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Displaying results 1 to 4 of 4.

  1. Mixed bundling auctions
    Author: Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny
    Published: 2006
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (5566)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 5566
    Subjects: Auktion; Auktionstheorie; Leistungsbündel; Gewinn; Theorie; Auctions
    Scope: 25 S.
  2. Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
    Author: Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Published: 2006
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlisting is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore whether the procurer... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (166)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlisting is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore whether the procurer should reimburse the nonrecoverable cost of preparing a bid in whole or in part. We find that a reimbursement policy is profitable for the procurer only if performance and bidding costs are negatively correlated. Moreover, negative rebates (entry fees) always dominate positive rebates.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93797
    Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 166
    Subjects: Procurement; Auctions; Entry
    Scope: Online-Ressource (7 S.)
  3. License auctions with royalty contracts for losers
    Author: Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Published: 2006
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers of... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (96)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers of the auction the option to sign a royalty contract. The optimal new mechanism eliminates the losses from exclusionary licensing without reducing bidders' surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than both standard license auctions and pure royalty licensing. We also take into account that the number of licenses must be an integer, which is typically ignored in the literature.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93941
    Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 96
    Subjects: Patents; Licensing; Auctions; Royalty; Innovation; R&D; Mechanism Design
    Scope: Online-Ressource ([3], 13 S.)
  4. On seller estimates and buyer returns
    Author: Gershkov, Alex; Toxvaerd, Flavio
    Published: 2006
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    This paper revisits recent empirical research on buyer credulity in arts auctions and auctions for assets in general. We show that elementary results in auction theory can fully account for some stylized facts on asset returns that have been held to... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (143)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper revisits recent empirical research on buyer credulity in arts auctions and auctions for assets in general. We show that elementary results in auction theory can fully account for some stylized facts on asset returns that have been held to suggest that sellers of assets can exploit buyers by providing biased estimates of asset values. We argue that, rather than showing that buyers are credulous, the existing evidence can serve as an indirect test of the rationality assumptions underlying auction theory.

     
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93999
    Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 143
    Subjects: Auctions; information disclosure; seller manipulation; buyer credulity
    Scope: Online-Ressource (8 S.), graph. Darst.