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Displaying results 1 to 12 of 12.

  1. Ambiguity, cognitive reflection, and strategic complexity across auctions
    Author: Deck, Cary A.; Paan Jindapon; Melkonyan, Tigran A.; Schneider, Mark
    Published: 3-5-2024
    Publisher:  Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, [Orange, CA]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: ESI working papers ; 24, 04
    Subjects: Ambiguity; Ambiguity Attitude; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 75 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Collusion in repeated auctions with costless communication
    Author: Pinheiro, Roberto B.
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, [Cleveland, OH]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland working paper series ; no. 24, 21 (October 2024)
    Subjects: Collusion; Auctions; Cheap Talk Communication; Repeated Games
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism
    Author: Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Eicke, Anselm; Hirth, Lion; Ocker, Fabian; Ott, Marion; Schlecht, Ingmar; Wang, Runxi
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called... more

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    This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible consumers with a market-based approach. We conduct a game-theoretical analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism. Our analysis reveals that despite its intention, the capacity-based redispatch is prone to undesirable behavior of market participants. The reason is that the availability payment incentivizes participants to change their energy consumption (generation) behavior. However, this also applies to undesired participants who increase the redispatch requirement through participation. Under certain assumptions, the additional redispatch potential equals the additional redispatch demand it creates. Consequently, the mechanism does not resolve network constraints, while causing costs for the compensation payments. Furthermore, we study three alternative implementation options, none of which resolves the underlying problem. It follows from our analysis that a mechanism can only be promising if it is capable to distinguish between the potential participants to exclude the undesirable ones.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/298003
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 24, 025 (05/2024)
    Subjects: Energy market; Congestion management; Capacity-based redispatch; Game theory; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Competing models of the Bank of England's liquidity auctions
    truthful bidding is a good approximation
    Author: Grace, Charlotte
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Bank of England, London

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
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    Series: Staff working paper / Bank of England ; no. 1061 (February 2024)
    Subjects: Auctions; bid shading; central bank liquidity provision; product mix auction
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 95 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Haggle or hammer?
    dual-mechanism housing search
    Author: Barkley, Aaron; Genesove, David; Hansen, James
    Published: 17 July 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP19262
    Subjects: Auctions; Price determination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Unequal Uptake
    Assessing Distributional Disparities in the Residential Solar Market
    Author: Dorsey, Jackson; Wolfson, Derek C.
    Published: August 2024
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We examine technology adoption and consumer welfare disparities across demographic groups using data from an online solar photovoltaic (PV) marketplace. Low-income households are 25% less likely to purchase solar through the platform and obtain 53%... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    We examine technology adoption and consumer welfare disparities across demographic groups using data from an online solar photovoltaic (PV) marketplace. Low-income households are 25% less likely to purchase solar through the platform and obtain 53% lower expected consumer surplus than high-income households. Moreover, Black and Hispanic households are relatively less likely to purchase solar through the platform and obtain lower consumer surplus than White and Asian households. We develop a method to decompose the drivers of consumer welfare disparities between demographic groups. Differences in demand fully account for the consumer surplus disparities between high- and low-income households and between White and Hispanic households. However, supply-side factors explain 37% of the consumer surplus gap between White and Black households. Black households get relatively fewer bids and face higher prices, and installers have higher implied costs to serve them. Lastly, we assess counterfactuals that offer targeted price discounts to certain demographic groups

     
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  7. Auctions with frictions
    recruitment, entry, and limited commitment
    Author: Lauermann, Stephan; Wolinsky, Asher
    Published: March 2024
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, [Bonn]

    Auction models are convenient abstractions of informal price-formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. These processes involve frictions such as bidder recruitment costs for sellers, participation costs for bidders, and... more

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    Auction models are convenient abstractions of informal price-formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. These processes involve frictions such as bidder recruitment costs for sellers, participation costs for bidders, and limitations on sellersícommitment abilities. This paper develops an auction model that captures such frictions. We derive several novel predictions; in particular, we Önd that outcomes are often ineffi cient, and the market sometimes unravels.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/289574
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 288
    Subjects: Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Information-Based Pricing in Specialized Lending
    Author: Blickle, Kristian; He, Zhiguo; Huang, Jing; Parlatore, Cecilia
    Published: February 2024
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We study specialized lending in a credit market competition model with private information. Two banks, equipped with similar data processing systems, possess "general" signals regarding the borrower's quality. However, the specialized bank gains an... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    We study specialized lending in a credit market competition model with private information. Two banks, equipped with similar data processing systems, possess "general" signals regarding the borrower's quality. However, the specialized bank gains an additional advantage through further interactions with the borrower, allowing it to access "specialized" signals. In equilibrium, both lenders use general signals to screen loan applications, and the specialized lender prices the loan based on its specialized signal conditional on making a loan. This private-information-based pricing helps deliver the empirical regularity that loans made by specialized lenders have lower rates (i.e., lower winning bids) and better ex-post performance (i.e., lower non-performing loans). We show the robustness of our equilibrium characterization under a generalized information structure, endogenize the specialized lending through information acquisition, and discuss its various economic implications

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w32155
    Subjects: Bank; Kreditgeschäft; Preismanagement; Asymmetrische Information; Kreditwürdigkeit; Theorie; Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; Auctions; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors; General
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  9. Money Isn't Everything
    Estimating the Prestige Value of Winning Cutthroat Kitchen from Overbidding in Sabotage Auctions
    Author: Snyder, Meg; Bragen, Daniel; Rousu, Matthew C.; Snyder, Christopher M.
    Published: January 2024
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We seek to estimate the prestige value of winning beyond monetary prizes in Cutthroat Kitchen, a cooking show in which dishes are judged in a series of elimination rounds, with the twist that action is periodically paused to auction sabotages against... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    We seek to estimate the prestige value of winning beyond monetary prizes in Cutthroat Kitchen, a cooking show in which dishes are judged in a series of elimination rounds, with the twist that action is periodically paused to auction sabotages against rivals. We estimate the distribution of contestants' prestige values using a structural model of bidding by a contestant with rational expectations about sabotage effectiveness taken from the data. Our most conservative specification--allowing for risk aversion and bias in the beliefs about sabotage effectiveness--yields mean prestige values of nearly $10,000 for typical episodes and over $35,000 for tournaments

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w32070
    Subjects: Fernsehprogramm; Auktionstheorie; Auctions; Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making; Economics of the Arts and Literature
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  10. A market for airport slots
    Author: Marra, M. R.
    Published: 05 September 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP19442
    Subjects: Airline industry; Structural estimation; Airports; Auctions; Demand estimation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 82 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. A market for airport slots
    Author: Marra, M. R.
    Published: 05 September 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP19442
    Subjects: Airline industry; Structural estimation; Airports; Auctions; Demand estimation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 82 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Haggle or hammer?
    dual-mechanism housing search
    Author: Barkley, Aaron; Genesove, David; Hansen, James
    Published: 17 July 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Unter den Linden
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    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP19262
    Subjects: Auctions; Price determination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen