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  1. Does tax competition drive cooperation in local economic development policies?
    evidence on inter-local business parks in Germany
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics, Marburg

    An increasing number of municipalities cooperates in the field of economic development. In this paper, we focus on a specific instrument in this field, namely the development of joint business parks. We apply a hazard model to data from West-German... more

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    An increasing number of municipalities cooperates in the field of economic development. In this paper, we focus on a specific instrument in this field, namely the development of joint business parks. We apply a hazard model to data from West-German municipalities between 2000 and 2015. We find inter-local business parks to be more frequent among small municipalities and in constellations where suitable land is scarce. Our main focus rests on the role of tax competition. An analogy building on the literature on international tax coordination supports the hypothesis that inter-local business parks are more likely in regions where tax competition is intense. The evidence is affirmative: We find that the likelihood of inter-local business park formation to increase in the intensity of local tax competition.

     

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    hdl: 10419/204801
    Series: Joint discussion paper series in economics ; no. 2019, 06
    Subjects: Inter-local business parks; inter-municipal cooperation; tax competition; hazard model; Germany
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Multi-stage taxation by subnational gGovernments
    welfare effects
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  [Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata], [La Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentinien]

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    Series: Serie documentos de trabajo / Departamento de Economía e Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata ; nro. 111 (septiembre 2017)
    Subjects: Ländersteuer; Steuerwettbewerb; Indirekte Besteuerung; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Theorie; Argentinien; local indirect taxation; multistage taxes; tax competition; welfare taxation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Haupttitel sollte lauten: Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments

  3. Taxing capital and labor when both factors are imperfectly mobile internationally
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques, Paris

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    Series: Working paper / Paris School of Economics ; no 2018, 40
    Subjects: tax competition; globalization; imperfect factor mobility
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Cross-border or online
    tax competition with mobile consumers under destination and origin principle
    Author: Birg, Laura
    Published: March 2019
    Publisher:  Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, cege, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Göttingen

    This paper studies the effect of an online retailer on spatial tax competition with mobile consumers. Under non-cooperative Leviathan governments, tax treatment of online purchases according to the destination principle mitigates tax competition; tax... more

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    This paper studies the effect of an online retailer on spatial tax competition with mobile consumers. Under non-cooperative Leviathan governments, tax treatment of online purchases according to the destination principle mitigates tax competition; tax treatment of online purchases of online purchases according to the origin principle enhances tax competition. Cooperation between government eliminates the potential pro-competitive effect of the online retailer: Under both tax treatments, the online retailer weakens tax competition. For a sufficiently low tax rate in the country hosting the online retailer, welfare in the online retailer's home country is higher under the origin principle, while welfare in the other country is higher under the destination principle. For a sufficiently low tax differential between both countries, global welfare is higher under the destination principle.

     

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    hdl: 10419/194182
    Edition: Revised Version March 2019
    Series: Discussion papers / Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research ; number 265 (November 2015)
    Subjects: tax competition; cross-border shopping; online retailer; destination principle; origin principle
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Kant-Nash tax competition
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    In a two-country economy we analyze how tax competition differs from the standard all-Nashian tax competition, if one or both countries are Kantians in Roemer's sense. Kantians are shown to choose a higher tax rate than Nashians for any given tax... more

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    In a two-country economy we analyze how tax competition differs from the standard all-Nashian tax competition, if one or both countries are Kantians in Roemer's sense. Kantians are shown to choose a higher tax rate than Nashians for any given tax rate of the other country, which indicates that they seek to mitigate the (Nashian) race to the bottom. We avoid dealing with multiple equilibria by assuming that capital is sufficiently scarce, and we find for symmetric countries that the all-Kantian tax competition is efficient and that the inefficient race to the bottom is weakened in economies with a Nashian and a Kantian. That confirms the intuitive idea that countries following the Kantian categorical imperative avoid or at least soften the socially undesirable impact of (Nashian) self-interest. We also investigate the incentives of opportunistic countries to choose Nashian or Kantian behavior out of self-interest and find that either both governments choose to behave as Kantians or that - under different conditions - the robust Nashian selfinterest supersedes Kantian moral principles such that the inefficient all-Nashian tax competition results.

     

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    hdl: 10419/198931
    Series: Array ; no. 7571 (March 2019)
    Subjects: tax competition; best reply; Kantian; Nashian; endogenous behavior selection
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Decentralization with porous borders
    public production in a federation with tax competition and spillovers
    Published: January 2019
    Publisher:  Universität Basel, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Basel, Switzerland

    We analyze the strategic interaction of regional and federal governments using a model that includes fiscal externalities in the form of inter-regional capital tax competition and technical externalities in the form of inter-regional spillovers. The... more

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    We analyze the strategic interaction of regional and federal governments using a model that includes fiscal externalities in the form of inter-regional capital tax competition and technical externalities in the form of inter-regional spillovers. The federal government aims to correct for these inefficiencies using a transfer system. If the regional governments are policy leaders (such that federal policy is set conditional on regional choices), they will internalize both fiscal and technical externalities but free-ride on the transfer system. Efficiency can be achieved by introducing a second transfer scheme that is independent of regional public production. If the federal government sets its policy first and can commit itself to it, the outcome is efficient only if matching grants are used that are financed outside of the transfer system.

     

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    hdl: 10419/207094
    Series: WWZ working paper ; 2019, 03
    Subjects: Fiscal federalism; tax competition; externalities; spillovers; commitment; centralized leadership; decentralized leadership
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Attracting profit shifting or fostering innovation?
    on patent boxes and R&D subsidies
    Published: February 2021
    Publisher:  [University of Oxford, Sai͏̈d Business School, Centre for Business Taxation], [Oxford]

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    Series: Working paper / University of Oxford, Sai͏̈d Business School, Centre for Business Taxation ; 2021, 02
    Subjects: corporate taxation; profit shifting; patent boxes; R&D tax credits; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten)
  8. Taxing mobile and overconfident top earners
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are... more

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    We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are overconfident about the probability of the high state and hence of receiving the bonus, whereas firms and governments are not. When governments maximize tax revenues, we show that overconfidence unambiguously reduces the bonus tax rate that governments set in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium, while increasing tax revenues. When the government objective incorporates the welfare of resident managers, however, bonus taxes also serve a corrective role and may rise in equilibrium when overconfidence is increased.

     

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    hdl: 10419/256785
    Edition: Revised version, February 2022
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 318 (February 14, 2022)
    Subjects: Overconfidence; bonus taxes; tax competition; migration
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. A theory of public goods under complementarity between safety and consumptions
    Published: April 2020
    Publisher:  [CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo], [Tokyo]

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    Series: Array ; CIRJE-F-1150
    Subjects: complementarity; public security; tax competition; efficiency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Taxing mobile and overconfident top earners
    Published: February 2022
    Publisher:  Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka, Japan

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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 11094/86379
    Edition: Revised version, February 2022
    Series: Discussion papers in economics and business ; 21, 26
    Subjects: Overconfidence; bonus taxes; tax competition; migration
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Tax competition and the efficiency of "benefit-related" business taxes
    Published: March 2019
    Publisher:  [University of Oxford, Sai͏̈d Business School, Centre for Business Taxation], [Oxford]

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    Series: Working paper / University of Oxford, Sai͏̈d Business School, Centre for Business Taxation ; 2019, 02
    Subjects: tax competition; public services provided to business; tax on production vs. tax on capital
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten)
  12. Property tax competition
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

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    Series: CEPA discussion papers ; no. 52 (October 2022)
    Subjects: efficiency; property taxes; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (71 Seiten, 11002 KB), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    We develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under three alternative taxa-tion regimes often used in the public finance literature: decentralized taxation, centralized taxation, and “rent seeking” regimes. We show that decentralized taxation results in inefficiently high tax rates, whereas centralized taxation yields a common optimal tax rate, and tax rates in the rent-seeking regime can be either inefficiently high or low. We quantify the effects of switching from the observed tax system to the three regimes for Japan and Germany. The decentralized or rent-seeking regime best describes the Japanese tax system, whereas the centralized regime does so for Germany. We also quantify the welfare effects of regime changes

  13. Property tax competition
    a quantitative assessment
    Published: October 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under three alternative taxation regimes often used in the public finance literature: decentralized taxation, centralized taxation, and "rent seeking" regimes. We show that... more

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    We develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under three alternative taxation regimes often used in the public finance literature: decentralized taxation, centralized taxation, and "rent seeking" regimes. We show that decentralized taxation results in inefficiently high tax rates, whereas centralized taxation yields a common optimal tax rate, and tax rates in the rent-seeking regime can be either inefficiently high or low. We quantify the effects of switching from the observed tax system to the three regimes for Japan and Germany. The decentralized or rent-seeking regime best describes the Japanese tax system, whereas the centralized regime does so for Germany. We also quantify the welfare effects of regime changes.

     

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    hdl: 10419/267235
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 10002 (2022)
    Subjects: property taxes; tax competition; efficiency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Multinational corporations and tax havens
    evidence from country-by-country reporting
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Prague

    A growing body of economics literature shows that multinational corporations (MNCs) shift their profits to tax havens. We contribute to this evidence by comparing a range of available data sets focusing on US MNCs, including country-by-country... more

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    A growing body of economics literature shows that multinational corporations (MNCs) shift their profits to tax havens. We contribute to this evidence by comparing a range of available data sets focusing on US MNCs, including country-by-country reporting data which has been released in December 2018 for the first time. With each of the datasets, we analyse the effective tax rates that US MNCs face in each country and the amount of profits they report. Using country-by-country reporting data, we have been able to establish that lower effective corporate tax rates are associated with higher levels of reported profits when compared with different indicators of real economic activity. This corresponds to the notion that MNCs often shift profits to countries with low effective tax rates - without also shifting substantive economic activity. Consequently, we identify the most important tax havens for US MNCs as countries with both low effective tax rates and high profits misaligned with economic activity.

     

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    hdl: 10419/228072
    Series: IES working paper ; 2019, 31
    Subjects: Effective tax rate; profit shifting; tax haven; country-by-country reporting; multinational enterprise; foreign direct investment; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Corporate taxation, tax administration and financial development
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    This paper analyzes corporate tax-related policies and the difference between them in developed and developing countries. I show that the relationship between financial development and corporate income tax rates as well as the tax administrations'... more

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    This paper analyzes corporate tax-related policies and the difference between them in developed and developing countries. I show that the relationship between financial development and corporate income tax rates as well as the tax administrations' effectiveness follows a U-shaped pattern, a discrepancy to the observation that developing countries usually have the weakest administrative structures. However, this observation can be explained under the premise that the tax administration's effectiveness is determined at a later stage, and not simultaneously with the corporate tax rate. Moreover, I show that, under this premise, fighting tax havens increases tax revenues in developed countries, but decreases them in developing countries. Instead, if policies are simultaneously considered, the fight against tax havens will also benefit developing countries.

     

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    hdl: 10419/214942
    Series: Array ; no. 7940 (November 2019)
    Subjects: developing countries; profit shifting; tax administration; tax competition; tax haven
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Lifestyle taxes in the presence of profit shifting
    Published: February 2020
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) cause about 71% of all deaths globally and a considerable increase in health care costs. To tackle this problem, several Governments have designed "sin taxes", i.e, extra payments related to the quantity of unhealthy... more

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    Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) cause about 71% of all deaths globally and a considerable increase in health care costs. To tackle this problem, several Governments have designed "sin taxes", i.e, extra payments related to the quantity of unhealthy contents of specific goods. However, unhealthy food and soda drinks are often produced by multinational companies for which also profit shifting is a serious issue. The international dimension of these markets may have a dramatic impact on the actual implementation of sin taxes. This article contributes to the literature by analysing the effectiveness of sin taxes levied on a good produced by a multinational company. Our analysis shows that a trade off between profit shifting and lifestyle taxes may exist. In general, the First Best sin tax cannot be levied if Governments are also interested in corporate tax revenue. This is a quite interesting policy issue: countries that today benefit from profit shifting may find it harder to impose significant lifestyle taxes. We also provide some insights about the effects that the international effort to fight profit shifting may have on lifestyle taxes.

     

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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/216534
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8138 (2020)
    Subjects: optimal lifestyle tax; multinational industry; profit shifting; health care costs; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 15 Seiten)
  17. On tax competition, international migration, and occupational choice
    Published: February, 2020
    Publisher:  University of Luxemborg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Luxembourg

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    Series: Array ; 2020, 07
    Subjects: migration; tax competition; occupational choice; social welfare
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten)
  18. Attracting profit shifting or fostering innovation?
    on patent boxes and R&D subsidies
    Published: October 2020
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Many countries have introduced patent box regimes in recent years, offering a reduced tax rate to businesses for their IP-related income. Patent boxes are supposed to increase innovative activity, but they are also suspected to aim at attracting... more

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    Many countries have introduced patent box regimes in recent years, offering a reduced tax rate to businesses for their IP-related income. Patent boxes are supposed to increase innovative activity, but they are also suspected to aim at attracting inward profit shifting from multinational firms. In this paper, we analyze the effects of patent box regimes when countries can simultaneously use patent boxes and R&D subsidies to promote innovation. We show that when countries set their tax policies unilaterally, innovation is fostered, at the margin, only by the R&D subsidy. The patent box tax rate is instead targeted at attracting international profit shifting, and it is optimally set below the corporate tax rate. With cooperative tax setting, the optimal royalty tax rate is instead equal to, or even above, the statutory corporation tax. Hence, patent box regimes emerge in the decentralized policy equilibrium, but never under policy coordination. Enforcing a nexus principle, as proposed by the OECD, is helpful to mitigate harmful competition for paper profits, but it comes at the price of increased strategic competition in direct R&D subsidies to attract physical R&D units instead of intangible patents.

     

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    hdl: 10419/229458
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8640 (2020)
    Subjects: R&D investment; patent boxes; investment tax credits; profit shifting; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten)
  19. Multinational corporations' effective tax rates
    evidence from orbis
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Prague

    Effective tax rates (ETRs) estimated from the balance sheet data of multinational corporations (MNCs) are useful for comparing MNCs' corporate income taxation across countries. In this paper we propose a new methodological approach to estimate ETRs... more

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    Effective tax rates (ETRs) estimated from the balance sheet data of multinational corporations (MNCs) are useful for comparing MNCs' corporate income taxation across countries. In this paper we propose a new methodological approach to estimate ETRs as reliably and as for as many countries as possible using Orbis' unconsolidated data for the 2011-2015 period. We focus on countries with at least 50 available companies, which results in a sample of 50, mostly European, countries. We estimate the ETR of a country as the ratio of corporate income tax to gross income for all affiliates of MNCs in that country, weighted by gross income. We propose four ETR estimations, including lower and upper bounds, which differ by gross income calculation. We find that ETRs substantially differ from statutory rates for some countries. For example, we show that despite similar statutory rates of 28% and 29%, MNCs in Luxembourg paid as little as 1-8% of gross income in taxes while those in Norway paid as much as 45-66%. Despite being the best available, existing data is still imperfect, and we therefore call for better data in the form of MNCs' unconsolidated, public country-by-country reporting data.

     

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    hdl: 10419/228102
    Series: IES working paper ; 2020, 20
    Subjects: Effective tax rate; multinational corporation; foreign direct investment; profit shifting; tax haven; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Endogenous timing in tax competition
    the effect of asymmetric information
    Published: August 20, 2020
    Publisher:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

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    Series: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2020, 22
    Subjects: tax competition; endogenous leadership; asymmetric information
    Scope: 24 Blätter, Illustrationen
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    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe

  21. Profit-led in effect or in mere appearance?
    estimating the Irish demand regime given the influence of multinational enterprises
    Published: January 2021
    Publisher:  Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy Berlin, Berlin

    In the Republic of Ireland, the activities of MNEs drive real demand on one level and severely distort conventional national accounts statistics on another. This poses a problem for the valid estimation of the Irish demand regime since key variables... more

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    In the Republic of Ireland, the activities of MNEs drive real demand on one level and severely distort conventional national accounts statistics on another. This poses a problem for the valid estimation of the Irish demand regime since key variables such as the wage share of GDP are skewed and strongly correlated with omitted variables that determine some components of demand. This paper summarises the real and distortionary effects of MNEs in Ireland, and then adjusts and controls for these effects as much as possible in an econometric estimation of the underlying Irish demand regime. Both ordinary least squares and three stage least squares estimators are used, the latter as an attempt to deal with the issue of simultaneity bias that confronts all empirical attempts at demand regime estimation. The main results of this paper are twofold. Firstly, Ireland is found to be wage-led in the specifications that adjust and control for the influence of MNEs. Second, the average effective corporate tax rate (AECTR) on foreign affiliates in Ireland is found to be statistically significant in explaining investment. This, alongside indicative foreign affiliate statistics, supports the view that Ireland may be "tax competition-led", in the sense implied by Woodgate (2020), where a lower AECTR has a net positive effect on aggregate demand in Ireland (though at the expense of other nations). The implications of these findings for policy are drawn.

     

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    hdl: 10419/228869
    Series: Working paper / Institute for International Political Economy Berlin ; no. 154 (2021)
    Subjects: Distribution; demand regime; Ireland; tax competition; profit shifting
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Coordinating revenue incentive policies in the Caribbean
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  International Monetary Fund, [Washington, DC]

    The pervasive use of tax incentives is costly for the Caribbean countries, yet the benefits seem limited. Better policy coordination at the regional level is needed to help overcome the collective action problems and generate more revenue to support... more

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    The pervasive use of tax incentives is costly for the Caribbean countries, yet the benefits seem limited. Better policy coordination at the regional level is needed to help overcome the collective action problems and generate more revenue to support the much-needed infrastructure investment. Using the region's Citizenship-by-Investment (CBI) programs as an example, we also show that a price-quantity coordination mechanism can help achieve an efficient outcome with greater CBI incomes for member countries

     

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  23. Dynamic sales tax competition
    evidence from panel data at the border
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, [Boston, MA]

    We examine both vertical and horizontal tax competition over time by studying the strategic response of county sales taxation to state sales taxes and to cross-border neighboring municipalities' combined (state and county) taxes. Using county and... more

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    We examine both vertical and horizontal tax competition over time by studying the strategic response of county sales taxation to state sales taxes and to cross-border neighboring municipalities' combined (state and county) taxes. Using county and state sales tax data from 2003 through 2009, we employ both static and dynamic panel analysis as well as an instrumental variables approach in combination with a border analysis. Our results confirm the presence of tax competition in the cross section, as previous studies have found. Results from the fixedeffects and dynamic panel analysis also indicate the presence of vertical competition, though quite small, as counties are consistently responsive to changes in their own state sales tax level across all models and specifications. However, the panel findings suggest little to no horizontal tax competition. Following Parchet (2019), we address additional concerns about endogeneity by instrumenting the neighboring-county sales tax rate with the state-level sales tax rate of the neighboring state. Results from instrumental variables analysis reinforce the presence of a small vertical tax competition between local and state sales tax policies. Interestingly, our results, like those of Parchet (2019), indicate that cross-border local sales tax rates act as strategic substitutes.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/227940
    Edition: This version: March 2020
    Series: Working papers / Federal Reserve Bank of Boston ; no. 20, 5
    Subjects: tax competition; sales taxation; border approach
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten)
  24. Bilateral tax competition and regional spillovers in tax treaty formation
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  European Commission, Seville

    Tax treaties are often seen as a means to mitigate fierce tax competition. We challenge this view by arguing that taxes on passive income reduce e↵ective average tax rates, and induce neighbouring countries to react by reducing bilateral tax rates.... more

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    Tax treaties are often seen as a means to mitigate fierce tax competition. We challenge this view by arguing that taxes on passive income reduce e↵ective average tax rates, and induce neighbouring countries to react by reducing bilateral tax rates. As opposed to traditional tax competition, where every foreign investor would benefit from lower tax rates, we show that countries also engage in cutting tax rates for investors from a particular country, leaving taxes for everyone else una↵ected. We call this bilateral tax competition, and we test these predictions empirically. We focus on the four treaty withholding tax rates on passive income - portfolio dividends, participation dividends, interest, and royalties - and collect these rates for 3,000 tax treaties and amending protocols signed between 1930 and 2012. We find a positive relationship in the negotiated withholding tax rates of a destination country's tax treaty and destination country competitors' past tax treaties with the same source country. This relationship is strongest for the tax rates on interest and royalties, and varies from an average elasticity between 0.19 and 0.36 with both source and destination country being an OECD member, and an average elasticity up to 0.64 when both countries are tax havens.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248820
    Series: JRC working papers on taxation and strucutral reforms ; no 2020, 07
    Subjects: tax competition; international taxation; double taxation treaties; taxtreaty formation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Profit shifting and equilibrium principles of international taxation
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Paris School of Economics, Paris

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Paris School of Economics ; no 2021, 43
    Subjects: tax competition; multinational firms; corporate taxes; transfer pricing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen