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Displaying results 1 to 5 of 5.

  1. Dealer networks in the world of art
    Author: De Silva, Dakshina G.; Gertsberg, Marina; Kosmopoulou, Georgia; Campbell, Rachel
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Lancaster University Management School, Lancester

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics working paper series ; 2017/025
    Subjects: Auctions; Art Dealers; Networks
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Allocating essential inputs
    Author: Rey, Patrick; Salant, David J.
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 330
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 820 (17)
    Subjects: Auctions; Market design; Essential inputs; Regulation; Antitrust
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 90 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Transaction costs and the duration of contracts
    Author: MacKay, Alexander
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Harvard Business School, [Boston, MA]

    The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of re-selecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of re-selecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures this tradeoff and provide an empirical strategy for quantifying (unobserved) transaction costs. I estimate the model using federal supply contracts for a standardized product, where suppliers are selected by procurement auctions. The estimated transaction costs are substantially greater than consumer switching costs and a significant portion of total buyer costs. Counterfactuals illustrate the importance of accounting for the duration margin

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School ; 18, 058
    Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper
    Subjects: vertical relationships; transaction costs; contract duration; identification; Supply Chain; Cost; Contracts; Auctions; Mathematical Methods
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 75 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Signaling in auctions
    experimental evidence
    Author: Bos, Olivier; Gomez-Martinez, Francisco; Onderstal, Sander; Truyts, Tom
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  KU Leuven, Center for Economic Studies, Faculty of Economics and Business, Leuven

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper series / KU Leuven, Center for Economic Studies ; DPS17, 08 (June 2017)
    Subjects: Auctions; Signaling; Experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. The evolution of U.S. spectrum values over time
    Author: Connolly, Michelle P.; Sá, Nelson; Zaman, Azeem; Roark, Christopher; Trivedi, Akshaya
    Published: June 7, 2017
    Publisher:  Economic Research Initiatives @ Duke (ERID), Durham, NC

    Using data on all FCC auctions of spectrum related to cellular services from 1997 to 2015 we attempt to identify intrinsic spectrum values from winning auction bids. Our analysis includes 15 auctions and close to 7,200 observations. We add two... more

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    Using data on all FCC auctions of spectrum related to cellular services from 1997 to 2015 we attempt to identify intrinsic spectrum values from winning auction bids. Our analysis includes 15 auctions and close to 7,200 observations. We add two components to previous literature on this topic. First, we control for license and block specific auction rules. Second, we introduce two technological measures to separate out technological progress that effectively reduces spectrum scarcity from technological progress that increases demand for mobile applications. Previous papers have included simple time trends to reflect technological changes. Time trends are unable to distinguish across markets within the United States and conflate the effects of these two types of technological progress. Our results confirm previous theoretical and empirical findings for basic measures of demand such as population, population density, income levels, frequency levels, bandwidth and paired bands. We were surprised that 47 percent of all cellular licenses since 1997 have been won by small bidders: 42 percent were won using small bidder credits, 5 percent were won in set-aside/closed licenses, and 10 percent were won in closed licenses using bidding credits. Adjusting for the value of these licenses, this represents 27 percent of the real dollar value of these licenses. Our results further quantify the negative impact on headline winning bids when won using bidding credits. Increased spectral efficiency appears to be reducing spectrum scarcity as evidenced by its lowering of winning bids. Additionally, auction results confirm that the relative value of higher frequency spectrum is increasing over time

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: ERID working paper ; Number 247
    Subjects: Spectrum; Spectrum Scarcity; Auctions; FCC; Auction Rules; Mobile Applications; Spectral Efficiency; Broadband Speeds; Closed Auctions; Small Bidders; 'The Google Effect'
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen