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Displaying results 1 to 5 of 5.

  1. Antipathy for Heidelberg, sympathy for Freiburg?
    Vincent Ostrom on Max Weber, Walter Eucken, and the compound history of order
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  Walter Eucken Institut, [Freiburg i. Br.]

    Vincent Ostrom's legacy is revisited in this paper along three dimensions: Ostrom's contributions as a historian of politico-economic thought, as a complexity theorist, and as an epistemologist. All three dimensions are captured from a perspective... more

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    Vincent Ostrom's legacy is revisited in this paper along three dimensions: Ostrom's contributions as a historian of politico-economic thought, as a complexity theorist, and as an epistemologist. All three dimensions are captured from a perspective which has seldom been studied systematically before: The paper reconstructs Ostrom as a reader and interpreter of German politico-economic thought, especially of Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy and of Walter Eucken's theory of social and epistemic orders. The systems of these two German social scientists embody for Ostrom the two types of social order central to his own typology. The paper incorporates archival sources from the Elinor and Vincent Ostrom Papers, including unpublished papers and correspondence with German social scientists he met during the Ostroms' 1981/1982 stay at Bielefeld University's Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF). Overall, this narrative focuses on what Ostrom called in his reception of the Freiburg School "Eucken's challenge": A set of inquiries about the relevance of political economy for the study of polycentric orders.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/210991
    Series: Freiburg discussionpapers on constitutional economics ; 19, 6
    Subjects: Bloomington School; Freiburg School; political theory; history of economics; economic sociology; polycentricity; epistemology
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten)
  2. Equity as meta-law
    Published: October 15, 2020
    Publisher:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 1051 (12/2020)
    Subjects: equity; polycentricity; opportunism; meta-law; complex system; formalism; contextualism; rules; standards; privity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 81 Seiten)
    Notes:

    Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal

    This paper can also be downloaded without charge from: The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3734662

  3. Polycentricity and multi-stakeholder platforms
    governance of the commons in India
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, USA

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: IFPRI discussion paper ; 02067 (December 2021)
    Subjects: commons; multi-stakeholder platforms; polycentricity; India
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Polycentric governance in collusive agreements
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg

    Collusive agreements in the form of cartels among firms are complex structures. The involved firms need to agree on prices and sales quotas that are legally not enforceable. Market characteristics that foster cartels’ failure or success are widely... more

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    Collusive agreements in the form of cartels among firms are complex structures. The involved firms need to agree on prices and sales quotas that are legally not enforceable. Market characteristics that foster cartels’ failure or success are widely examined. However, the interplay between the involved firms in a collusive agreement, i.e., the governance dimension within a cartel, has received surprisingly low attention. Using a comprehensive dataset of 191 cartels from 2012 - 2018, this paper empirically reveals that polycentric structures within the cartel governance may contribute to longer duration and lower sanctions imposed by competition authorities, especially for large cartels. By that, the paper sheds new light on two aspects: The entangled governance structures of collusive undertakings as well as the relevance of polycentricity in the firm environment. The insights may be helpful for cartel authorities and new research combining institutional and industrial economics.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/284409
    Series: Freiburg discussionpapers on constitutional economics ; 24, 1
    Subjects: Collusion; illegal cartels; polycentricity; governance; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Governance of the water-energy-food nexus for an integrated implementation of the 2030 Agenda
    conceptual and methodological framework for analysis