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  1. The causal effect of trust
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick
    Published: October 2018
    Publisher:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the... more

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    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent.

     
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    hdl: 10419/192913
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 304
    Subjects: Trust; causality; equilibrium selection; belief distortions; incomplete contracts; screening; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Is this obvious?
    screening for important contributions in science
    Author: Mitchell, Matthew F.; Schütt, Florian
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  [KU Leuven, Department of Economics], [Leuven]

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    Series: Discussion paper series / KU Leuven, Department of Economics ; DPS 24, 12 (October 2024)
    Subjects: economics of science; academic publishing; screening; obviousness
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Temporary agency work and labor misallocation
    Author: Carrasco, Raquel; Gálvez-Iniesta, Ismael; Jerez, Belén
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  UC3M, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, [Getafe (Spain)]

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    hdl: 10016/44503
    Series: Array ; 2024, 13
    Subjects: temporary agency work; intermediation; search and matching; screening; efficiency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. The complementarity between trust and contract enforcement
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    Agreements are rarely fully enforceable, exposing trading parties to some risk of exploitation. In such circumstances, trust-defined as the belief in the trustworthiness of others-seems important for realizing gains from trade. This paper explores an... more

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    Agreements are rarely fully enforceable, exposing trading parties to some risk of exploitation. In such circumstances, trust-defined as the belief in the trustworthiness of others-seems important for realizing gains from trade. This paper explores an unstudied question: whether trust is a substitute for, or a complement to, the availability of contract enforcement opportunities. One intuition suggests that trust becomes more important when contract enforcement is weak, implying that they are substitutes. We show, however, that trust can be a complement, mattering more when contract enforcement is stronger. Our evidence comes from experiments that exogenously vary both trust and contract enforcement. We argue that the mechanism is equilibrium selection: richer opportunities for contract enforcement can lead to a wider set of equilibria. Trust can then become more important because it helps select between efficient and inefficient equilibria. We provide empirical evidence for this mechanism, and a corresponding theoretical framework. The complementarity of trust and strength of contract enforcement has important policy implications.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Media type: Book
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    hdl: 10419/306549
    Edition: Revised version, October 2024
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 377
    Subjects: Trust; contract enforcement; complementarity; equilibrium selection; causal effect; screening; belief distortions; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 92 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Temporary agency work and labor misallocation
    Author: Carrasco, Raquel; Gálvez-Iniesta, Ismael; Jerez, Belén
    Published: Octubre de 2024
    Publisher:  [FEDEA], [Madrid]

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    Series: Documento de trabajo / Fedea ; 2024, 09
    Subjects: temporary agency work; intermediation; search and matching; screening; efficiency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Information technology in banking and entrepreneurship
    Author: Ahnert, Toni; Dörr, Sebastian; Pierri, Nicola; Timmer, Yannick
    Published: August 2024
    Publisher:  Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.

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    Series: Finance and economics discussion series ; 2024, 083
    Subjects: technology in banking; entrepreneurship; information technology; collateral; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 85 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Information technology in banking and entrepreneurship
    Author: Ahnert, Toni; Dörr, Sebastian; Pierri, Nicola; Timmer, Yannick
    Published: August 2024
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We study the importance of information technology (IT) in banking for entrepreneurship. Guided by a parsimonious model, we establish that job creation by young firms is stronger in US counties more exposed to banks with greater IT adoption. We present... more

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    We study the importance of information technology (IT) in banking for entrepreneurship. Guided by a parsimonious model, we establish that job creation by young firms is stronger in US counties more exposed to banks with greater IT adoption. We present evidence consistent with banks’ IT adoption spurring entrepreneurship through a collateral channel: entrepreneurship increases by more in IT-exposed counties when house prices rise. Further analysis suggests that IT improves banks’ ability to determine collateral values, in particular when collateral appraisal is more complex. IT also reduces the time and cost of disbursing collateralized loans.

     
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    hdl: 10419/305526
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 11284 (2024)
    Subjects: technology in banking; entrepreneurship; information technology; collateral; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 86 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Screening using a menu of contracts
    a structural model of lending markets
    Author: Taburet, Arthur; Polo, Alberto; Vo, Quynh Anh
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Bank of England, London

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    Series: Staff working paper / Bank of England ; no. 1057 (February 2024)
    Subjects: Adverse selection; screening; structural model
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Targeting disability insurance applications with screening
    Author: Godard, Mathilde; Koning, Pierre; Lindeboom, Maarten
    Published: May 2019
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI) applications using exogenous variation in screening induced by a policy reform. The reform raised DI application costs and revealed more information... more

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    We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI) applications using exogenous variation in screening induced by a policy reform. The reform raised DI application costs and revealed more information about the true disability status of applicants at the point of the award decision. We use administrative data on DI claims and awards and merge these with other administrative data on hospitalization, mortality and labor market outcomes. Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT) regressions show substantial declines in DI application rates and changes in the composition of the pool of applicants. We find that the health of those who are not discouraged from applying is worse than those who are. This suggests that the pool of applicants becomes more deserving. At the same time, compared with those who did not apply under the old system of more lax screening, those who are discouraged from applying are in worse health, have substantially lower earnings and are more often unemployed. This indicates that there are spillovers of the DI reform to other social insurance programs. As we do not find additional screening effects on health at the point of the award decision, we conclude that changes in the health condition of the pool of awarded applicants are fully driven by self-screening of (potential) applicants.

     
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    hdl: 10419/202689
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 12343
    Subjects: disability insurance; screening; composition effects; targeting efficiency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. The impact of venture capital screening
    Author: Abuzov, Rustam
    Published: March 2019
    Publisher:  Swiss Finance Institute, Geneva

    I study the effect of limited attention on resource allocation by venture capitalists. Using engagement in the IPO process as a measure of distraction, I document that investments made by distracted venture capitalists into new portfolio companies... more

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    I study the effect of limited attention on resource allocation by venture capitalists. Using engagement in the IPO process as a measure of distraction, I document that investments made by distracted venture capitalists into new portfolio companies tend to underperform. Such companies are 7% less likely to go public or get acquired, and also exhibit lower exit multiples. The adverse effect of the attention constraints is present only in the vicinity of the distracting IPO and manifests itself both for individual partners and venture capital funds. Overall, the results indicate that the scarcity of attention hypothesis holds in the context of deal sourcing and screening in venture capital, highlighting the presence of skill in the company selection process

     
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    Series: Research paper series / Swiss Finance Institute ; no 19, 14
    Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper ; No. 19-14
    Other subjects: Array
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. The effect of employment protection on firms' worker selection
    Author: Butschek, Sebastian; Sauermann, Jan
    Published: April 2019
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    To estimate the causal effect of employment protection on firms' worker selection, we study a policy change that reduced dismissal costs for the employers of over a tenth of Sweden's workforce. Our difference-in-differences analysis of firms' hiring... more

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    To estimate the causal effect of employment protection on firms' worker selection, we study a policy change that reduced dismissal costs for the employers of over a tenth of Sweden's workforce. Our difference-in-differences analysis of firms' hiring uses individual ability measures including estimated worker fixed effects and cognitive test scores. We find that the reform reduced minimum hire quality by 5% of a standard deviation, half of which we can attribute to firms' hiring becoming more selective. Our results help discriminate between existing theories, supporting the prediction that firms shift their hiring standards in response to changes in dismissal costs.

     
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    hdl: 10419/196803
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 12305
    Subjects: worker selection; screening; hiring standard; employment protection; dismissal costs
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Optimal short-time work
    screening for jobs at risk
    Author: Teichgräber, Julian; Žužek, Simon; Hensel, Jannik
    Published: February 2022
    Publisher:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    Short-time work - a wage subsidy conditional on hour reductions - has become an important tool of labor market policy in many European countries. As the scope of these policies expanded, concerns about side effects due to adverse selection increased.... more

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    Short-time work - a wage subsidy conditional on hour reductions - has become an important tool of labor market policy in many European countries. As the scope of these policies expanded, concerns about side effects due to adverse selection increased. We develop a model of job retention policies in the presence of asymmetric information to study selection into these programs. The social planner wants to prevent excessive job destruction but cannot observe which jobs are truly at risk. We do not restrict the social planner to use hour reductions a priori. Instead, we show that hour reductions of short-time work policies act as a screening mechanism to mitigate the adverse selection problem. This perspective of short-time work as a policy response to an underlying adverse selection problem provides an entirely new rationale for these policies. Our approach can be used to revisit recent empirical findings which rely on employment effects to evaluate existing short-time work schemes. In our model, however, average employment effects across groups are not sufficient to determine whether the policy is efficient. Indeed, we show that an optimal short-time work policy cannot avoid a small degree of adverse selection. This is particularly important in light of recent evidence that firms with small revenue shocks and no discernible employment effects have participated in short-time work programs at large costs to the public. In our model, these costs are information rents which are required to screen for jobs at risk. We calibrate our model to German data before the financial crisis and find that the optimal short-time work policy would have reduced separations by 1.2 - 2.4 percentage points.

     
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    hdl: 10419/251432
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 402
    Subjects: Short-time work; employment subsidies; job retention; asymmetric information; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Does it help?
    information technology in banking and entrepreneurship
    Author: Ahnert, Toni; Dörr, Sebastian; Pierri, Nicola; Timmer, Yannick
    Published: 29 May 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17335
    Subjects: technology in banking; entrepreneurship; Information Technology; Collateral; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa Seiten)
  14. Screening green innovation through carbon pricing
    Author: Ahlvik, Lassi; Bijgaart, Inge van den
    Published: September 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Green innovation is essential for climate change mitigation, but not all innovative projects deliver equal social value. We consider innovator heterogeneity in a model where the policy maker cannot observe innovation quality and directly subsidize... more

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    Green innovation is essential for climate change mitigation, but not all innovative projects deliver equal social value. We consider innovator heterogeneity in a model where the policy maker cannot observe innovation quality and directly subsidize the socially most valuable green innovations. We find that carbon pricing works as an innovation screening device; this creates a premium on the optimal carbon price, raising it above the Pigouvian level. We identify conditions for perfect screening and generalize results to screening policies under alternative intellectual property regimes and complementary policies.

     
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    hdl: 10419/265966
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9931 (2022)
    Subjects: carbon pricing; green innovation; optimal policy; R&D; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Screening with multitasking
    Author: Dinerstein, Michael; Opper, Isaac M.
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though... more

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    What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the short-term, we derive three sufficient conditions under which the heterogenous response improves screening efficiency: 1) all employees place similar value on staying in their current role; 2) the employees' utility functions satisfy a variation of the traditional single-crossing condition; 3) employer and worker preferences over output are similar. We then assess these predictions empirically by studying a change to teacher tenure policy in New York City, which increased the role that a single measure - test score value-added - played in tenure decisions. We show that in response to the policy teachers increased test score value-added and decreased output that did not enter the tenure decision. The increase in test score value-added was largest for the teachers with more ability to improve students' untargeted outcomes, increasing their likelihood of getting tenure. We find that the endogenous response to the policy announcement reduced the screening efficiency gap - defined as the reduction of screening efficiency stemming from the partial observability of output - by 28%, effectively shifting some of the cost of partial observability from the post-tenure period to the pre-tenure period.

     
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    hdl: 10419/263799
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9869 (2022)
    Subjects: Arbeitsproduktivität; Signalling; Asymmetrische Information; Dienstleistungsqualität; Lehrkräfte; Qualifikation; USA; New York; screening; multidimensional value-added; multitasking; teacher effectiveness
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 86 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Simultaneous search and adverse selection
    Author: Auster, Sarah; Gottardi, Piero; Wolthoff, Ronald
    Published: September 04, 2022
    Publisher:  University of Toronto, Department of Economics, [Toronto]

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    Series: Working paper / University of Toronto, Department of Economics ; 734
    Subjects: search; adverse selection; screening; labor market; coordination frictions; search frictions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Credit building or credit crumbling?
    a credit builder loan's effects on consumer behavior, credit scores and their predictive power
    Author: Burke, Jeremy; Jamison, Julian C.; Karlan, Dean; Mihaly, Kata; Zinman, Jonathan
    Published: 22 July 2019
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Series: Array ; DP13884
    Subjects: subprime; thin file; credit scoring; screening; credit invisibles; household finance; consumer finance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Credit building or credit crumbling?
    a credit builder loan's effects on consumer behavior, credit scores and their predictive power
    Author: Burke, Jeremy; Jamison, Julian C.; Karlan, Dean; Mihaly, Kata; Zinman, Jonathan
    Published: 22 July 2019
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Series: Array ; DP13984
    Subjects: subprime; thin file; credit scoring; screening; credit invisibles; household finance; consumer finance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Whoever you want me to be: personality and incentives
    Author: McGee, Andrew D.; McGee, Peter
    Published: October 2020
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    What can employers learn from personality tests when job applicants have incentives to misrepresent themselves? Using a within-subject, laboratory experiment, we compare personality measures with and without incentives for misrepresentation.... more

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    What can employers learn from personality tests when job applicants have incentives to misrepresent themselves? Using a within-subject, laboratory experiment, we compare personality measures with and without incentives for misrepresentation. Incentivized personality measures are weakly to moderately correlated with non-incentivized measures in most treatments but are correlated with intelligence when test-takers have information about desired personalities or are warned that responses may be verified. We document that actual job ads provide information about desired personalities and that employers in the UK who administer personality tests are also likely to administer intelligence tests despite the potential for substitution between the tests.

     
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    hdl: 10419/227336
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 13809
    Subjects: personality; measurement; hiring; screening; experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 84 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Patent screening, innovation, and welfare
    Author: Schankerman, Mark; Schütt, Florian
    Published: 17 September 2020
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Series: Array ; DP15301
    Subjects: innovation; patent quality; screening; litigation; courts; patent fees; licensing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Essays on the selectiveness of firms' hiring: determinants and measurement
    Author: Butschek, Sebastian
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln, Köln

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    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Universitätsbibliothek Clausthal
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    Fachhochschule Erfurt, Hochschulbibliothek
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    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Contributor: Sliwka, Dirk (AkademischeR BetreuerIn); Lindqvist, Erik (AkademischeR BetreuerIn); Hirsch, Boris (AkademischeR BetreuerIn)
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Subjects: worker selection; hiring standard; screening; labor-labor substitution; minimum wage; employment protection; dismissal cost; cognitive ability; test score; unobserved productivity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 119 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Enthält mehrere Beiträge

    Dissertation, Universität zu Köln, 2019
  22. Sorting in credit rationing
    an elementary survey
    Author: Camacho, Carmen; Cho, Hye-Jin
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Paris School of Economics, Paris

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: Working paper / Paris School of Economics ; no 2020, 77
    Subjects: single crossing property; screening; credit rationing; performance incentives
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 15 Seiten)
  23. Support for small businesses amid COVID-19
    Author: Goodhart, Charles A. E.; Tsomocos, Dimitrios P.; Wang, Xuan
    Published: 17 July 2020
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP15055
    Subjects: COVID-19; government guarantees; optimal default sanction; unemployment; productivity; adverse selection; private information; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. The complementary nature of trust and contract enforcement
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick
    Published: January 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness... more

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    Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and contract enforcement are complements. We demonstrate that under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from trade, but when we successively improve contract enforcement, larger effects of trust emerge. Likewise, improvements in contract enforcement generate no increases in gains from trade under low initial trust, but cause high increases when initial trust is high. Thus, the effect of improvements in contract enforcement is trust-dependent, and the effect of increases in trust is dependent on the strength of contract enforcement. We identify three key ingredients underlying this complementarity: (1) heterogeneity in trustworthiness; (2) strength of contract enforcement affecting the ability to elicit reciprocal behavior from trustworthy types, and screen out untrustworthy types; (3) trust beliefs determining willingness to try such strategies.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/232423
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8826 (2021)
    Subjects: trust; contract enforcement; complementarity; equilibrium selection; causal effect; screening; belief distortions; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 86 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Designing disability insurance reforms
    tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?
    Author: Haller, Andreas; Staubli, Stefan; Zweimüller, Josef
    Published: August 2020
    Publisher:  Retirement and Savings Institute, [Montréal]

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    VS 721
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: Working paper / Institut sur la retraite et l'épargne, HEC Montréal ; no. 5
    Subjects: Disability insurance; screening; benefits; policy reform
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 92 Seiten), Illustrationen