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  1. Why Bitcoin and Ethereum differ in transaction costs
    a theory of blockchain fee policies
    Published: August 2024
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Blockchains, the technology underlying cryptocurrencies, face large fluctuations in user demand and marginal costs. These fluctuations make effective fee policies necessary to manage transaction service allocation. This paper models the conflict... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 63
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    Blockchains, the technology underlying cryptocurrencies, face large fluctuations in user demand and marginal costs. These fluctuations make effective fee policies necessary to manage transaction service allocation. This paper models the conflict between the blockchain designer and validators with monopoly power in choosing between price-setting and quantity-setting fee policies. The key determinants of the advantage of price-setting on blockchains are the validators’ bargaining power, the elasticity of demand, the validators’ uncertainty about demand, and the covariance of demand and marginal costs. My results help account for differences between the fee policy designs of Bitcoin and Ethereum, the leading blockchains, and have implications for how they can be improved.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/305516
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 11274 (2024)
    Subjects: blockchain; transaction costs; fee policies; Bitcoin; Ethereum; demand fluctuations; price elasticity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Decentralised finance
    a categorisation of smart contracts
    Published: 1 August 2024
    Publisher:  European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), Economics, Financial Stability and Risk Department, Paris

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    ZSS 19
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: ESMA working paper ; no. 2024, 3
    Subjects: Decentralised finance; DeFi; smart contracts; Ethereum; blockchain
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Economic determinants of ethereum transaction fees in the priority fee and proof of stake periods
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  [Simon Fraser University, Department of Economics], [Burnaby]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 722
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: [Discussion papers] / [Simon Fraser University, Department of Economics] ; [dp 24, 02]
    Subjects: transaction fees; blockchain; Ethereum; gas price; supply and demand factors; time series analysis
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. How would the war and the pandemic affect the stock and cryptocurrency cross-market linkages?
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, [Waterloo, Ontario]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 714
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis ; wp 24, 01
    Subjects: Bitcoin; Ethereum; cryptocurrency; stock market; tail dependence; local Gaussian partial correlation; pandemic uncertainty; geopolitical risk uncertainty
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Why bitcoin and ethereum differ in transaction fees
    a theory of blockchain fee policies
    Published: 07 March 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Blockchains, the technology underlying cryptocurrencies, face large fluctuations in user demand and marginal costs. These fluctuations make effective fee policies necessary to manage transaction service allocation. This paper models the conflict... more

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    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    LZ 161
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
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    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Blockchains, the technology underlying cryptocurrencies, face large fluctuations in user demand and marginal costs. These fluctuations make effective fee policies necessary to manage transaction service allocation. This paper models the conflict between the blockchain designer and validators with monopoly power in choosing between price-setting and quantity-setting fee policies. The key determinants of the advantage of price-setting on blockchains are the validators' bargaining power, the elasticity of demand, the validators’ uncertainty about demand, and the covariance of demand and marginal costs. My results help account for differences between the fee policy designs of Bitcoin and Ethereum, the leading blockchains, and have implications for how they can be improved.

     

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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18890
    Subjects: Blockchain; Transaction costs; Fee policies; Bitcoin; Ethereum; Demand fluctuations; Price elasticity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Information and Market Power in DeFi Intermediation
    Published: September 2024
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    This paper considers the "DeFi intermediation chain"--the market structure that underlies the creation and distribution of ETH, the native cryptocurrency of Ethereum--to examine how information asymmetry shapes intermediation rents. We argue that... more

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    This paper considers the "DeFi intermediation chain"--the market structure that underlies the creation and distribution of ETH, the native cryptocurrency of Ethereum--to examine how information asymmetry shapes intermediation rents. We argue that using proof-of-stake blockchain technology in DeFi leads to a novel limit to arbitrage, arising from the tension between arbitrageurs' privacy needs and blockchain transparency. Using a new dataset which distinguishes private and public transactions in Ethereum, we find that a 1% increase in private information advantage leads to a 1.4% increase in intermediaries' profit share. We develop a dynamic bargaining model that predicts information market power stems exclusively from participants' private information advantage. Our analysis illustrates how blockchain technology can sustain arbitrage opportunities despite low entry barriers

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w32949
    Subjects: Finanzintermediation; Blockchain; Elektronisches Handelssystem; Asymmetrische Information; Vertragstheorie; Decentralized Finance; Ethereum; Survey Methods; Sampling Methods; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design; Economics of Contract: Theory; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors; Other; Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

  7. Beneath the crypto currents
    the hidden effect of crypto "whales"
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 438
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: Working papers / Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ; 24, 14 (August 2024)
    Subjects: Cryptocurrency; Ethereum; ETH; crypto whales; blockchain; pump-and-dump
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Why bitcoin and ethereum differ in transaction fees
    a theory of blockchain fee policies
    Published: 07 March 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Blockchains, the technology underlying cryptocurrencies, face large fluctuations in user demand and marginal costs. These fluctuations make effective fee policies necessary to manage transaction service allocation. This paper models the conflict... more

    Access:
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Unter den Linden
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

     

    Blockchains, the technology underlying cryptocurrencies, face large fluctuations in user demand and marginal costs. These fluctuations make effective fee policies necessary to manage transaction service allocation. This paper models the conflict between the blockchain designer and validators with monopoly power in choosing between price-setting and quantity-setting fee policies. The key determinants of the advantage of price-setting on blockchains are the validators' bargaining power, the elasticity of demand, the validators’ uncertainty about demand, and the covariance of demand and marginal costs. My results help account for differences between the fee policy designs of Bitcoin and Ethereum, the leading blockchains, and have implications for how they can be improved.

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18890
    Subjects: Blockchain; Transaction costs; Fee policies; Bitcoin; Ethereum; Demand fluctuations; Price elasticity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen