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Displaying results 1 to 9 of 9.

  1. The role of domain restrictions in mechanism design
    ex post incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency
    Author: Barberà, Salvador; Berga Colom, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo
    Published: March 2018
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1024
    Subjects: Mechanisms; Interdependent Types; Ex Post Incentive Compatibility; Strategy Proofness; Pareto Efficiency; Preference Functions; Jury Decisions; Allocation Problems; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Do better informed investors always do better?
    a buyback puzzle
    Author: Boyle, Glenn W.; Ward, Gerald
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 92 (2018,6)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: Revision
    Series: Working paper / Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business, University of Canterbury ; no. 2018, 6
    Subjects: Auctions; racehorses; buybacks
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten)
  3. The evolution of U.S. spectrum values over time
    Author: Connolly, Michelle P.; Sa, Nelson; Zaman, Azeem; Roark, Chris; Trivedi, Akshaya
    Published: February 13, 2018
    Publisher:  Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School, Waltham, MA

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School ; 121
    Subjects: Spectrum; Spectrum Scarcity; Auctions; FCC; Auction Rules; Mobile Applications; Spectral Efficiency; Broadband Speeds; Closed Auctions; Small Bidders; “The Google Effect”
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Evolution of Online Advertising
    Author: Chandana, Nagandla; Abhishek, Thati Vikram; Sen, Anindya
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Calcutta

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Keine Rechte
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / Indian Institute of Management Calcutta ; no. 814
    Subjects: Auctions; Online Ad Auctions; Sponsored Search; Contextual Ads
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. An auction-based test of private information in an interdealer FX market
    = Una prueba de informacion privada basada en subastas en un mercado cambiario
    Author: Bonaldi, Pietro; Villamizar, Mauricio
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  Banco de la Republica Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 468 (1049)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Borradores de economía ; no. 1049 (2018)
    Subjects: Auctions; Common Values; Private Values; Private Information; Foreign Exchange Market; Regression Discontinuity Design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Strategies under strategic uncertainty
    Author: Mass, Helene
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  ZEW, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH, Mannheim

    I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    DS 15 (2018,55)
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not rationalizable. Second, I apply the maximin expected utility criterion. Using this decision criterion, one can derive predictions about outcomes and recommendations for players facing strategic uncertainty. A bidder following this decision criterion in a first-price auction expects all other bidders to bid their highest rationalizable bid given their valuation. As a consequence, the bidder never expects to win against an equal or higher type and resorts to win against lower types with certainty.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/190570
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung ; no. 18, 055
    Subjects: Auctions; Incomplete Information; Informational Robustness; Rationalizability
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions
    Author: Gretschko, Vitali; Mass, Helene
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  ZEW, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH, Mannheim

    Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders about their competitors' willingness to pay. We analyze bidding behavior in a first-price auction in which the knowledge of the bidders about the distribution of their... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 15 (2018,56)
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    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders about their competitors' willingness to pay. We analyze bidding behavior in a first-price auction in which the knowledge of the bidders about the distribution of their competitors' valuations is restricted to the support and the mean. To model this situation, we assume that under such uncertainty a bidder will expect to face the distribution of valuations that minimizes her expected utility, given her bid is an optimal reaction to the bids of her competitors induced by this distribution. This introduces a novel way to endogenize beliefs in games of incomplete information. We find that for a bidder with a given valuation her worst-case belief just puts sufficient probability weight on lower valuations of her competitors to induce a high bid. At the same time the worst-case belief puts as much as possible probability weight on the same valuation in order to minimize the bidder's winning probability. This implies that even though the worst-case beliefs are type dependent in a non-monotonic way, an efficient equilibrium of the first-price auction exists.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/190571
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung ; no. 18, 056
    Subjects: Auctions; mechanism design; beliefs; uncertainty
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 92 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect
    Author: Dijk, Justin; Ansink, Erik; Soest, Daniël Pieter van
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or decreases... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 432 (2018,93)
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    We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while behavioral economics suggests that repetition may increase market efficiency because it attenuates the endowment effect - the phenomenon that ownership of a good tends to increase one's valuation of the good. We find that of these two countervailing effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition increases market efficiency, conservation contracts can be of shorter duration and procured at a higher frequency than has been suggested before.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/205282
    Series: Array ; TI 2018, 093
    Subjects: Auctions; procurement; endowment effect; collusion; nature conservation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Tractable equilibria in sponsored search with endogenous budgets
    Author: Ciocan, Dragos Florin; Iyer, Krishnamurthy
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  INSEAD, [Fontainebleau]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; 2018, 47
    Subjects: Auctions; Bipartite Matching; Endogenous Budgets
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten)