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Displaying results 26 to 50 of 153.

  1. Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction
    Author: Bajari, Patrick L.; Fox, Jeremy T.
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; 11671
    Subjects: Mobilkommunikation; Lizenz; Auktion; USA; Auctions; Cell phone systems
    Scope: 49 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w11671.pdf - lizenzpflichtig
  2. Mixed bundling auctions
    Author: Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny
    Published: 2006
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Media type: Book
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    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 5566
    Subjects: Auktion; Auktionstheorie; Leistungsbündel; Gewinn; Theorie; Auctions
    Scope: 25 S.
  3. On seller estimates and buyer returns
    Author: Gershkov, Alex; Toxvaerd, Flavio
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 6503
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Asymmetrische Information; Kunsthandel; Wertpapierhandel; Rationale Erwartung; Auctions; Consumer behavior
    Scope: 8 S., graph. Darst.
  4. When are auctions best?
    Author: Bulow, Jeremy; Klemperer, Paul
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 6393
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Verkauf; Unternehmen; Verhandlungsmacht; Auctions; Consolidation and merger of corporations
    Scope: 37 S., graph. Darst.
  5. If winning isn't everthing, ,why do they keep score?
    a structural empirical analysis of Dutch flower auctions
    Author: Berg, Gerard J. van den; Klaauw, Bas van der
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 6323
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Markov-Kette; Monte-Carlo-Simulation; Niederlande; Auctions; Selling; Cut flower industry
    Scope: 49 S., graph. Darst.
  6. Auctions with anticipated emotions
    overbidding, underbidding, and optimal reserve prices
    Author: Roider, Andreas; Schmitz, Patrick W.
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 6476
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Emotion; Verhaltensökonomik; Auctions; Emotions
    Scope: 18 S., graph. Darst.
  7. Mergers as auctions
    Author: Ivaldi, Marc; Motis, Jrissy
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 6434
    Subjects: Fusion; Ereignisstudie; Auktionstheorie; Nichtparametrisches Verfahren; Schätzung; Industrie; USA
    Other subjects: Array; Array; Array
    Scope: 41 S.
  8. Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments
    Published: June 2005
    Publisher:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY

    "We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors... more

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    "We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors substantially overbid relative to other majors; and those with superior SAT/ACT scores are much less susceptible to the winner's curse, with the primary effect coming from those with below median scores doing worse, as opposed to those with very high scores doing substantially better, and with composite SAT/ACT score being a more reliable predictor than either math or verbal scores by themselves. There are strong selection effects in bid estimates for both inexperienced and experienced subjects that are not identified using standard econometric techniques but rather through our experimental design effects. Ignoring these selection effects is most misleading for inexperienced bidders, as the unbiased estimates of the bid function indicate much faster learning and adjustment to the winner's curse for individual bidders than do the biased estimates"--Federal Reserve Bank of New York web site

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/60705
    Series: Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York ; 213
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Experiment; Auctions; Value
    Notes:

    Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/5/2005

    Includes bibliographical references

    Also available in print
  9. Demand reduction and pre-emptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions
    Author: Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 4899
    Subjects: Auktion; Auktionstheorie; Konzession; Nachfrage; Experiment; Auctions; Demand functions (Economic theory)
    Scope: 33, [8] S, graph. Darst
  10. Bidding with securities
    auctions and security design
    Author: DeMarzo, Peter M.; Kremer, Ilan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
    Published: 2004
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

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    Series: NBER working paper series ; 10891
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Wertpapier; Auctions; Securities
    Scope: 37 S
    Notes:

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w10891.pdf - lizenzpflichtig
  11. Anatomy of the rise and fall of a price-fixing conspiracy
    auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's
    Author: Ashenfelter, Orley; Graddy, Kathryn
    Published: 2004
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Media type: Book
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; 10795
    Subjects: Auktion; Preiskartell; Kartellrecht; Zivilprozess; USA; Price fixing; Auctions
    Other subjects: Array; Array
    Scope: 26 S
    Notes:

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w10795.pdf - lizenzpflichtig
  12. The evolution of U.S. spectrum values over time
    Author: Connolly, Michelle P.; Sa, Nelson; Zaman, Azeem; Roark, Chris; Trivedi, Akshaya
    Published: February 13, 2018
    Publisher:  Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School, Waltham, MA

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    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School ; 121
    Subjects: Spectrum; Spectrum Scarcity; Auctions; FCC; Auction Rules; Mobile Applications; Spectral Efficiency; Broadband Speeds; Closed Auctions; Small Bidders; “The Google Effect”
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Dealer networks in the world of art
    Author: De Silva, Dakshina G.; Gertsberg, Marina; Kosmopoulou, Georgia; Campbell, Rachel
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Lancaster University Management School, Lancester

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    Series: Economics working paper series ; 2017/025
    Subjects: Auctions; Art Dealers; Networks
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Renegotiation and discrimination in symmetric procurement auctions
    Author: Arozamena, Leandro; Ganuza, Juan José; Weinschelbaum, Federico
    Published: July 2021
    Publisher:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    Series: Economics working paper series ; no. 1790
    Subjects: Auctions; Favoritism; Auction Design; Renegotiation; Corruption
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Anchored strategic reasoning
    Author: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Seres, Gyula
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s... more

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    Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents’ intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/256781
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 314 (January 25, 2022)
    Subjects: Anchoring Bias; Auctions; Games; Incomplete Information; Strategy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 11 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Optimal procurement with quality concerns
    Author: Lopomo, Giuseppe; Persico, Nicola; Villa, Alessandro T.
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, [Chicago, Illinois]

    Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also lowquality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA which, under some conditions, is the best incentive-compatible mechanism for maximizing either the seller's or the social... more

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    Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also lowquality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA which, under some conditions, is the best incentive-compatible mechanism for maximizing either the seller's or the social surplus in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor (or minimum) price, and a reserve (or maximum) price. Conveniently, the LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild regularity conditions, is unique. We perform a counterfactual experiment on Italian government procurement auctions: we compute the gain that the government could have made, had it used the optimal mechanism (which happens to be a LoLA), relative to a first-price auction, which is the format the government actually used. Finally, we provide software applications for computing the optimal procurement mechanism.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/264335
    Series: [Working paper] / Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ; WP 2022, 21 (September 22, 2021)
    Subjects: Procurement Auctions; Auctions; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Consumer Demand with Social Influences
    Evidence from an E-Commerce Platform
    Author: Caoui, El Hadi; Farronato, Chiara; Horton, John J.; Schultz, Robert
    Published: August 2022
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    For some kinds of goods, rarity itself is valued. "Fashionable'" goods are demanded in part because they are unique. In this paper, we explore the economics of rare goods using auctions of limited-edition shoes held by an e-commerce platform. We... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    For some kinds of goods, rarity itself is valued. "Fashionable'" goods are demanded in part because they are unique. In this paper, we explore the economics of rare goods using auctions of limited-edition shoes held by an e-commerce platform. We model endogenous entry and bidding in multi-unit auctions and construct demand curves from realized bids. We find that doubling inventory reduces willingness to pay by 7-15%. From the producer perspective, ignoring the value of rarity leads to substantial overproduction: auctioned quantities are 82% above the profit-maximizing level. From the consumer perspective however, the negative spillovers of restricting quantity more than offset the benefits of rarer goods

     
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w30351
    Subjects: Konsumentenverhalten; Digitale Plattform; Electronic Commerce; Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse; Auktionstheorie; Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis; Auctions; Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  18. Information Spillovers and Sovereign Debt
    Theory Meets the Eurozone Crisis
    Author: Cole, Harold L.; Neuhann, Daniel; Ordoñez, Guillermo
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We develop a theory of information spillovers in sovereign bond markets in which investors can acquire information about default risk before trading in primary and secondary markets. If primary markets are structured as multi-unit... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    We develop a theory of information spillovers in sovereign bond markets in which investors can acquire information about default risk before trading in primary and secondary markets. If primary markets are structured as multi-unit discriminatory-price auctions, an endogenous winner's curse leads to strategic complementarities in information acquisition. As a result, shocks to default risk in one country may trigger crisis episodes with widespread information acquisition, sharp increases in the level and volatility of yields in risky countries, falling yields in safe countries, endogenous market segmentation, and arbitrage profits between primary and secondary markets. These predictions are consistent with the behavior of primary and secondary market yields, market segmentation, and measures of information acquisition during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis

     
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    Media type: Book
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w30216
    Subjects: Kreditrisiko; Internationale Staatsschulden; Spillover-Effekt; Öffentliche Anleihe; Öffentliche Schulden; Eurozone; Auctions; Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook; International Lending and Debt Problems; International Financial Markets
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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  19. Screening Adaptive Cartels
    Author: Ortner, Juan M.; Chassang, Sylvain; Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of asymptotically safe tests, i.e. tests that are passed with probability approaching one by competitive firms, regardless of the underlying economic environment. Our main result establishes that screening for collusion with safe tests is a robust improvement over laissez-faire. Safe tests do not create new collusive equilibria, and do not hurt competitive industries. In addition, safe tests can have strict bite, including unraveling all collusive equilibria in some settings. We provide evidence that cartel adaptation to regulatory oversight is a real concern

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w30219
    Subjects: Kartell; Regulierung; Kartellrecht; Signalling; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Auktionstheorie; Econometrics of Games and Auctions; Noncooperative Games; Auctions; Procurement; Antitrust Issues and Policies
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  20. Auction design with data-driven misspecifications
    Author: Jehiel, Philippe; Mierendorff, Konrad
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Paris School of Economics, Paris

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    Series: Working paper / Paris School of Economics ; no 2022, 22
    Subjects: Belief Formation; Auctions; Effiency; Analogy-based Expectations
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Multi-objective optimization methods for allocation and prediction
    Author: Ye, Qing Chuan
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Erasmus Institute of Management (ERIM), Rotterdam

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    Media type: Dissertation
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    ISBN: 9789058925398
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 1765/116462
    Series: ERIM PhD series in research in management ; EPS-2019-460-LIS
    Subjects: Auctions; task allocation; fairness; repeated auctions; auction design; machine learning; mathematical model; algorithm
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 188 Seiten), Illustrationen
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    Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2019
  22. Procurement design with loss averse bidders
    Author: Fugger, Nicolas; Gillen, Philippe; Riehm, Tobias
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment... more

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    We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment rule. Secondly, we introduce a simple two-stage mechanism which always leads to a decrease in procurement costs compared to any single-stage auction. Finally we derive the optimal efficient two-stage mechanism.

     
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    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 19, 060 (12/2019)
    Subjects: Auctions; Experiment; Loss aversion; Preferences
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Financial contracts as coordination device
    Author: Le Coq, Chloé; Schwenen, Sebastian
    Published: April 2019
    Publisher:  Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden

    We study the use of financial contracts as bid-coordinating device in multi-unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the "volunteer") is needed to increase the... more

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    DS 672
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    We study the use of financial contracts as bid-coordinating device in multi-unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the "volunteer") is needed to increase the market clearing price. Volunteering, however, is costly, as inframarginal suppliers sell their entire capacity whereas the volunteer only sells residual demand. We identify conditions under which signing financial contracts solves this dilemma. We test our framework exploiting data on contract positions by large producers in the New York power market. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we show that the contracting strategy is payoff dominant and provide estimates of the benefits of such strategy.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/204758
    Series: Working paper / Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics ; no. 47
    Subjects: Auctions; Coordination; Volunteer's dilemma; Forwardmarkets
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Central counterparty auctions and loss allocation
    Author: Oleschak, Robert
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  Swiss National Bank, Zurich

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 555
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: SNB working papers ; 2019, 6
    Subjects: Central Counterparty; Default Management; Auctions; Recovery
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Market evolution, bidding strategies, and survival of art dealers
    Author: De Silva, Dakshina G.; Gertsberg, Marina; Campbell, Rachel
    Published: [2016]
    Publisher:  Lancaster University Management School, Lancester

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Rechte
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics working paper series ; 2016/017
    Subjects: Auctions; Bidding; Art Dealers; Market Evolution; Common Value
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen