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Displaying results 1 to 12 of 12.

  1. Shelving or developing?
    the acquisition of potential competitors under financial constraints
    Author: Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Tarantino, Emanuele
    Published: July 2020
    Publisher:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 574
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economic working paper ; no. 1735
    Subjects: merger policy; digital markets; potential competition; conglomerate mergers
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Big tech mergers
    Author: Motta, Massimo; Peitz, Martin
    Published: July 2020
    Publisher:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economic working paper ; no. 1736
    Subjects: merger policy; digital markets; potential competition; conglomerate mergers
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten)
  3. Big tech mergers
    Author: Motta, Massimo; Peitz, Martin
    Published: July 2020
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1198
    Subjects: Merger policy; digital markets; potential competition; conglomerate mergers
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten)
  4. Shelving or developing?
    the acquisition of potential competitors under financial constraints
    Author: Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Tarantino, Emanuele
    Published: July 2020
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 541
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1197
    Subjects: Merger policy; digital markets; potential competition; conglomerate mergers
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten)
  5. Killer acquisitions and beyond: policy effects on innovation strategies
    Author: Letina, Igor; Schmutzler, Armin; Seibel, Regina
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative innovation effect. We... more

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    This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the effect and, in particular, whether it is zero or positive. We further analyze the effects of less restrictive policies, including merger remedies and the tax treatment of acquisitions and initial public offerings. Such interventions tend to prevent acquisitions only if the entrant has sufficiently high stand-alone profits.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235608
    Edition: This version: June 2021
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 358
    Subjects: innovation; killer acquisitions; merger policy; potential competition; start-ups
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Killer acquisitions and beyond
    policy effects on innovation strategies
    Author: Letina, Igor; Schmutzler, Armin; Seibel, Regina
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that, in spite of countervailing incentives on incumbents and entrants,... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 191
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    This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that, in spite of countervailing incentives on incumbents and entrants, prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative overall innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the effect and, in particular, conditions under which it is zero. We further analyze the effects of less restrictive policies, including merger remedies and the tax treatment of acquisitions and initial public offerings. Such interventions tend to prevent acquisitions only if the entrant has sufficiently high stand-alone profits.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10.5167/uzh-189748
    hdl: 10419/275661
    Edition: This version: July 2023
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 358
    Subjects: innovation; killer acquisitions; merger policy; potential competition; start-ups
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 72 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Perfect competition, market power, and contestability
    Author: Budzinski, Oliver; Stöhr, Annika
    Published: May 2024
    Publisher:  Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics, Ilmenau ; Universitätsbibliothek

    The model of perfect competition is one of the most famous, most important, and most misunderstood concepts in economics. Rather than aiming to be a full-blown model of real-world competitive markets, the perfect competition model isolates the... more

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    Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
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    The model of perfect competition is one of the most famous, most important, and most misunderstood concepts in economics. Rather than aiming to be a full-blown model of real-world competitive markets, the perfect competition model isolates the decentralized coordination mechanism inherent in all competitive markets. Coordinating supply and demand is not the only feature of market competition, but it plays a central role regarding to its virtues, and understanding the working mechanism of this coordination is valuable for economic thinking and economic theory. However, the implications of the perfect competition model for competition law and policy are limited. Market power is a multifaceted phenomenon that consists of several distinguishable types. This contribution explains absolute market power (single-firm monopoly and dominance), collective market power, relative market power, and systemic market power. Due to the possibility of merit-driven paths to market power positions (especially disruptive innovations), market power is difficult to prohibit – despite its welfare-reducing effects within the affected markets (anticompetitive effects) and in other parts of the economy and society (rent-seeking, lobbying, distributional issues). Therefore, competition policy usually focuses on preventing non-merit paths to market power (merger control) and on combating the (anticompetitive) abuse of market power. Contestability refers to the openness of markets. More specifically, it is the ability of companies to overcome barriers to entry and exit as well as to expansion on markets. While the original economic theory of contestability defines very strict conditions for perfectly contestable markets, antitrust has employed the term contestability in broader and in varying ways, emphasizing the role of potential competition and potential market entries to discipline the behavior of powerful incumbents on monopoly or dominance markets. Recently, contestability is rising to new prominence as a major goal of the European regulation of digital ecosystems.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/296473
    RVK Categories: QR 300 ; QC 133
    Series: Ilmenau economics discussion papers ; vol. 29, no. 189
    Subjects: perfect competition; atomistic competition; coordination of supply and demand; market power; monopoly; market concentration; dominance; digital ecosystems; price setting; economic power; contestability; entry barriers; exit barriers; potential competition; open markets; Digital Markets Act (EU)
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (34 Seiten)
  8. Killer acquisitions and beyond: policy effects on innovation strategies
    Author: Letina, Igor; Schmutzler, Armin; Seibel, Regina
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative innovation effect. We... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 191
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the effect and, in particular, conditions under which it is zero. We further analyze the effects of less restrictive policies, including merger remedies and the tax treatment of acquisitions and initial public offerings. Such interventions tend to prevent acquisitions only if the entrant has sufficiently high stand-alone profits.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/246283
    Edition: This version: October 2021
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 358
    Subjects: Innovation; killer acquisitions; merger policy; potential competition; start-ups
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 72 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. How do incumbents react to the exit of a potential competitor?
    evidence from the airline sector
    Author: Oliveira, Rafael Rocha; Lucinda, Cláudio Ribeiro
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  [FEA/USP], [São Paulo]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / Department of Economics-FEA/USP ; no 2024, 04
    Subjects: threat; potential competition; exit; Bankruptcy; airline companies; tariffs airlines
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Killer acquisitions and beyond: policy effects on innovation strategies
    Author: Letina, Igor; Schmutzler, Armin; Seibel, Regina
    Published: August 2020
    Publisher:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We show that prohibiting killer acquisitions strictly reduces the variety of innovation projects. By contrast, we find that prohibiting other... more

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    Signature:
    DS 191
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    This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We show that prohibiting killer acquisitions strictly reduces the variety of innovation projects. By contrast, we find that prohibiting other acquisitions only has a weakly negative innovation effect, and we provide conditions under which the effect is zero. Furthermore, for both killer and other acquisitions, we identify market conditions under which the innovation effect is small, so that prohibiting acquisitions to enhance competition would be justified.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/224202
    Edition: This version: August 2020
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 358
    Subjects: Innovation; killer acquisitions; merger policy; potential competition; start-ups
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Competition intensity, potential competition and transaction cost economics
    Author: Busse, Matthias
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  HWWA, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Hamburg

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  12. Competition intensity, potential competition and transaction cost economics
    Author: Busse, Matthias
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA), Hamburg

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