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Displaying results 1 to 14 of 14.

  1. Vertical integration of multiproduct monopolists
    Author: Wang, Hao
    Published: 2021-07-07
    Publisher:  National School of Development, Peking University, [Beijing]

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    Language: English
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    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / China Center for Economic Research ; $lE 2021, 003
    Subjects: Antitrust; Multiproduct; Vertical integration
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 13 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Wettbewerb und Antitrust in Unterhaltungsmärkten
    Author: Budzinski, Oliver; Gänßle, Sophia; Lindstädt-Dreusicke, Nadine
    Published: Januar 2021
    Publisher:  Technische Universität Ilmenau, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ilmenau ; Universitätsbibliothek

    Dieser Beitrag fasst die ökonomischen Besonderheiten von Unterhaltungsmärkten zusammen und legt dabei einen besonderen Fokus auf Digitalisierungseffekte. Dabei werden die Aspekte Erfahrungsgüter und Qualität, Fixkostendegression & Güterheterogenität,... more

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    Dieser Beitrag fasst die ökonomischen Besonderheiten von Unterhaltungsmärkten zusammen und legt dabei einen besonderen Fokus auf Digitalisierungseffekte. Dabei werden die Aspekte Erfahrungsgüter und Qualität, Fixkostendegression & Güterheterogenität, Super-stareffekte, die Rolle (digitaler) Medien, sowie Preis- und Geschäftsmodelle diskutiert. Ein wesentliches Ergebnis der Betrachtung ist, dass Unterhaltungsmärkte im digitalen Zeitalter anfällig werden für typische Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in digitalen Ökosystemen. Die Autoren unterstreichen diesen Befund mit einer Auswahl an relevanten und aktuellen Wettbewerbsproblemen und -fällen. Dabei zeigt sich, dass (i) die prowettbewerbliche Wirkung der Digitalisierung auf Medienmärkte fragil ist und des aktiven wettbewerbspolitischen Schutzes bedarf, (ii) nicht-horizontale Verflechtungen in digitalen Ökosystemen erhebliche Anreize zu behinderungswettbewerblichen Strategien wie Selbstbevorzugung, Monopolisierung und Raising Rivals Costs mit sich bringen und (iii) bisher funktionierende Abhilfemaßnahmen unter den Rahmenbedingungen digitalisierter Medien- und Unterhaltungsmärkte wohlfahrtssenkende Wirkungen entfalten können. Daher bedarf es einer Modernisierung der Wettbewerbsordnung für die Unterhaltungsindustrien.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/228751
    RVK Categories: QQ 000
    Series: Diskussionspapier / Technische Universität Ilmenau, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre ; Nr. 147
    Subjects: Wettbewerb; Antitrust; Unterhaltungsindustrien; Entertainment; Wettbewerbsordnung; digitale Medienmärkte; Medienökonomik; Kulturökonomik; Streaming; Sport und Medien
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (46 Seiten)
  3. Vertical mergers with input substitution
    double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare
    Author: Moresi, Serge; Schwartz, Marius
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Georgetown University, Department of Economics, Washington, DC

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    Series: Working papers / Georgetown University, Department of Economics ; 21, 03
    Subjects: Vertical Mergers; Foreclosure; Input Substitution; Antitrust
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    A shorter version of this paper is forthcoming in Economics Letters
  4. Fighting collusion
    an implementation theory approach
    Author: Azacis, Helmuts; Vida, Péter
    Published: August 2021
    Publisher:  Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom

    A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the... more

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    A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the competition authority.Assuming that the firms can only report prices and quantities, we characterize what objectives are one-shot and repeatedly implementable.We use this characterization to identify conditions when the competitive output is implementable. We extend the analysis to the cases when a buyer also knows the private information of firms and when the firms can supply hard evidence about their costs.

     
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    hdl: 10419/250343
    Series: Cardiff economics working papers ; no. E2021, 19
    Subjects: Collusion; Antitrust; (Repeated) Implementation; Monotonicity; Price-Quantity Mechanism; Hard Evidence
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Platform annexation
    Author: Athey, Susan; Scott Morton, Fiona
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  SIEPR Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford, CA

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    Series: Working paper / SIEPR Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research ; no. 21, 015 (March, 2021)
    Subjects: Antitrust; platform; merger; monopolization
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten)
  6. Does common ownership influence the financial strategy of the French pharmaceutical firms?
    Author: Estache, Antonio; Kieffer, Christophe
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  ECARES, Brussels, Belgium

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/321968
    Series: ECARES working paper ; 2021, 09
    Subjects: Antitrust; Common Ownership; France; Index funds; Institutional Investors; Financial strategy; Market Power; Pharmaceuticals; Regulation; Shareholding
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Price effects of horizontal mergers: a retrospective on retrospectives
    Author: Stöhr, Annika
    Published: July 2021
    Publisher:  Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics, Ilmenau ; Universitätsbibliothek

    In this comprehensive review of ex-post merger studies price effects of horizontal transactions are evaluated. By combining and further analyzing the results of 52 retrospective studies on 82 mergers or merger-like transactions it can be shown that... more

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    In this comprehensive review of ex-post merger studies price effects of horizontal transactions are evaluated. By combining and further analyzing the results of 52 retrospective studies on 82 mergers or merger-like transactions it can be shown that the industry alone is no strong indication for the direction of price-related merger effects. However, the "size" or "importance" of a transaction as well as market concentration pre-merger and change in concentration due to the transaction seem to have an impact on post-transaction price development.

     
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    Language: English
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    hdl: 10419/245947
    RVK Categories: QR 300 ; QP 450 ; PE 760
    Series: Ilmenau economics discussion papers ; vol. 27, no. 151
    Subjects: Antitrust; Merger Control; Industrial Economics; Retrospective Studies; Ex-Post Studies; Competition Law Enforcement
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (56 Seiten), Diagramme, Illustrationen
  8. How do start-up acquisitions affect the direction of innovation?
    Author: Dijk, Esmée; Moraga-González, José Luis; Motchenkova, Evgenia
    Published: 15 July 2021
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP16362
    Subjects: start-ups; Acquisitions; mergers; innovation portfolios; competition policy; Antitrust
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Because of monopolies, income inequality significantly understates economic inequality
    Author: Schmitz, James Andrew
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, MN

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    Series: Working paper / Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis ; no. 777 (March 2021)
    Subjects: Inequality; Well-being; Income inequality; Consumption inequality; Monopoly; Antitrust; Housing crisis; Public education; Credit cards; Repair services; Sabotage
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Autonomous algorithmic collusion: economic research and policy implications
    Author: Assad, Stephanie; Calvano, Emilio; Calzolari, Giacomo; Clark, Robert; Denicolò, Vincenzo; Ershov, Daniel; Johnson, Justin P.; Pastorello, Sergio; Rhodes, Andrew; Xu, Lei; Wildenbeest, Matthijs R.
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1210
    Subjects: Algorithmic Pricing; Antitrust; Competition Policy; Artificial Intelligence; Collusion; Platforms
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. The inner workings of a hub-and-spoke cartel in the automotive fuel industry
    Author: Chaves, Daniel; Duarte, Marco
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Social Science Centre, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada

    We analyze a hub-and-spoke cartel in the Brazilian automotive fuel industry. Using the court documents and detailed data on the supply chain we uncover three mechanisms beyond information sharing used by wholesalers (hub) to help retailers (spokes)... more

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    We analyze a hub-and-spoke cartel in the Brazilian automotive fuel industry. Using the court documents and detailed data on the supply chain we uncover three mechanisms beyond information sharing used by wholesalers (hub) to help retailers (spokes) solve the obstacles of price coordination: vertical transfers across asymmetric spokes; subsidies during punishment; and cost stabilization. We argue that wholesalers benefited from the cartel by being the exclusive supplier during the scheme. We use the synthetic control approach to quantify how successful the cartel was in increasing markups. We find that not only retailers, but wholesalers benefited from the cartel.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    hdl: 10419/261277
    Series: Department of Economics research report series ; # 2021, 6 (December 2021)
    Subjects: Antitrust; Hub-and-Spoke Collusion; Vertical Restraints
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Paying off the competition
    market power and innovation incentives
    Author: Li, Xuelin; Lo, Andrew W.; Thakor, Richard T.
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  MIT Sloan School of Management, [Cambridge, MA]

    How does a firm’s market power in existing products affect its incentives to innovate? We explore this fundamental question using granular project-level and firm-level data from the pharmaceutical industry, focusing on a particular mechanism through... more

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    How does a firm’s market power in existing products affect its incentives to innovate? We explore this fundamental question using granular project-level and firm-level data from the pharmaceutical industry, focusing on a particular mechanism through which incumbent firms maintain their market power: “reverse payment” or “pay-for-delay” agreements to delay the market entry of competitors. We first show that when firms are unfettered in their use of “pay-for-delay” agreements, they reduce their innovation activities in response to the potential entry of direct competitors. We then examine a legal ruling that subjected these agreements to antitrust litigation, thereby reducing the incentive to enter them. After the ruling, incumbent firms increased their net innovation activities in response to competitive entry. These effects center on firms with products that are more directly affected by competition. However, at the product therapeutic area level, we find a reduction in innovation by new entrants after the ruling in response to increased competition. Overall, these results are consistent with firms having reduced incentives to innovate when they are able to maintain their market power, highlighting a specific channel through which this occurs

     
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    Edition: This Draft: 19 June 2021
    Series: MIT Sloan School working paper ; 6040 (19)
    Subjects: Drug Development; Pharmaceutical Industry; Monopoly; Antitrust; Market Power; Competition; Innovation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Bork's hoax
    antitrust and the internet market
    Author: Alleman, James H.
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  International Telecommunications Society, Online

    Robert Bork's Antitrust Paradox (1978) has been justification for lack of antitrust behavior for over four decades. His test essentially asks if consumers are harmed by the pricing practices of the firm in the market in which they purchase the good... more

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    Robert Bork's Antitrust Paradox (1978) has been justification for lack of antitrust behavior for over four decades. His test essentially asks if consumers are harmed by the pricing practices of the firm in the market in which they purchase the good or service. Even if these firms are monopoly or oligopolies in their fields with huge economic rents, if they pass this test, no action is taken against them. "Bigness is not bad." This narrow view, inter alia, ignores two- and multisided markets (MSM) where the appearance of "no harm" is addressed to only one side of the market. The correct view is to examine all the markets impacting potential harm to consumers. It illustrates the harm which is "free" to the users, but advertisers pay dearly for the ability to micro-focus on potential consumers of their products. Facebook and Google are used as examples. This advertising cost is added into the sales price of the product, resulting in consumers being harmed by the embedded advertising costs in the products or services purchased. We argue here, using Bork's own criterion - except to expand it to the other side of the market and eliminating producer's surplus - that much needed antitrust action has been ignored by this narrow criterion. This analysis indicates that antitrust action is long overdue after considering two-sided markets. In addition, we argue that his "consumer welfare" criterion is misleading and liable to deceive, thus the hoax. The Bork critique is a hoax in two ways: Bork's analysis does not include the other side of the market. The cost of advertising has to be included in the price of the products being sold in order for the firm to remain in business. So, clearly, the price of goods and services is increased by the cost of advertising, thus reducing consumers' surplus. The second flaw is Bork's definition of "consumer welfare" - it includes the economic rents of the firm - all at a cost to consumers. Enhancing the wealth (profits) of corporations in the name of efficiency was not the purpose of the antitrust laws. We address the Bork Paradox on its own terms by examining the second side of the market which harms consumers indirectly by increasing the price of the products and services they purchase. Using the corrected Bork metric - both sides of the market and no producer's surplus - the estimated loss of consumers' welfare in $60.4 and $43.7 billion respectively from Google and Facebook, respectively.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/238003
    Series: Digital societies and industrial transformations : policies, markets, and technologies in a post-Covid world : 23rd biennial conference
    Subjects: Advertising; Antitrust; Bork; competition; consumers’ surplus; digital markets,Information and Communications Technology (ICT); internet; platform economics; monopoly,regulation; two-sided/multisided markets
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 17 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Reflective willingness to pay
    preferences for sustainable consumption in a consumer welfare analysis
    Author: Inderst, Roman; Thomas, Stefan
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  [Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance, House of Finance, Goethe University], [Frankfurt am Main, Germany]

    Our starting point is the following simple but potentially underappreciated observation: When assessing willingness to pay (WTP) for hedonic features of a product, the results of such measurement are influenced by the context in which the consumer... more

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    Our starting point is the following simple but potentially underappreciated observation: When assessing willingness to pay (WTP) for hedonic features of a product, the results of such measurement are influenced by the context in which the consumer makes her real or hypothetical choice or in which the questions to which she replies are set (such as in a contingent valuation analysis). This observation is of particular relevance when WTP regards sustainability, the "non-use value" of which does not derive from a direct (physical) sensation and where perceived benefits depend heavily on available information and deliberations. The recognition of such context sensitivity paves the way for a broader conception of consumer welfare (CW), and our proposed standard of "reflective WTP" may materially change the scope for private market initiatives with regards to sustainability, while keeping the analytical framework within the realm of the CW paradigm. In terms of practical implications, we argue, for instance, that actual purchasing decisions may prove insufficient to measure consumer appreciation of sustainability, as they may rather echo learnt but unreflected heuristics and may be subject to the specific shopping context, such as heavy price promotions. Also, while it may reflect current social norm, the latter may change considerably over time as more consumers adopt their behavior.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/244694
    Edition: Version: 05 July 2021
    Series: LawFin working paper ; [no. 14]
    Subjects: Konsumentenverhalten; Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse; Nachhaltiger Konsum; Soziale Norm; Präferenztheorie; Antitrust; Consumer Welfare; Sustainability
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten)