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Displaying results 1 to 25 of 123.

  1. Bidder behavior in repo auctions without minimum bid rate
    evidence from the Bundesbank
    Author: Linzert, Tobias; Nautz, Dieter; Breitung, Jörg
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg, Frankfurt am Main

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QK 630 ; QB 910 ; QK 630
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum (Frankfurt, Main): Discussion paper ; 03,13
    Subjects: Pensionsgeschäft; Wertpapierleihe; Refinanzierung; Auktion; Zins; Erwartungsbildung; Zinspolitik
    Other subjects: (stw)Repo-Geschäft; (stw)Refinanzierung; (stw)Auktion; (stw)Zins; (stw)Erwartungsbildung; (stw)Zinspolitik; (stw)Deutschland; Monetary Policy Instruments; Auctions; Bidder Behavior; Panel Analysis; Online-Publikation; Arbeitspapier; Buch; Graue Literatur; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: Online-Ressource
  2. Common value auctions and the winner's curse
    Author: Kagel, John Henry
    Published: c2002
    Publisher:  Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J

    Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a... more

     

    Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies s

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9780691016672; 9781282158757
    Subjects: Value; Auctions; Paradoxes
    Scope: Online-Ressource (xvi, 401 p.), ill
    Notes:

    Includes bibliographical references and index

    Bidding in common value auctions: a survey of experimental research / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    First-price common value auctions: bidder behavior and the "winner's curse" / John H. Kagel ... [et al.]

    Winner's curse and public information in common value auctions / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad

    Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: a laboratory study / John H. Kagel, Ronald M. Harstad, Dan Levin

    Revenue effects and information processing in English common value auctions / Dan Levin, John H. Kagel, Jean-François Richard

    Common value auctions with insider information / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? / Colin Campbell, Dan Levin

    Second-price auctions with asymmetric payoffs: an experimental investigation / Christopher Avery, John H. Kagel

    Learning in common value auctions: some initial observations / Susan Garvin, John H. Kagel

    Cross-game learning: experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions / John H. Kagel

    Comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: a laboratory analysis / Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    Bidding in common value auctions: how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse / Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel.

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  3. The role of domain restrictions in mechanism design
    ex post incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency
    Author: Barberà, Salvador; Berga Colom, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo
    Published: March 2018
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1024
    Subjects: Mechanisms; Interdependent Types; Ex Post Incentive Compatibility; Strategy Proofness; Pareto Efficiency; Preference Functions; Jury Decisions; Allocation Problems; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Putting auction theory to work
    Author: Milgrom, Paul Robert
    Published: 2004
    Publisher:  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

    A comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its applications. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories... more

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    A comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its applications. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
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    ISBN: 0511164173; 0521536723; 0521551846
    RVK Categories: QH 430
    Series: Churchill lectures in economics
    Subjects: Privatization; Auctions
    Scope: Online-Ressource (xxii, 368 p), ill
    Notes:

    Includes bibliographical references (p. 339-346) and indexes

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    Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Table of Contents; Preface; Foreword; CHAPTER ONE: Getting to Work; PART ONE: THE MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH; PART TWO: MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS; Bibliography; Author Index; Subject Index
  5. Experimental auctions
    methods and applications in economic and marketing research
    Author: Lusk, Jayson
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    A comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions more

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    A comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
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    ISBN: 0521855160; 0521671248; 9781139134279; 9781283329767; 9780521855167; 9780521671248
    RVK Categories: QC 110 ; QH 430
    Series: Quantitative methods for applied economics and business research
    Subjects: Auctions; Consumers' preferences
    Scope: Online-Ressource (xii, 304 p), ill, 26 cm
    Notes:

    Includes bibliographical references (p. 279-296) and index

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    Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Acknowledgments; Contents; Figures; Tables; 1 Introduction; 2 Incentive compatible auctions: theory and evidence; 3 Value theory; 4 Conducting experimental auctions: some preliminaries; 5 Conducting experimental auctions; 6 Data analysis; 7 Valuation case studies; 8 Auction design: case studies; 9 Validity of experimental auctions; 10 The future of experimental auctions; References; Index
  6. Do better informed investors always do better?
    a buyback puzzle
    Author: Boyle, Glenn W.; Ward, Gerald
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: Revision
    Series: Working paper / Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business, University of Canterbury ; no. 2018, 6
    Subjects: Auctions; racehorses; buybacks
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten)
  7. Ambiguity, cognitive reflection, and strategic complexity across auctions
    Author: Deck, Cary A.; Paan Jindapon; Melkonyan, Tigran A.; Schneider, Mark
    Published: 3-5-2024
    Publisher:  Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, [Orange, CA]

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    Series: ESI working papers ; 24, 04
    Subjects: Ambiguity; Ambiguity Attitude; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 75 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Collusion in repeated auctions with costless communication
    Author: Pinheiro, Roberto B.
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, [Cleveland, OH]

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    Series: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland working paper series ; no. 24, 21 (October 2024)
    Subjects: Collusion; Auctions; Cheap Talk Communication; Repeated Games
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism
    Author: Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Eicke, Anselm; Hirth, Lion; Ocker, Fabian; Ott, Marion; Schlecht, Ingmar; Wang, Runxi
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called... more

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    This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible consumers with a market-based approach. We conduct a game-theoretical analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism. Our analysis reveals that despite its intention, the capacity-based redispatch is prone to undesirable behavior of market participants. The reason is that the availability payment incentivizes participants to change their energy consumption (generation) behavior. However, this also applies to undesired participants who increase the redispatch requirement through participation. Under certain assumptions, the additional redispatch potential equals the additional redispatch demand it creates. Consequently, the mechanism does not resolve network constraints, while causing costs for the compensation payments. Furthermore, we study three alternative implementation options, none of which resolves the underlying problem. It follows from our analysis that a mechanism can only be promising if it is capable to distinguish between the potential participants to exclude the undesirable ones.

     
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    hdl: 10419/298003
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 24, 025 (05/2024)
    Subjects: Energy market; Congestion management; Capacity-based redispatch; Game theory; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Competing models of the Bank of England's liquidity auctions
    truthful bidding is a good approximation
    Author: Grace, Charlotte
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Bank of England, London

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    Series: Staff working paper / Bank of England ; no. 1061 (February 2024)
    Subjects: Auctions; bid shading; central bank liquidity provision; product mix auction
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 95 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments
    Published: June 2005
    Publisher:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY

    "We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors... more

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    "We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors substantially overbid relative to other majors; and those with superior SAT/ACT scores are much less susceptible to the winner's curse, with the primary effect coming from those with below median scores doing worse, as opposed to those with very high scores doing substantially better, and with composite SAT/ACT score being a more reliable predictor than either math or verbal scores by themselves. There are strong selection effects in bid estimates for both inexperienced and experienced subjects that are not identified using standard econometric techniques but rather through our experimental design effects. Ignoring these selection effects is most misleading for inexperienced bidders, as the unbiased estimates of the bid function indicate much faster learning and adjustment to the winner's curse for individual bidders than do the biased estimates"--Federal Reserve Bank of New York web site

     
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    hdl: 10419/60705
    Series: Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York ; 213
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Experiment; Auctions; Value
    Notes:

    Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/5/2005

    Includes bibliographical references

    Also available in print
  12. The evolution of U.S. spectrum values over time
    Author: Connolly, Michelle P.; Sa, Nelson; Zaman, Azeem; Roark, Chris; Trivedi, Akshaya
    Published: February 13, 2018
    Publisher:  Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School, Waltham, MA

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    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School ; 121
    Subjects: Spectrum; Spectrum Scarcity; Auctions; FCC; Auction Rules; Mobile Applications; Spectral Efficiency; Broadband Speeds; Closed Auctions; Small Bidders; “The Google Effect”
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Dealer networks in the world of art
    Author: De Silva, Dakshina G.; Gertsberg, Marina; Kosmopoulou, Georgia; Campbell, Rachel
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Lancaster University Management School, Lancester

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    Series: Economics working paper series ; 2017/025
    Subjects: Auctions; Art Dealers; Networks
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Renegotiation and discrimination in symmetric procurement auctions
    Author: Arozamena, Leandro; Ganuza, Juan José; Weinschelbaum, Federico
    Published: July 2021
    Publisher:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    Series: Economics working paper series ; no. 1790
    Subjects: Auctions; Favoritism; Auction Design; Renegotiation; Corruption
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Anchored strategic reasoning
    Author: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Seres, Gyula
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s... more

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    Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents’ intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes.

     
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    hdl: 10419/256781
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 314 (January 25, 2022)
    Subjects: Anchoring Bias; Auctions; Games; Incomplete Information; Strategy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 11 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Optimal procurement with quality concerns
    Author: Lopomo, Giuseppe; Persico, Nicola; Villa, Alessandro T.
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, [Chicago, Illinois]

    Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also lowquality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA which, under some conditions, is the best incentive-compatible mechanism for maximizing either the seller's or the social... more

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    Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also lowquality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA which, under some conditions, is the best incentive-compatible mechanism for maximizing either the seller's or the social surplus in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor (or minimum) price, and a reserve (or maximum) price. Conveniently, the LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild regularity conditions, is unique. We perform a counterfactual experiment on Italian government procurement auctions: we compute the gain that the government could have made, had it used the optimal mechanism (which happens to be a LoLA), relative to a first-price auction, which is the format the government actually used. Finally, we provide software applications for computing the optimal procurement mechanism.

     
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    hdl: 10419/264335
    Series: [Working paper] / Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ; WP 2022, 21 (September 22, 2021)
    Subjects: Procurement Auctions; Auctions; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Consumer Demand with Social Influences
    Evidence from an E-Commerce Platform
    Author: Caoui, El Hadi; Farronato, Chiara; Horton, John J.; Schultz, Robert
    Published: August 2022
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    For some kinds of goods, rarity itself is valued. "Fashionable'" goods are demanded in part because they are unique. In this paper, we explore the economics of rare goods using auctions of limited-edition shoes held by an e-commerce platform. We... more

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    For some kinds of goods, rarity itself is valued. "Fashionable'" goods are demanded in part because they are unique. In this paper, we explore the economics of rare goods using auctions of limited-edition shoes held by an e-commerce platform. We model endogenous entry and bidding in multi-unit auctions and construct demand curves from realized bids. We find that doubling inventory reduces willingness to pay by 7-15%. From the producer perspective, ignoring the value of rarity leads to substantial overproduction: auctioned quantities are 82% above the profit-maximizing level. From the consumer perspective however, the negative spillovers of restricting quantity more than offset the benefits of rarer goods

     
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w30351
    Subjects: Konsumentenverhalten; Digitale Plattform; Electronic Commerce; Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse; Auktionstheorie; Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis; Auctions; Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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  18. Information Spillovers and Sovereign Debt
    Theory Meets the Eurozone Crisis
    Author: Cole, Harold L.; Neuhann, Daniel; Ordoñez, Guillermo
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We develop a theory of information spillovers in sovereign bond markets in which investors can acquire information about default risk before trading in primary and secondary markets. If primary markets are structured as multi-unit... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    We develop a theory of information spillovers in sovereign bond markets in which investors can acquire information about default risk before trading in primary and secondary markets. If primary markets are structured as multi-unit discriminatory-price auctions, an endogenous winner's curse leads to strategic complementarities in information acquisition. As a result, shocks to default risk in one country may trigger crisis episodes with widespread information acquisition, sharp increases in the level and volatility of yields in risky countries, falling yields in safe countries, endogenous market segmentation, and arbitrage profits between primary and secondary markets. These predictions are consistent with the behavior of primary and secondary market yields, market segmentation, and measures of information acquisition during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis

     
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w30216
    Subjects: Kreditrisiko; Internationale Staatsschulden; Spillover-Effekt; Öffentliche Anleihe; Öffentliche Schulden; Eurozone; Auctions; Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook; International Lending and Debt Problems; International Financial Markets
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  19. Screening Adaptive Cartels
    Author: Ortner, Juan M.; Chassang, Sylvain; Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of asymptotically safe tests, i.e. tests that are passed with probability approaching one by competitive firms, regardless of the underlying economic environment. Our main result establishes that screening for collusion with safe tests is a robust improvement over laissez-faire. Safe tests do not create new collusive equilibria, and do not hurt competitive industries. In addition, safe tests can have strict bite, including unraveling all collusive equilibria in some settings. We provide evidence that cartel adaptation to regulatory oversight is a real concern

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w30219
    Subjects: Kartell; Regulierung; Kartellrecht; Signalling; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Auktionstheorie; Econometrics of Games and Auctions; Noncooperative Games; Auctions; Procurement; Antitrust Issues and Policies
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  20. Auction design with data-driven misspecifications
    Author: Jehiel, Philippe; Mierendorff, Konrad
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Paris School of Economics, Paris

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Paris School of Economics ; no 2022, 22
    Subjects: Belief Formation; Auctions; Effiency; Analogy-based Expectations
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Multi-objective optimization methods for allocation and prediction
    Author: Ye, Qing Chuan
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Erasmus Institute of Management (ERIM), Rotterdam

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    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789058925398
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 1765/116462
    Series: ERIM PhD series in research in management ; EPS-2019-460-LIS
    Subjects: Auctions; task allocation; fairness; repeated auctions; auction design; machine learning; mathematical model; algorithm
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 188 Seiten), Illustrationen
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    Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2019
  22. Procurement design with loss averse bidders
    Author: Fugger, Nicolas; Gillen, Philippe; Riehm, Tobias
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment... more

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    We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment rule. Secondly, we introduce a simple two-stage mechanism which always leads to a decrease in procurement costs compared to any single-stage auction. Finally we derive the optimal efficient two-stage mechanism.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/211482
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 19, 060 (12/2019)
    Subjects: Auctions; Experiment; Loss aversion; Preferences
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Financial contracts as coordination device
    Author: Le Coq, Chloé; Schwenen, Sebastian
    Published: April 2019
    Publisher:  Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden

    We study the use of financial contracts as bid-coordinating device in multi-unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the "volunteer") is needed to increase the... more

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    We study the use of financial contracts as bid-coordinating device in multi-unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the "volunteer") is needed to increase the market clearing price. Volunteering, however, is costly, as inframarginal suppliers sell their entire capacity whereas the volunteer only sells residual demand. We identify conditions under which signing financial contracts solves this dilemma. We test our framework exploiting data on contract positions by large producers in the New York power market. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we show that the contracting strategy is payoff dominant and provide estimates of the benefits of such strategy.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/204758
    Series: Working paper / Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics ; no. 47
    Subjects: Auctions; Coordination; Volunteer's dilemma; Forwardmarkets
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Central counterparty auctions and loss allocation
    Author: Oleschak, Robert
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  Swiss National Bank, Zurich

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: SNB working papers ; 2019, 6
    Subjects: Central Counterparty; Default Management; Auctions; Recovery
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Market evolution, bidding strategies, and survival of art dealers
    Author: De Silva, Dakshina G.; Gertsberg, Marina; Campbell, Rachel
    Published: [2016]
    Publisher:  Lancaster University Management School, Lancester

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics working paper series ; 2016/017
    Subjects: Auctions; Bidding; Art Dealers; Market Evolution; Common Value
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen