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Displaying results 1 to 7 of 7.

  1. Auctions vs. negotiations
    the case of favoritism ; conference paper
    Author: Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer s preferences and may collude with... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DSM 13
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    We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer s preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise definition of both mechanisms and show contrary to conventional wisdom that an intransparent negotiation yields a higher buyer surplus than a transparent auction for a range of parameters. In particular, for small expected punishments there exists a lower and an upper bound on the number of sellers such that the negotiation yields a higher buyer surplus with a probability arbitrary close to 1 in the parameter space. Moreover, if the expected punishment is small, the negotiation is always more efficient and generates a higher surplus for the sellers.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79774
    Series: Array ; V1
    Subjects: Corruption; Auctions; Negotiations; Public procurement
    Scope: Online-Ressource (26 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. The doping threshold in sport contests
    Author: Müller, Daniel
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  WWZ, Basel

    We analyze the doping behavior of heterogeneous athletes in an environment of private information. In a n-player strategic game, modeled as an all-pay auction, each athlete has private information about his actual physical ability and choses the... more

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 523 (2013,5)
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    We analyze the doping behavior of heterogeneous athletes in an environment of private information. In a n-player strategic game, modeled as an all-pay auction, each athlete has private information about his actual physical ability and choses the amount of performance-enhancing drugs. The use of doping substances is costly but not further regulated. The main finding of the analysis is the existence of a doping threshold. In our leading case only strong athletes dope. The level of the doping threshold is increasing in the doping costs and decreasing in the prize level. Furthermore, increasing the number of athletes affects the doping decision in two ways. More competition increases the incentives to dope for strong athletes. At the same time, we find a discouragement effect for weak athletes.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/123449
    Series: WWZ discussion paper ; 2013,05
    Subjects: Drogenkonsum; Arzneimittel; Profisport; Asymmetrische Information; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Theorie; Auctions; Contests; Doping; Heterogeneity; Private Information
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 25 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. Price effects of sovereign debt auctions in the Euro-zone
    the role of the crisis
    Published: 2013

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/87231
    Series: Array ; 2013,150
    Subjects: Public debt; Auctions; Yield movements; Euro-zone; Crisis; Italy; Germany; Event study; Primary dealers; Bid-to-cover ratio.
    Scope: Online-Ressource (40 S.), graph. Darst.
  4. Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
    Author: Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (403)
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    If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of pooling equilibria. If one eliminates belief systems that violate the "intuitive criterion", one obtains a unique equilibrium reserve price equal to the seller's own valuation. Paradoxically, even if bidders initially believe that the auctioneer is bound by his reserve almost with certainty, commitment has no value.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93904
    Series: Discussion paper / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; 403
    Subjects: Auctions; signalling; mechanism design
    Scope: Online-Ressource (12 S., 1,80 MB), graph. Darst.
  5. Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion?
    evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power
    Author: Heim, Sven; Goetz, Georg
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZEW, Mannheim

    We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an... more

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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 15 (2013,35)
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    We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal suppliers and inelastic demand. The price increase can be traced back to an abuse of the auction’s pay-as-bid mechanism by the two largest firms. In contrast to theoretical findings, we show that pay-as-bid auctions do not necessarily reduce incentives for strategic capacity withholding and collusive behavior, but can even increase them.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/74798
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; 13-035
    Subjects: Auctions; Collusion; Market Power; Energy Markets; Reserve Power; Balancing Power
    Scope: Online-Ressource (24, [3] S.), graph. Darst.
  6. Complements and substitutes in sequential auctions
    the case of water auctions
    Author: Donna, Javier; Espin-Sanchez, Jose-Antonio
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern Univ., Evanston, Ill.

    We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are complements or substitutes. A sequential English auction model determines the estimating structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by paying... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 74 (125)
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    We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are complements or substitutes. A sequential English auction model determines the estimating structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit, thus deterring others from bidding on subsequent units. When units are substitutes, different bidders win the units with positive probability, paying prices similar in magnitude, even when the same bidder wins all units. We recover individual demand consistent with this stark pattern of outcomes and confirm it is not collusive, but consistent with non-cooperative behavior. Demand estimates are biased if one ignores these features.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/92474
    Edition: First version: December 10, 2010, This version: December 6, 2013
    Series: CSIO working paper ; 0125
    Subjects: Auctions; Structural Demand Estimation; Market Structure; Competition; Collusion
    Scope: Online-Ressource (50 + A-62 S.), Ill., graph. Darst.
  7. Auctioning vs. grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information
    Author: Alvarez González, Francisco; André, Francisco J.
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano

    We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit,... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 125 (2013,98)
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    We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information. At the auction each firm anticipates his role in the secondary market, which affects the firms' valuation of the permits (that are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it would occur in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms' costs are asymmetric enough, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and uncertainty about the marginal costs is large enough. If market power spills over the auction, the latter is always less cost-effective than grandfathering. One central policy implication is that the specific design of the auction turns out to be crucial for cost-effectiveness. The chances of the auction to outperform grandfathering require that the former is capable of diluting the market power that is present in the secondary market.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/89576
    Series: Array ; 98.2013
    Subjects: Cap-and-Trade Systems; Auctions; Grandfathering; Market Power; Bayesian Games of Incomplete Information
    Scope: Online-Ressource (43 S.), graph. Darst.