Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 11 of 11.

  1. Anchored strategic reasoning
    Author: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Seres, Gyula
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 553
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents’ intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/256781
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 314 (January 25, 2022)
    Subjects: Anchoring Bias; Auctions; Games; Incomplete Information; Strategy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 11 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Optimal procurement with quality concerns
    Author: Lopomo, Giuseppe; Persico, Nicola; Villa, Alessandro T.
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, [Chicago, Illinois]

    Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also lowquality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA which, under some conditions, is the best incentive-compatible mechanism for maximizing either the seller's or the social... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 244
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also lowquality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA which, under some conditions, is the best incentive-compatible mechanism for maximizing either the seller's or the social surplus in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor (or minimum) price, and a reserve (or maximum) price. Conveniently, the LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild regularity conditions, is unique. We perform a counterfactual experiment on Italian government procurement auctions: we compute the gain that the government could have made, had it used the optimal mechanism (which happens to be a LoLA), relative to a first-price auction, which is the format the government actually used. Finally, we provide software applications for computing the optimal procurement mechanism.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/264335
    Series: [Working paper] / Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ; WP 2022, 21 (September 22, 2021)
    Subjects: Procurement Auctions; Auctions; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Consumer Demand with Social Influences
    Evidence from an E-Commerce Platform
    Author: Caoui, El Hadi; Farronato, Chiara; Horton, John J.; Schultz, Robert
    Published: August 2022
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    For some kinds of goods, rarity itself is valued. "Fashionable'" goods are demanded in part because they are unique. In this paper, we explore the economics of rare goods using auctions of limited-edition shoes held by an e-commerce platform. We... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    For some kinds of goods, rarity itself is valued. "Fashionable'" goods are demanded in part because they are unique. In this paper, we explore the economics of rare goods using auctions of limited-edition shoes held by an e-commerce platform. We model endogenous entry and bidding in multi-unit auctions and construct demand curves from realized bids. We find that doubling inventory reduces willingness to pay by 7-15%. From the producer perspective, ignoring the value of rarity leads to substantial overproduction: auctioned quantities are 82% above the profit-maximizing level. From the consumer perspective however, the negative spillovers of restricting quantity more than offset the benefits of rarer goods

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w30351
    Subjects: Konsumentenverhalten; Digitale Plattform; Electronic Commerce; Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse; Auktionstheorie; Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis; Auctions; Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  4. Information Spillovers and Sovereign Debt
    Theory Meets the Eurozone Crisis
    Author: Cole, Harold L.; Neuhann, Daniel; Ordoñez, Guillermo
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We develop a theory of information spillovers in sovereign bond markets in which investors can acquire information about default risk before trading in primary and secondary markets. If primary markets are structured as multi-unit... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We develop a theory of information spillovers in sovereign bond markets in which investors can acquire information about default risk before trading in primary and secondary markets. If primary markets are structured as multi-unit discriminatory-price auctions, an endogenous winner's curse leads to strategic complementarities in information acquisition. As a result, shocks to default risk in one country may trigger crisis episodes with widespread information acquisition, sharp increases in the level and volatility of yields in risky countries, falling yields in safe countries, endogenous market segmentation, and arbitrage profits between primary and secondary markets. These predictions are consistent with the behavior of primary and secondary market yields, market segmentation, and measures of information acquisition during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w30216
    Subjects: Kreditrisiko; Internationale Staatsschulden; Spillover-Effekt; Öffentliche Anleihe; Öffentliche Schulden; Eurozone; Auctions; Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook; International Lending and Debt Problems; International Financial Markets
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  5. Screening Adaptive Cartels
    Author: Ortner, Juan M.; Chassang, Sylvain; Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of asymptotically safe tests, i.e. tests that are passed with probability approaching one by competitive firms, regardless of the underlying economic environment. Our main result establishes that screening for collusion with safe tests is a robust improvement over laissez-faire. Safe tests do not create new collusive equilibria, and do not hurt competitive industries. In addition, safe tests can have strict bite, including unraveling all collusive equilibria in some settings. We provide evidence that cartel adaptation to regulatory oversight is a real concern

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w30219
    Subjects: Kartell; Regulierung; Kartellrecht; Signalling; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Auktionstheorie; Econometrics of Games and Auctions; Noncooperative Games; Auctions; Procurement; Antitrust Issues and Policies
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  6. Auction design with data-driven misspecifications
    Author: Jehiel, Philippe; Mierendorff, Konrad
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Paris School of Economics, Paris

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 331
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Paris School of Economics ; no 2022, 22
    Subjects: Belief Formation; Auctions; Effiency; Analogy-based Expectations
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. The effects of changes in the regulation of the Colombian wholesale electricity market in a structural model of complex auctions
    Author: Balat, Jorge F.; Carranza, Juan Esteban; Martin, Juan David; Riascos Villegas, Álvaro J.
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Banco de la Republica Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia

    Access:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 468
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 20.500.12134/10496
    Series: Borradores de economía ; no. 1211 (2022)
    Subjects: Auctions; structural estimation; electricity markets
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Underbidding for oil and gas tracts
    Author: Martin, Julien; Pesendorfer, Martin; Shannon, Jack
    Published: 15 November 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Access:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    LZ 161
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17673
    Subjects: Testing; Collusion; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Motivated beliefs in auctions
    Author: Riehm, Tobias
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    In auctions bidders are usually assumed to have rational expectations with regards to their winning probability. However, experimental and empirical evidence suggests that agent's expectations depend on direct utility stemming from expectations,... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 15
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    In auctions bidders are usually assumed to have rational expectations with regards to their winning probability. However, experimental and empirical evidence suggests that agent's expectations depend on direct utility stemming from expectations, resulting in optimism or pessimism. Optimism increases ex ante savoring, while pessimism leads to less disappointment ex post. Hence, optimal expectations depend on the time left until the uncertainty is resolved, i.e. the time one can savor ex ante by being (too) optimistic. Applying the decision theory model of Gollier and Muermann (2010) to first price auctions, I show that by decreasing the time between bids and revelation of results, the auctioneer can induce bidders to forego optimism, leading to more aggressive bids and thereby higher revenues for the auctioneer. Finally I test these predictions experimentally, finding no evidence for my theoretical predictions.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/266652
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 22, 062 (12/2022)
    Subjects: Auctions; Experiment; Motivated Beliefs
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Optimal reserve prices
    Author: Koska, Onur A.; Stähler, Frank
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics and Finance, UC Business School, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 92
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business and Economics, University of Canterbury ; no. 2022, 7
    Subjects: Auctions; Interdependent values; Optimal reserve prices
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 8 Seiten)
  11. Reserve prices as signals
    Author: Koska, Onur A.; Stähler, Frank
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics and Finance, UC Business School, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 92
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business and Economics, University of Canterbury ; no. 2022, 10
    Subjects: Auctions; Interdependent values; Optimal reserve prices; Rationalsignaling
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen