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Displaying results 1 to 8 of 8.

  1. Falling interest rates and credit misallocation
    lessons from general equilibrium
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: Updated version: November 2021
    Series: Economics working paper series ; no. 1784
    Subjects: Allgemeines Gleichgewicht; Kapitalbedarf; Zins; Allokation; Kreditmarkt; Wirkungsanalyse; Investitionsentscheidung; Theorie
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Constrained-Efficient Capital Reallocation
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We analyze the constrained-efficient allocation in an equilibrium model of investment and capital reallocation with heterogeneous firms facing collateral constraints. The model features two types of pecuniary externalities: collateral externalities,... more

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    We analyze the constrained-efficient allocation in an equilibrium model of investment and capital reallocation with heterogeneous firms facing collateral constraints. The model features two types of pecuniary externalities: collateral externalities, because the resale price of capital affects firms' ability to borrow, and distributive externalities, because buyers of old capital are more financially constrained than sellers, consistent with empirical evidence. We show analytically and quantitatively that the equilibrium price of old capital is inefficiently high in general, because the distributive pecuniary externality exceeds the collateral externality, by a factor of two in the calibrated model. New investment generates a positive aggregate externality by reducing the future price of old capital, fostering reallocation toward more constrained firms. The constrained-efficient allocation induces a consumption-equivalent welfare gain of 5% compared to the competitive equilibrium, and can be implemented with subsidies on new capital and taxes on old capital

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w28384
    Subjects: Allokation; Allokationseffizienz; Kapitalmobilität
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

  3. Intrahousehold resource allocation and individual poverty: assessing collective model predictions against direct evidence on sharing
    Published: May 2021
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Welfare analyses conducted by policy practitioners around the world usually rely on equivalized or per-capita expenditures and ignore the extent of within-household inequality. Recent advances in the estimation of collective models suggest ways to... more

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    Welfare analyses conducted by policy practitioners around the world usually rely on equivalized or per-capita expenditures and ignore the extent of within-household inequality. Recent advances in the estimation of collective models suggest ways to retrieve the complete sharing process within families using homogeneity assumptions (typically preferences stability upon exclusive goods across individuals or household types) and the observation of exclusive goods. So far, the prediction of these models has not been validated, essentially because intrahousehold allocation is seldom observed. We provide such a validation by leveraging a unique dataset from Bangladesh, which contains information on the fully individualized expenditures of each family member. We also test the core assumption (efficiency) and homogeneity assumptions used for identification. It turns out that the collective model predicts individual resources reasonably well when using clothing, i.e., one of the rare goods commonly assignable to male, female and children in standard expenditure surveys. It also allows identifying poor individuals in non-poor households while the traditional approach understates poverty among the poorest individuals.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/236437
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14406
    Subjects: Armut; Allokation; Haushaltsökonomik; Wohlfahrtsökonomik; Bangladesch; collective model; Engel Curves; Rothbarth Method; sharing rule
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Priorities in budgetary allocations for health during the Fourteenth Finance Commission
    evidence from five states
    Published: February 2021
    Publisher:  Institute of Economic Growth, University of Delhi, Delhi, India

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: IEG working paper ; no. 419
    Subjects: Gesundheitsfinanzierung; Allokation; Gesundheitswesen; Vergleich; Bihar; Himachal Pradesh; Tamil Nadu; West Bengal; Uttar Pradesh; Indien
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten)
  5. Large mechanism design with Moment-based allocation externality
    Published: August 2021
    Publisher:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    VS 330
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1241
    Subjects: Allokation; Externer Effekt; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, Palaiseau, France

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    VS 647
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / Center for Research in Economics and Statistics ; no. 2021, 11 (July 2021)
    Subjects: Matching; Marktmechanismus; Allokation; Allokationseffizienz
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten)
  7. Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Goods and services---public housing, medical appointments, schools---are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We characterize optimal allocation rules when individual preferences are known... more

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Goods and services---public housing, medical appointments, schools---are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We characterize optimal allocation rules when individual preferences are known and when they are not. Several insights emerge. First-best allocations may involve assigning some agents "lotteries" between high- and low-ranked goods. When preference intensities are private information, second-best allocations always involve such lotteries and, crucially, may coincide with first-best allocations. Furthermore, second-best allocations may entail disposal of services. We discuss a market-based alternative and show how it differs

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w29208
    Subjects: Allokation; Präferenztheorie; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie; Verhandlungstheorie; Theorie
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

  8. Per Algorithmus zum Kitaplatz?
    Potenziale und Erfolgsfaktoren für eine bessere Kitaplatzvergabe mithilfe von algorithmischen Systemen
    Published: Juni 2021
    Publisher:  Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Subjects: Kinderbetreuung; Kinderbetreuungseinrichtung; Allokation; Matching; Algorithmus; Software; Deutschland
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen