    Author: Colonnello, Stefano; Curatola, Giuliano Antonio; Xia, Shuo
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Venice Italy

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    Series: Working paper / Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Department of Economics ; 2022, no. 16
    Subjects: Executive Compensation; Equity Incentives; Insider Trading; Hedging; Dynamic Contracting
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. When structure meets personality
    how duality and social dominance affect the short vs long term focus of the CEO
    Author: Shefer, Natalie; Lungeanu, Razvan; Stern, Ithai
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  INSEAD, [Fontainebleau]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; 2024, 03
    Subjects: CEO Duality; Executive Personality; Executive Compensation; R&D Intensity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Verdienen Manager, was sie verdienen?
    eine wirtschaftsethische Stellungnahme
    Author: Pies, Ingo; Sass, Peter
    Published: 2010
    Publisher:  Martin-Luther-Univ. Halle-Wittenberg, Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsethik, Halle

    In der öffentlichen Diskussion werden die Bezüge von Führungskräften mit der Semantik der Leistungsgerechtigkeit bewertet. Allerdings zeigt eine detaillierte Analyse von Prinzipal-Agent-Problemen in der modernen Wirtschaft, dass eine... more

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    Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt / Zentrale
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    eBook
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    In der öffentlichen Diskussion werden die Bezüge von Führungskräften mit der Semantik der Leistungsgerechtigkeit bewertet. Allerdings zeigt eine detaillierte Analyse von Prinzipal-Agent-Problemen in der modernen Wirtschaft, dass eine leistungsgerechte Entlohnung oft nicht das beste Ergebnis hervorruft. Daher schlagen wir vor, eine alternative Semantik bei der Festlegung und Bewertung der Managerentlohnung zu verwenden: Verfahrensgerechtigkeit. Die Verwendung dieser Semantik im öffentlichen Diskurs führt zu glaubwürdigeren Argumenten und höherer Akzeptanz der Managerentlohnung in der Bevölkerung. "Pay-for-Performance" is the central semantics in the public discourse on executive compensation. But a detailed analysis of principal-agent-problems in a modern firm shows that strictly performance-based compensation schemes do often lead to a suboptimal outcome. To solve that problem, the focus of the public discourse has to shift from the "Pay-for-Performance"-semantics to a "process"-semantics: compensation is to be considered as appropriate if it is the outcome of a fair and transparent procedure. Such a paradigm shift of public perception would - to the advantage of all stakeholders - foster the social acceptance of efficient executive compensation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783868292923
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/170333
    RVK Categories: CC 7262 ; QC 010
    Series: Diskussionspapier des Lehrstuhls für Wirtschaftsethik an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg ; Nr. 2010, 4
    Subjects: Managervergütung; Leistungsmotivation; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Gerechtigkeit; Managerentlohnung; Innovationen; Leistungsgerechtigkeit; Verfahrensgerechtigkeit; öffentlicher Diskurs; Executive Compensation; Innovations; Pay for Performance; Public Discourse
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: III, 32 S., 1,60 MB), graph. Darst.
  10. Does financial misconduct affect the future compensation of alumni managers?
    Author: Groysberg, Boris; Lin, Eric; Serafeim, George
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Harvard Business School], [Boston, MA

    We explore how an organization's financial misconduct may affect pay for former employees not implicated in wrongdoing. Drawing on stigma theory we hypothesize that although such alumni did not participate in the financial misconduct and they had... more

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    We explore how an organization's financial misconduct may affect pay for former employees not implicated in wrongdoing. Drawing on stigma theory we hypothesize that although such alumni did not participate in the financial misconduct and they had left the organization years before the misconduct, they experience a compensation penalty. Our results support this prediction. The stigma effect increases in relation to the job function proximity to the misconduct, recency of the misconduct, and an employee's seniority. Collectively, our results suggest that the stigma of financial misconduct could reach alumni employees and need not be confined to executives and directors that oversaw the organization during the misconduct

     
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    Language: English
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    Format: Online
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    Series: [Working paper / Harvard Business School ; 18, 041]
    Harvard Business School Working Paper
    Subjects: Misconduct; Financial Misconduct and Fraud; Accounting restatement; compensation; executive search firms; Finance; Crime and Corruption; Executive Compensation; Human Capital; Outcome or Result
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. CEO investment of deferred compensation plans and firm performance
    Author: Cambrea, Domenico Rocco; Colonnello, Stefano; Curatola, Giuliano Antonio; Fantini, Giulia
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  SAFE, Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Frankfurt am Main

    We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred... more

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    We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred compensation is to a large extent invested in the company equity in good times and divested from it in bad times. The divestment from company equity in bad times arguably re ects CEOs' incentive to \abandon" the firm and to invest in alternative instruments to preserve the value of their deferred compensation plans. This result suggests that the incentive alignment effects of deferred compensation crucially depend on the firm's health status.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/203305
    Edition: This Draft: January 2019
    Series: SAFE working paper ; no. 160
    Subjects: Executive Compensation; Deferred Compensation; Corporate Distress
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten)
  12. Fiscal treatment of managerial compensation
    a welfare analysis ; conference paper
    Author: Hilmer, Michael
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    We analyze the consequences of bonus taxes, limited deductibility of bonuses from company pro ts and a corporate income tax (CIT) in a principal-agent model and explore how these tax instruments affect managerial incentives and how they change the... more

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    We analyze the consequences of bonus taxes, limited deductibility of bonuses from company pro ts and a corporate income tax (CIT) in a principal-agent model and explore how these tax instruments affect managerial incentives and how they change the design of incentive contracts used in equilibrium. Introducing bonus taxes decreases the agent's net bonus and reduces effort. Limited deductibility has no such effects. In equilibrium both instruments lead to a lower effort incentivized by the principal with a lower bonus when bonuses are less deductible. We find that a bonus tax can lead to an increase in bonus payments. Moreover, the model explains the welfare eff ects and distributional implications of the actions named above. Limited deductibility and bonus taxes are close substitutes and lead to a welfare loss compared to a taxation by a CIT as the CIT neither has an effect on incentives nor on the incentive contract. Furthermore welfare can be increased by paying a subsidy for bonus payments.

     
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    Language: English
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79703
    Series: Array ; V1
    Subjects: Bonus Tax; Limited Deductibility; Principal-Agent Model; Welfare Effects; Executive Compensation
    Scope: Online-Ressource (29 S.)
  13. Too many to fail
    how bonus taxation prevents gambling for bailouts ; conference paper
    Author: Hilmer, Michael
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    Using a simple symmetric principal-agent model of two banks, this paper studies the effects of both bailouts and bonus taxes on risk taking and managerial compensation. In contrast to existing literature, we assume financial institutions to be... more

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    Using a simple symmetric principal-agent model of two banks, this paper studies the effects of both bailouts and bonus taxes on risk taking and managerial compensation. In contrast to existing literature, we assume financial institutions to be systemic only on a collective basis, implying support only if they collectively fail. This too-many-to-fail assumption generates incentives for herding and collective moral hazard. If banks can anticipate bailouts, they can coordinate on equilibrium where they collectively incentivize higher risk-taking. A bonus tax can prevent this market failure, even if it is implemented unilaterally: proper bonus taxation reduces risk-taking of the taxed bank and, consequentially, rules out the equilibrium with high risk-taking of both banks. In preventing market failure due to banks collective moral hazard, bonus taxation reestablishes market discipline.

     
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    Language: English
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/100552
    Series: Array ; V2
    Subjects: Bonus Tax; Executive Compensation; Bailout; Systemic Risk; Too Many To Fail; Collective Moral Hazard
    Scope: Online-Ressource (31 S.), graph. Darst.
  14. Regulation of disclosure and corporate governance
    an empirical investigation of economic consequences
    Author: Müller-Bloch, Stephanie
    Published: 2016

    The level of regulation of disclosure and corporate governance on the national and supranational level has increased substantially in the last decade. With that in mind, and in the light of the demand for evidence-based financial reporting and... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Bibliothek im Kurt-Schwitters-Forum
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Zentrale Hochschulbibliothek Lübeck
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    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Hochschule Magdeburg-Stendal, Hochschulbibliothek
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    UB Weimar
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    The level of regulation of disclosure and corporate governance on the national and supranational level has increased substantially in the last decade. With that in mind, and in the light of the demand for evidence-based financial reporting and disclosure regulation (Buijink, 2006; Gassen and Günther, 2014; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016), this dissertation aims at investigating economic consequences of such regulation. In particular, this dissertation attempts to provide empirical evidence that helps regulators to assess intended and unintended economic consequences of regulating disclosure and cor...

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Contributor: Hitz, Jörg-Markus (AkademischeR BetreuerIn)
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 11858/00-1735-0000-002B-7C9F-0
    Subjects: Regulation; Disclosure; Corporate Governance; Executive Compensation; IFRS; Enforcement; Downlisting
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 143 Seiten), Illustrationen
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    Dissertation, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, 2016