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Displaying results 1 to 10 of 10.

  1. Multi-objective optimization methods for allocation and prediction
    Author: Ye, Qing Chuan
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Erasmus Institute of Management (ERIM), Rotterdam

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789058925398
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 1765/116462
    Series: ERIM PhD series in research in management ; EPS-2019-460-LIS
    Subjects: Auctions; task allocation; fairness; repeated auctions; auction design; machine learning; mathematical model; algorithm
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 188 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2019
  2. Procurement design with loss averse bidders
    Author: Fugger, Nicolas; Gillen, Philippe; Riehm, Tobias
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment... more

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    We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment rule. Secondly, we introduce a simple two-stage mechanism which always leads to a decrease in procurement costs compared to any single-stage auction. Finally we derive the optimal efficient two-stage mechanism.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/211482
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 19, 060 (12/2019)
    Subjects: Auctions; Experiment; Loss aversion; Preferences
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Financial contracts as coordination device
    Author: Le Coq, Chloé; Schwenen, Sebastian
    Published: April 2019
    Publisher:  Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden

    We study the use of financial contracts as bid-coordinating device in multi-unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the "volunteer") is needed to increase the... more

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    We study the use of financial contracts as bid-coordinating device in multi-unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the "volunteer") is needed to increase the market clearing price. Volunteering, however, is costly, as inframarginal suppliers sell their entire capacity whereas the volunteer only sells residual demand. We identify conditions under which signing financial contracts solves this dilemma. We test our framework exploiting data on contract positions by large producers in the New York power market. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we show that the contracting strategy is payoff dominant and provide estimates of the benefits of such strategy.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/204758
    Series: Working paper / Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics ; no. 47
    Subjects: Auctions; Coordination; Volunteer's dilemma; Forwardmarkets
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Central counterparty auctions and loss allocation
    Author: Oleschak, Robert
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  Swiss National Bank, Zurich

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: SNB working papers ; 2019, 6
    Subjects: Central Counterparty; Default Management; Auctions; Recovery
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Commitment in first-price auctions
    Author: Gillen, Philippe
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    We study the role of commitment in a first-price auction environment. We devise a simple two-stage model in which bidders first submit an initial offer that the auctioneer can observe and then make a counteroffer. There is no commitment on the... more

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    We study the role of commitment in a first-price auction environment. We devise a simple two-stage model in which bidders first submit an initial offer that the auctioneer can observe and then make a counteroffer. There is no commitment on the auctioneer's side to accept an offer as is or even to choose the lowest bidder. We compare this setting to a standard first-price auction both theoretically and experimentally. While theory suggests that the offers and the auctioneer's revenue should be higher in a standard first-price auction compared to the first-price auction with renegotiation, we cannot confirm these hypotheses in the experiment.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/213106
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 19, 062 (12/2019)
    Subjects: Auctions; Experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Are strategies anchored?
    Author: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Seres, Gyula
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Munich, Germany

    Anchoring is one of the most studied and robust behavioral biases, but there is little knowledge about its persistence in strategic settings. This article studies the role of anchoring bias in private-value auctions. We test experimentally two... more

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    Anchoring is one of the most studied and robust behavioral biases, but there is little knowledge about its persistence in strategic settings. This article studies the role of anchoring bias in private-value auctions. We test experimentally two different anchor types. The announcement of a random group identification number but also of an upper bid limit in the first-price sealed-bid auction result in higher bids. We show that such behavior can be explained as a rational response to biased beliefs. In Dutch auctions, the effect of a starting price, is negative. We demonstrate that the long-established ranking that the Dutch auction generates lower revenue than the first-price sealed-bid auction crucially depends on the size of the anchor.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/222108
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 211 (December 11, 2019)
    Subjects: Anchoring Bias; Games; Incomplete Information; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Combinatorial auction-based allocation of collaborative transportation
    Author: Naranjo, Daniel Nicola
    Published: 2019

    The rapid development of the transportation industry has motivated companies and researchers to develop methods in order to reduce costs and increase productivity. This has led collaborative relationships to become one main trend in transportation.... more

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    The rapid development of the transportation industry has motivated companies and researchers to develop methods in order to reduce costs and increase productivity. This has led collaborative relationships to become one main trend in transportation. This work focuses specifically on the study of request exchange mechanisms that offer carriers the opportunity to improve their sets of requests and obtain efficiency gains. First, a new type of problem scenario is introduced, combining various attributes: a pickup and delivery problem with multiple regions, multiple depots and multiple transportation modes. This includes an extensive literature review and mathematical models from simple and well-known scenarios to the multi-region multi-depot pickup and delivery problem. Second, regression-based estimation models are presented. These models provide fast predictions for the travel distance for various problems. This is very helpful for evaluating the costs for servicing requests. Finally, frameworks for auction-based and posted price request-exchange mechanisms are presented. All mechanisms are tested within the same scenario and their results are compared aiming to obtain insights regarding the efficiency gains they offer and the amount of information required for their application.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
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    Subjects: Collaborative Mechanisms; Transportation; Auctions; Assignment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 108 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Enthält 3 Beiträge

    Dissertation, Universität Wien, 2019
  8. Investing in superheroes?
    comic art as a new alternative investment
    Author: Bocart, Fabian; Hafner, Christian M.; Kasperskaya, Yulia; Sagarra, Marti
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2078.1/220659
    Series: CORE discussion papers ; 2019, 16
    Subjects: Comic Art; Alternative Investments; Auctions; Hedonic regressions; Price index; Portfolio
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
    Author: Auster, Sarah; Kellner, Christian
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Economics Department, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion papers in economics and econometrics ; no. 19, 03
    Subjects: Auctions; Ambiguity; Consistent Planning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. On the competitive effects of screening in procurement
    Author: Pigoń, Adam; Seres, Gyula
    Published: May 14, 2019
    Publisher:  CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: Discussion paper / CentER, Center for Economic Research ; no. 2019, 019
    TILEC discussion paper ; no. 2019, 009
    Subjects: Procurement; Auctions; Market Design; Litigation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen