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  1. How do households allocate risk?
    Author: Engel, Christoph; Fedorets, Alexandra; Gorelkina, Olga
    Published: November 2018
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Individuals often have to decide to which degree of risk they want to expose others, or how much risk to accept if their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 62
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Individuals often have to decide to which degree of risk they want to expose others, or how much risk to accept if their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German Socio-Economic Panel with two members from 494 households. Participants have a good estimate of each other's risk preferences, even if not explicitly informed. They do not simply match this preference when deciding on behalf of the other household member, but shy away from exposing others to risk. We model the situation, and we find four distinct types of individuals, and two distinct types of households.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0002-8B3F-C
    hdl: 10419/204696
    Edition: This version: November 25, 2018
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2018, 14
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. How do households allocate risk?
    Author: Engel, Christoph; Fedorets, Alexandra; Gorelkina, Olga
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), DIW Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Individuals often have to decide to which degree of risk they want to expose others, or how much risk to accept if their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 318
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Individuals often have to decide to which degree of risk they want to expose others, or how much risk to accept if their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German Socio-Economic Panel with two members from 494 households. Participants have a good estimate of each other's risk preferences, even if not explicitly informed. They do not simply match this preference when deciding on behalf of the other household member, but shy away from exposing others to risk. We model the situation, and we find four distinct types of individuals, and two distinct types of households.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/191627
    Edition: This version: December 2, 2018
    Series: SOEPpapers on multidisciplinary panel data research ; 1000 (2018)
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The proper scope of behavioral law and economics
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: January 2018
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Behavioral law and economics applies the conceptual tools of behavioral economics to the analysis of legal problems and legal intervention. These models, and the experiments to test them, assume an institution free state of nature. In modern... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 62 (2018,2)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Behavioral law and economics applies the conceptual tools of behavioral economics to the analysis of legal problems and legal intervention. These models, and the experiments to test them, assume an institution free state of nature. In modern societies, the law’s subjects never see this state of nature. However a rich arrangement of informal and formal institutions creates generalized trust. If individuals are sufficiently confident that nothing too bad will happen, they are freed up to interact with strangers as if they were in a state of nature. This willingness dramatically reduces transaction cost and enables division of labor. If generalized trust can be assumed, simple economic models are appropriate. But they must be behavioral, since otherwise individuals would not want to run the risk of interaction.

     
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/174505
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2018, 2
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 15 Seiten)