Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Narrow Search
Search narrowed by
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 2 of 2.

  1. All-pay aspects of decision making under public scrutiny
    Author: Giebe, Thomas; Schweinzer, Paul
    Published: 2011
    Publisher:  Dep. of Economics and Related Studies, Univ. of York, York

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Speicherung
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion papers in economics ; 2011,27
    Subjects: Auctions; Contests; Regulation; Conflict
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 11 S., 202 KB)
  2. Efficient Mechanisms for Access to Storage with Imperfect Competition in Gas Markets
    Author: Cavaliere, Alberto; Giust, Valentina; Maggi, Mario
    Published: 2011
    Publisher:  University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods, Pavia

    Scarce storage capacity and distortions in access to gas storage are considered causes of market foreclosure in liberalized gas markets. We consider rules currently adopted in Europe for storage rationing and propose efficient rationing mechanism... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 157 (2011,151)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Scarce storage capacity and distortions in access to gas storage are considered causes of market foreclosure in liberalized gas markets. We consider rules currently adopted in Europe for storage rationing and propose efficient rationing mechanism based on the value of storage, when other flexibility inputs are available. Firstly we analyse productive efficiency issues neglecting vertical restraints and strategic behaviour in the final market. Then we assume imperfect compettion in the downstream market for gas supplies, given the avaialbility of storage capacity upstream. We consider effciency issues in a two stage model comparing regulated storage tariffs coupled with a centralizedrationing mechanism with storage auctions. Finally we consider as an optimal mechanism the allocation of storage arising from welfare maximization by a social planner. We find that it is usually optimal to maximize the amount of storage capacity allocated to new entrants in the gas markets. Storage auctions deviates from the optimal mechanism, but still improve efficiency, with respect to current mechanisms, to the extent that they allocate storage according to its value. Furthermore storage allocation appear to be an extremeley powerful mechanism to improve competition and efficiency in gas markets.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/95283
    Series: Quaderni di Dipartimento ; 151
    Subjects: Liberalization; Auctions; Essential Facilities
    Scope: Online-Ressource