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Displaying results 1 to 4 of 4.

  1. Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions
    Author: Roberts, James W.
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: ERID working paper ; 80
    Subjects: Auctions; Unobserved Heterogeneity
    Scope: Online-Ressource (54 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Subsidies, knapsack auctions and Dantzig’s greedy heuristic
    Author: Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u. a.]

    A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (254)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We propose a buying mechanism which can be viewed as a game theoretic extension of Dantzig's greedy heuristic for the classic knapsack problem. We use Monte Carlo simulations to analyse the performance of our mechanism. Finally, we discuss how the mechanism can be applied to award R&D subsidies.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93872
    Series: Discussion paper / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; 254
    Subjects: Beschaffung; Auktionstheorie; Ganzzahlige Optimierung; Spieltheorie; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie; Theorie; Forschungsfinanzierung; KMU; Monte-Carlo-Simulation; Deutschland; Auctions; Subsidies; Market Design; Knapsack Problem
    Scope: Online-Ressource ([2], 8 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. Signal-jamming in a sequential auction
    Author: Ding, Weili; Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u. a.]

    In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (261)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/94064
    Series: Discussion paper / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; 261
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Extensives Spiel; Preiswettbewerb; Signalling; Dynamisches Gleichgewicht; Theorie; Auctions; Signaling; Price Competition
    Scope: Online-Ressource (7 S.), graph. Darst.
  4. Why do sellers (usually) prefer auctions?
    Author: Bulow, Jeremy; Klemperer, Paul
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (7411)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 7411
    Subjects: Verkauf; Wertpapier; Investitionsgüter; Auktion; Gewinn; Theorie
    Other subjects: Auctions; Selling
    Scope: 43 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen