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Displaying results 1 to 5 of 5.

  1. Security bid auctions for agency contracts
    Author: Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. 'Steeper' securities are better surplus... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (371)
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    A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. 'Steeper' securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the two highest valuations, yet reduce effort incentives. In view of this trade-off, the generalized equity auction that includes a (possibly negative) cash reward to the winner tends to outperform all other auctions, although it cannot extract the entire surplus implement efficient effort. Hence, profit sharing emerges without risk aversion or limited liability.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/94033
    Series: Discussion paper / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; 371
    Subjects: Erfolgsbeteiligung; Aktienoption; Auktionstheorie; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Leistungsanreiz; Theorie; Auctions; agency problems; licensing; innovation; mechanism design
    Scope: Online-Ressource (14 S., 363,67 KB), graph. Darst.
  2. Identification in auctions with selective entry
    Author: Gentry, Matthew; Li, Tong
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, London

    This paper considers nonparametric identification of a two-stage entry and bidding model for auctions which we call the Affiliated-Signal (AS) model. This model assumes that potential bidders have private values, observe imperfect signals of their... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 243 (2012,38)
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    This paper considers nonparametric identification of a two-stage entry and bidding model for auctions which we call the Affiliated-Signal (AS) model. This model assumes that potential bidders have private values, observe imperfect signals of their true values prior to entry, and choose whether to undertake a costly entry process. The AS model is a theoretically appealing candidate for the structural analysis of auctions with entry: it accommodates a wide range of entry processes, in particular nesting the Levin and Smith (1994) and Samuelson (1985) models as special cases. To date, however, the model's identification properties have not been well understood. We establish identification results for the general AS model, using variation in factors affecting entry behavior (such as potential competition or entry costs) to construct identified bounds on model fundamentals. If available entry variation is continuous, the AS model may be point identified; otherwise, it will be partially identified. We derive constructive identification results in both cases, which can readily be refined to produce the sharp identified set. We also consider policy analysis in environments where only partial identification is possible, and derive identified bounds on expected seller revenue corresponding to a wide range of counterfactual policies while accounting for endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. Finally, we establish that our core results extend to environments with asymmetric bidders and nonseperable auction-level unobserved heterogeneity.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79510
    Edition: This version: November 2012
    Series: Cemmap working paper / Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice ; 38/12
    Subjects: Auctions; endogenous participation; identification
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 69 S., 954 KB)
  3. Auctions for private congestible infrastructures
    Author: Berg, Vincent A. C. van den
    Published: 2012

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/87359
    Series: Array ; 2012,087
    Subjects: Verkehrsinfrastruktur; Privatisierung; Auktion; Maut; Auktionstheorie; Theorie; Private supply; Congestible facilities; Auctions; Serial facilities; Parallel facilities; Imperfect substitutes
    Scope: Online-Ressource (25 S.)
  4. License auctions with exit (and entry) options
    alternative remedies for the exposure problem
    Author: Hu, Luke; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the entrant values only the bundle of several units (synergy), incumbents are subject to non-increasing demand. The seller proactively... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (394)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the entrant values only the bundle of several units (synergy), incumbents are subject to non-increasing demand. The seller proactively encourages entry and restricts incumbent bidders. In this framework, an English clock auction gives rise to an exposure problem that distorts efficiency and impairs revenue. We consider three remedies: a (constrained) Vickrey package auction, an English clock auction with exit option that allows the entrant to annul his bid, and an English clock auction with exit and entry option that lifts the bidding restriction if entry failed.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/94172
    Series: Discussion paper / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; 394
    Subjects: Auctions; package auctions; combinatorial clock auctions; spectrum auction; bundling; synergies
    Scope: Online-Ressource (15 S., 951,33 KB)
  5. Fuzzy price-quality ratio procurement under incomplete information
    Author: Giebe, Thomas; Schweinzer, Paul
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Dep. of Economics and Related Studies, Univ. of York, York

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Keine Speicherung
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion papers in economics ; 2012,26
    Subjects: Auctions; Contests; Procurement
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 18 S., 269 KB), graph. Darst.