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Displaying results 1 to 3 of 3.

  1. Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction
    Author: Bajari, Patrick L.; Fox, Jeremy T.
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (11671)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: NBER working paper series ; 11671
    Subjects: Mobilkommunikation; Lizenz; Auktion; USA; Auctions; Cell phone systems
    Scope: 49 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w11671.pdf - lizenzpflichtig
  2. Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments
    Published: June 2005
    Publisher:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY

    "We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1140 (213)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    "We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors substantially overbid relative to other majors; and those with superior SAT/ACT scores are much less susceptible to the winner's curse, with the primary effect coming from those with below median scores doing worse, as opposed to those with very high scores doing substantially better, and with composite SAT/ACT score being a more reliable predictor than either math or verbal scores by themselves. There are strong selection effects in bid estimates for both inexperienced and experienced subjects that are not identified using standard econometric techniques but rather through our experimental design effects. Ignoring these selection effects is most misleading for inexperienced bidders, as the unbiased estimates of the bid function indicate much faster learning and adjustment to the winner's curse for individual bidders than do the biased estimates"--Federal Reserve Bank of New York web site

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/60705
    Series: Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York ; 213
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Experiment; Auctions; Value
    Notes:

    Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/5/2005

    Includes bibliographical references

    Also available in print
  3. Demand reduction and pre-emptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions
    Author: Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (4899)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 4899
    Subjects: Auktion; Auktionstheorie; Konzession; Nachfrage; Experiment; Auctions; Demand functions (Economic theory)
    Scope: 33, [8] S, graph. Darst