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  1. On the Endogenous Allocation of Decision Powers in Federal Structures
    Author: Lorz, Oliver; Willmann, Gerald
    Published: 2004
    Publisher:  Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel

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  2. Enumerating rights
    more is not always better
    Author: Ball, Sheryl; Dave, Chetan; Dodds, Stefan
    Published: July 2019
    Publisher:  University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics, Edmonton

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 566
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics ; no. 2019, 11
    Subjects: Constitutional Design; Coase Theorem; Framing; Preferences; Rights; Battle of the Sexes
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Political selection and the concentration of political power
    conference paper
    Author: Grunewald, Andreas; Hansen, Emanuel; Pönitzsch, Gert
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    This paper studies the effects of power-concentrating institutions on the quality of political selection, i.e., the voters' capacity to identify and empower competent politicians. In our model, candidates are privately informed about their abilities... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DSM 13
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper studies the effects of power-concentrating institutions on the quality of political selection, i.e., the voters' capacity to identify and empower competent politicians. In our model, candidates are privately informed about their abilities and are driven by office rents as well as welfare considerations. We show that variations in power concentration involve a trade-off. On the one hand, higher concentration of power enables the voters' preferred politician to enforce larger parts of his agenda. On the other hand, higher power concentration increases electoral stakes and thereby induces stronger policy distortions. We identify a negative relation between the optimal level of power concentration and the extent of office motivation. In particular, full concentration of power is desirable if and only if politicians are mostly welfare-oriented. The results of an empirical analysis are in line with this prediction.

     
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/100339
    Series: Array ; V1
    Subjects: Elections; Constitutional Design; Selection; Asymmetric Information
    Scope: Online-Ressource (50 S.), graph. Darst.