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Displaying results 1 to 8 of 8.

  1. Knowledge management as second level management
    evidence from a survey
    Author: Wilkesmann, Uwe; Virgillito, Alfredo; Wilkesmann, Maximiliane
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  Technische Univ., Zentrum für Weiterbildung, Dortmund

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    C 261069
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: AL 51801 ; ST 515
    Series: Discussion papers des Zentrums für Weiterbildung, Universität Dortmund ; Nr. 2009,01
    Subjects: Wissenstransfer; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Wissensmanagement; Soziales Netzwerk; Unternehmensnetzwerk; Motivation; Schätzung; Ärzte; Krankenhaus; Nordrhein-Westfalen
    Other subjects: Agency Theory; Business Network; Krankenhaus; Motivation; Nordrhein-Westfalen; Schätzung; Soziales Netzwerk; Wissensmanagement; Wissenstransfer; Ärzte
    Scope: 26 Bl., 30 cm
  2. Optimal degree of remote work
    Author: Bertram, Justus; Ruhnke, Carsten S.; Schöndube, Jens Robert
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  [Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Leibniz Universität Hannover], [Hannover]

    As a new work style remote work has become an increasingly important factor for firms and their employees. Employees potentially benefit from a higher flexibility when working remotely. Firms can make use of this non-financial benefit to increase... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    Location:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 8
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    As a new work style remote work has become an increasingly important factor for firms and their employees. Employees potentially benefit from a higher flexibility when working remotely. Firms can make use of this non-financial benefit to increase their attractiveness on the job market and to substitute financial wage payments to the employees. However, working remotely offers chances for the employees to engage in unproductive activities at the cost of productive working time. Hence, firms need to trade off the benefits against the costs in order to decide which degree of remote work is optimal. We use an agency model to examine the optimal degree of remote work and its interaction with the optimal incentive rate. Higher uncertainty in the productive outcome or higher risk aversion of the employee leads to both a lower degree of remote work and a lower incentive rate, while the effect of the employee's productivity on the degree of remote work is ambiguous. If pay-performance sensitivity is sufficiently high, an increase in the employee's productivity leads to a decrease in the degree of remote work, whereas it is the other way around for a low pay-performance sensitivity. In addition, we find that the optimal degree of remote work increases in the employee's preferred degree of remote work. While in the first-best solution the optimal degree of remote work is always higher than the preferred degree, in the second-best solution it can be higher or lower.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/296568
    Series: [Hannover economic papers (HEP)] / [Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Leibniz Universität Hannover] ; [Nummer: 718 (Mar 2024)]
    Subjects: Remote Work; New Work Style; Agency Theory; Multi-Task Problem
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Are managers more Machiavellian than other employees?
    Author: Baktash, Mehrzad B.; Jirjahn, Uwe
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Global Labor Organization (GLO), Essen

    Concerns about corporate scandals and abusive leadership suggest that individuals with an opportunistic and manipulative personality take advantage of incomplete incentive and control systems to get their way into managerial positions. Against this... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 565
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Concerns about corporate scandals and abusive leadership suggest that individuals with an opportunistic and manipulative personality take advantage of incomplete incentive and control systems to get their way into managerial positions. Against this background, we examine whether there is an association between Machiavellianism and occupying a managerial position. We suggest how to incorporate the psychological concept of Machiavellianism into agency theory and hypothesize that individuals scoring high on Machiavellianism are more likely to attain and keep a managerial position. Using a large and representative panel dataset from Germany, our empirical analysis confirms a strong and positive relationship between Machiavellianism and occupying a managerial position. This result holds in various robustness checks and in instrumental variable estimations accounting for possible endogeneity. Furthermore, our analysis provides evidence that the relationship is monotone; i.e., those with the highest scores of Machiavellianism are most likely to be managers. It also suggests that the direction of influence runs from Machiavellianism to occupational status and not vice versa.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/273675
    Series: GLO discussion paper ; no. 1317
    Subjects: Machiavellianism; Dark Triad; Managers; Agency Theory; Occupational Sorting
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten)
  4. Are managers more Machiavellian than other employees?
    Author: Baktash, Mehrzad B.; Jirjahn, Uwe
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Universität Trier, Trier

    Concerns about corporate scandals and abusive leadership suggest that individuals with an opportunistic and manipulative personality take advantage of incomplete incentive and control systems to get their way into managerial positions. Against this... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 434
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Concerns about corporate scandals and abusive leadership suggest that individuals with an opportunistic and manipulative personality take advantage of incomplete incentive and control systems to get their way into managerial positions. Against this background, we examine whether there is an association between Machiavellianism and occupying a managerial position. We suggest how to incorporate the psychological concept of Machiavellianism into agency theory and hypothesize that individuals scoring high on Machiavellianism are more likely to attain and keep a managerial position. Using a large and representative panel dataset from Germany, our empirical analysis confirms a strong and positive relationship between Machiavellianism and occupying a managerial position. This result holds in various robustness checks and in instrumental variable estimations accounting for possible endogeneity. Furthermore, our analysis provides evidence that the relationship is monotone; i.e., those with the highest scores of Machiavellianism are most likely to be managers. It also suggests that the direction of influence runs from Machiavellianism to occupational status and not vice versa.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283371
    Series: Research papers in economics ; no. 23, 7
    Subjects: Machiavellianism; Dark Triad; Managers; Agency Theory; Occupational Sorting
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten)
  5. Knowledge management as second level management
    evidence from a survey
    Author: Wilkesmann, Uwe; Virgillito, Alfredo; Wilkesmann, Maximiliane
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  Zentrum für Weiterbildung, Dortmund

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  6. Knowledge management as second level management
    Evidence from a survey
    Author: Virgillito, Alfredo; Wilkesmann, Maximiliane; Wilkesmann, Uwe
    Published: 2010
    Publisher:  Universitätsbibliothek Dortmund, Dortmund

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  7. Earnings management and internal control in bank-dominated corporate governance
    evidence from Japan
    Author: Sakawa, Hideaki; Watanabel, Naoki
    Published: Sept. 17, 2018
    Publisher:  Columbia Business School, Center on Japanese Economy and Business, New York

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 326
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    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / Columbia Business School, Center on Japanese Economy and Business ; no. 366
    Subjects: Auditing; Japan; Agency Theory; Corporate Governance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Governance quality and information asymmetry
    Author: Elbadry, Ahmed; Gounopoulos, Dimitrios; Skinner, Frank S.
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Brunel Univ. West London, Brunel Business School, Uxbridge

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Speicherung
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    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics and finance working paper series / Brunel University West London, Brunel Business School ; 14-12
    Subjects: Corporate Governance Mechanisms; Asymmetric Information; Agency Theory
    Scope: Online-Ressource (37 S.), graph. Darst.