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  1. Renegotiation and discrimination in symmetric procurement auctions
    Author: Arozamena, Leandro; Ganuza, Juan José; Weinschelbaum, Federico
    Published: July 2021
    Publisher:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 574
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics working paper series ; no. 1790
    Subjects: Auctions; Favoritism; Auction Design; Renegotiation; Corruption
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Signalling in auctions
    experimental evidence
    Author: Bos, Olivier; Gomez-Martinez, Francisco; Onderstal, Sander; Truyts, Tom
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Mannheim, Mannheim

    We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an... more

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    We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also reveals the bidders’ payments to an outside observer. We find that the all-pay sealed-bid auction in which the bidders’ payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism underperforms in terms of efficiency relative to the winner-pay auctions.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/233214
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 21, 037 (04/2021)
    Subjects: Auctions; Signalling; Experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. FAST: Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions
    Author: David, Bernardo; Gentile, Lorenzo; Pourpouneh, Mohsen
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO), University of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, Denmark

    Auctioning an asset with sealed bids has been shown to be economically optimal but requires trusting an auctioneer who analyzes the bids and determines the winner. Many privacy preserving computation protocols for auctions have been proposed, aiming... more

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    Auctioning an asset with sealed bids has been shown to be economically optimal but requires trusting an auctioneer who analyzes the bids and determines the winner. Many privacy preserving computation protocols for auctions have been proposed, aiming at eliminating the need for a trusted third party. However, they lack fairness, meaning that the adversary learns the outcome of the auction before honest parties and may choose to make the protocol fail without suffering any consequences. In this work, we propose efficient protocols for both first and second price sealed bid auctions with fairness against rational adversaries, leveraging secret cryptocurrency transactions and public smart contracts. In our approach, the bidders jointly compute the winner of the auction while preserving the privacy of losing bids and ensuring that cheaters are financially punished by losing a secret collateral deposit. We guarantee that it is never profitable for rational adversaries to cheat by making the deposit equal to the bid plus the cost of running the protocol, i.e., once a party commits to a bid it is guaranteed that it has the funds and it cannot walk away from the protocol without forfeiting the bid. Moreover, our protocols guarantee that the winner is determined and the auction payments are completed even if the adversary misbehaves, so that it cannot force the protocol to fail and then rejoin the auction with an adjusted bid. Our constructions are more efficient than the state-of-the-art even though they achieve stronger security guarantees, i.e., fairness. Interestingly, we show how the second price can be computed with a minimal increase of the complexity of the simpler first price case. Moreover, in case there is no cheating, only collateral deposit and refund transactions must be sent to the smart contract, significantly saving on-chain storage.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/231525
    Series: IFRO working paper ; 2021, 02
    Subjects: Cryptographic Protocols; Multiparty Computation; FinancialCryptography; Auctions; Fairness; Blockchain
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten)
  4. Renegotiation and discrimination in symmetric procurement auctions
    Author: Arozamena, Leandro; Ganuza, Juan José; Weinschelbaum, Federico
    Published: July 2021
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1275
    Subjects: Auctions; Favoritism; Auction Design; Renegotiation; Corruption
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Basic bidding formats: characteristics and differences
    Author: Helmedag, Fritz
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Chemnitz University of Technology, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Chemnitz, Germany

    In standard auction theory, the 'revenue equivalence theorem' asserts that the outcomes of the elementary allocation methods coincide. However, bidding processes differ fundamentally with regard to the decision situation of the participants: Is it at... more

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    In standard auction theory, the 'revenue equivalence theorem' asserts that the outcomes of the elementary allocation methods coincide. However, bidding processes differ fundamentally with regard to the decision situation of the participants: Is it at all imperative to take into consideration the number of competitors ('stochastic' strategy) or not ('deterministic' course of action)? Furthermore, established auction theory neglects the operating modes of procurement alternatives under uncertainty. Apart from the lacking knowledge how many rivals have to be beaten, tenderers regularly are ignorant of the buyer's reserve price. Then it is even more tentative to calculate an offer based on probability theory. Consequently, the suppliers' propensity to collude increases.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/246868
    Series: Chemnitz economic papers ; no. 051 (October 2021)
    Subjects: Auctions; Tendering; Strategic Bidding
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Optimal discounts in Green Public Procurement
    Author: Chiappinelli, Olga; Seres, Gyula
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  DIW Berlin, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin

    We consider a Green Public Procurement setting where the procurer provides a bid discount to environment-friendly technologies to foster their use. We assume that, before the auction, firms may switch to green technology via a publicly observable... more

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    We consider a Green Public Procurement setting where the procurer provides a bid discount to environment-friendly technologies to foster their use. We assume that, before the auction, firms may switch to green technology via a publicly observable costly investment. We show that investment acts as a signaling device. This mitigates the effect of incomplete information on firms’ costs, thereby triggering more competitive bidding, which results in lower prices for the procurer. Therefore, even a procurer with no preference toward green technology can find it optimal to use a discount. Our results challenge the common perception that Green Public Procurement always implies a trade-off between environmental performance and purchasing price.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248486
    Series: Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung ; 1983
    Subjects: Public Procurement; Environmental Policy; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Optimal discounts in green public procurement
    Author: Chiappinelli, Olga; Seres, Gyula
    Published: November 16, 2021
    Publisher:  CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg

    We consider a Green Public Procurement setting where the procurer provides a bid discount to environment-friendly technologies to foster their use. We assume that, before the auction, firms may switch to green technology via a publicly observable... more

    Access:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 786
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider a Green Public Procurement setting where the procurer provides a bid discount to environment-friendly technologies to foster their use. We assume that, before the auction, firms may switch to green technology via a publicly observable costly investment. We show that investment acts as a signaling device. This mitigates the effect of incomplete information on firms’ costs, thereby triggering more competitive bidding, which results in lower prices for the procurer. Therefore, even a procurer with no preference toward green technology can find it optimal to use a discount. Our results challenge the common perception that Green Public Procurement always implies a trade-off between environmental performance and purchasing price

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: TILEC discussion paper ; DP 2021, 015
    Subjects: Public Procurement; Environmental Policy; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Getting auctions for transportation capacity to roll
    Author: Cherbonnier, Frédéric; Salant, David J.; Van der Straeten, Karine
    Published: September 2021
    Publisher:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    VS 330
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1254
    Subjects: Rail transportation; Open access; Auctions; Regulation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten)