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Displaying results 1 to 14 of 14.

  1. Crowdsourcing financial information to change spending behavior
    Author: D'Acunto, Francesco; Rossi, Alberto G.; Weber, Michael
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We document five effects of providing individuals with crowdsourced spending information about their peers (individuals with similar characteristics) through a FinTech app. First, users who spend more than their peers reduce their spending... more

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    We document five effects of providing individuals with crowdsourced spending information about their peers (individuals with similar characteristics) through a FinTech app. First, users who spend more than their peers reduce their spending significantly, whereas users who spend less keep constant or increase their spending. Second, users' distance from their peers' spending affects the reaction monotonically in both directions. Third, users' reaction is asymmetric - spending cuts are three times as large as increases. Fourth, lower-income users react more than others. Fifth, discretionary spending drives the reaction in both directions and especially cash withdrawals, which are commonly used for incidental expenses and anonymous transactions. We argue Bayesian updating, peer pressure, or the fact that bad news looms more than (equallysized) good news cannot alone explain all these facts.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/198893
    Series: Array ; no. 7533 (February 2019)
    Subjects: FinTech; learning; beliefs and expectations; peer pressure; financial decisionmaking; saving; consumer finance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. The distributional effects of peer and aspirational pressure
    Author: Angelopulos, Kōnstantinos; Lazarakis, Spyridon; Malley, James R.
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We develop a theoretical framework where the cross-sectional distributions of hours, earnings, wealth and consumption are determined jointly with a set of expenditure targets defining peer and aspirational pressure for members of different social... more

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    We develop a theoretical framework where the cross-sectional distributions of hours, earnings, wealth and consumption are determined jointly with a set of expenditure targets defining peer and aspirational pressure for members of different social classes. We show existence of a stationary socio-economic equilibrium, under idiosyncratic stochastic productivity and socioeconomic class participation. We calibrate a model belonging to this framework using British data and find that it captures the main patterns of inequality, between and within the social groupings. We find that the effects of peer pressure on within-group inequality differ between groups. We also find that wealth and consumption inequality increase within groups who aspire to match social targets from a higher class, despite a reduction in within-group inequality in hours and earnings.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/207229
    Series: Array ; no. 7838 (September 2019)
    Subjects: inequality; incomplete markets; peer pressure; aspirations
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 75 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The distributional effects of peer and aspirational pressure
    Author: Angelopulos, Kōnstantinos; Lazarakis, Spyridon; Malley, James R.
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Adam Smith Business School University of Glasgow], [Glasgow

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: [Discussion papers / Adam Smith Business School University of Glasgow] ; 2019, 06
    Subjects: inequality; incomplete markets; peer pressure; aspirations
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. The effectiveness of behavioural interventions on residential location choices and commute behaviours
    experimental evidence from China
    Author: Bao, Helen X. H.; Liu, Yangfanqi; Liu, Jie
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  [Department of Land Economy, Environment, Law & Economics, University of Cambridge, Real Estate Research Centre], [Cambridge]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Series: Working paper series / Department of Land Economy, Environment, Law & Economics, University of Cambridge, Real Estate Research Centre ; no. 2023, 06
    Subjects: behavioural intervention; nudge; peer pressure; transport management; online panel data; randomised controlled trials
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Ideological perfectionism
    Author: Chen, Daniel L.; Michaeli, Moti; Spiro, Daniel
    Published: [2016]
    Publisher:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no TSE-694 (September 2016)
    Subjects: Judicial decision making; group decision making; ideology; peer pressure
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 99 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Team incentives, social cohesion, and performance: a natural field experiment
    Author: Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J.; Onemu, Okemena Abraham; Sol, Joeri
    Published: July 2020
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We conduct a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain of 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives, team social cohesion, and team performance. Theory predicts that the effect of team incentives on team performance increases with... more

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    We conduct a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain of 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives, team social cohesion, and team performance. Theory predicts that the effect of team incentives on team performance increases with the team's social cohesion, because social cohesion reduces free-riding behavior. In addition, team incentives may lead to more co-worker support or to higher peer pressure and thereby can affect the team's social cohesion. We introduce short-term team incentives in a randomly selected subset of stores and measure for all stores, both before and after the intervention, the team's sales performance, the team's social cohesion as well as co-worker support and peer pressure. The average treatment effect of the team incentive on sales is 1.5 percentage points, which does not differ significantly from zero. In line with theory, the estimated treatment effect increases with social cohesion as measured before the intervention. Social cohesion itself is not affected by the team incentives.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/223940
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 13498
    Subjects: field experiment; team incentives; social cohesion; peer pressure; co-worker support; sales performance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Individual oath-swearing and lying under peer pressure
    Author: Kingsuwankul, Sorravich
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Previous studies have shown that an oath can reduce lying at an individual level. Can oaths reduce lying in groups, a context where the prevalence of lying is typically higher? Results from a lab experiment reveal that the impact of an oath on lying... more

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    Previous studies have shown that an oath can reduce lying at an individual level. Can oaths reduce lying in groups, a context where the prevalence of lying is typically higher? Results from a lab experiment reveal that the impact of an oath on lying in a group context depends on the incentive structure. Oath reduces lying only when payoffs are independent. Evidence supports the notion that payoff interdependence creates pressure on individuals to conform to the group, crowding out the impact of oath on honest reporting. An implication is that to be effective in an organizational context, an oath intervention must be designed in strict connection with the incentive structures.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282882
    Series: Array ; TI 2023, 069
    Subjects: Honesty oath; lying; group incentive; peer pressure; lab experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Peer pressure and manager pressure in organisations
    Author: Battiston, Diego; Blanes i Vidal, Jordi; Kirchmaier, Tom; Szemeredi, Katalin
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Performance ; no. 1924 (June 2023)
    Subjects: social incentives; teamwork; peer pressure; monitoring; managers; peer effects; organisations
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Equal sharing rules in partnerships
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Siemens, Ferdinand von
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Univ., Volkswirtschaftl. Fak., München

    Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Most partnerships share profits equally among the partners. Following Kandel and Lazear (1992) it is often argued that "peer pressure'' mitigates the arising free-rider problem.... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 483 (2007,29)
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Most partnerships share profits equally among the partners. Following Kandel and Lazear (1992) it is often argued that "peer pressure'' mitigates the arising free-rider problem. This line of reasoning takes the equal sharing rule as exogenously given. The purpose of our paper is to show that with inequity averse partners - a behavioral assumption akin to peer pressure - the equal sharing rule arises endogenously as an optimal solution to the incentive problem in a partnership.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/104248
    Series: Münchener wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge ; 2007-29
    Subjects: Unternehmenskooperation; Gewinnverwendung; Gerechtigkeit; Vertragstheorie; Theorie; equal sharing rule; partnerships; incentives; peer pressure; inequity aversion
    Scope: Online-Ressource (19 S., 369 KB)
  10. Gender differences in juvenile delinquency
    The influence of socialization
    Author: Wangdi, Dorji
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783659308567; 3659308560
    Other identifier:
    9783659308567
    Edition: 1. Aufl.
    Other subjects: (Produktform)Electronic book text; Gender; family; Parents; schools; Youth; Gangs; behaviour; socialization; discrimination; Teachers; Rehabilitation; Counselling; Migration; Buddhism; Police; crime; Traditional; Influence; Delinquency; values; adolescent; Substance abuse; juvenile; stereotyping; Victim; daughter; peer pressure; Son; Bhutan; Responsibilities; Expectation; Boy; Girl; conflict with law; alcohol and drug; (VLB-WN)1726: Soziologie/Frauenforschung, Geschlechterforschung
    Scope: Online-Ressource
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    Lizenzpflichtig. - Vom Verlag als Druckwerk on demand angeboten
  11. Psychological and social motivations in microfinance contracts
    theory and evidence
    Author: Dhami, Sanjit S.; Arshad, Junaid; Al-Nowaihi, Ali
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Microfinance contracts have enormous economic and welfare significance. We study, theoretically and empirically, the problem of effort choice under individual liability (IL) and joint liability (JL) contracts when loan repayments are made either... more

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    Microfinance contracts have enormous economic and welfare significance. We study, theoretically and empirically, the problem of effort choice under individual liability (IL) and joint liability (JL) contracts when loan repayments are made either privately, or publicly in front of one's social group. Our theoretical model identifies guilt from letting down the expectations of partners in a JL contract, and shame from falling short of normatively inadequate effort, under public repayment of loans, as the main psychological drivers of effort choice. Evidence from our lab-in-the-field experiment in Pakistan reveals large treatment effects and confirms the central roles of guilt and shame. Under private repayment, a JL contract increases effort by almost 100% relative to an IL contract. Under public repayment, effort levels are comparable under IL and JL contracts, which is consistent with recent empirical results. This indicates that shame-aversion plays a more important role as compared to guilt-aversion. Under IL, repayment in public relative to private repayment increases effort by 60%, confirming our shame-aversion hypothesis. Under JL, a comparison of private and public repayment shows that shame trumps guilt in explaining effort choices of borrowers.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/201999
    Series: Array ; no. 7773 (July 2019)
    Subjects: microfinance; joint/individual liability; public/private repayment; belief-dependent motivations; guilt; shame; peer pressure; social capital; lab-in-the-field experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 78 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Essential themes in personnel economics
    Author: Josheski, Dushko
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    In this paper are presented essential themes in the subject of personnel economics. In the first part analysis has been conducted on the impact of peer pressure on workplace behaviour. Then again models for compensation structures within firms, and... more

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    In this paper are presented essential themes in the subject of personnel economics. In the first part analysis has been conducted on the impact of peer pressure on workplace behaviour. Then again models for compensation structures within firms, and their influence on the utility of work by employees. In the final section of the paper the productivity spillover effect has been analyzed, and the causes of existence of spillovers and their impact on workers' productivity

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/91614
    Edition: Preprint
    Subjects: Personnel economics; compensation structures; peer pressure; spillover effect
    Scope: Online-Ressource (11 S.), graph. Darst.
  13. Equal sharing rules in partnerships
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Siemens, Ferdinand von
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Most partnerships share profits equally among the partners. Following Kandel and Lazear (1992) it is often argued that peer pressure mitigates the arising free-rider problem. This... more

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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Most partnerships share profits equally among the partners. Following Kandel and Lazear (1992) it is often argued that peer pressure mitigates the arising free-rider problem. This line of reasoning takes the equal sharing rule as exogenously given. The purpose of our paper is to show that with inequity averse partners - a behavioral assumption akin to peer pressure - the equal sharing rule arises endogenously as an optimal solution to the incentive problem in a partnership.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93984
    Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 217
    Subjects: equal sharing rule; partnerships; incentives; peer pressure; inequity aversion
    Scope: Online-Ressource (19 S.)
  14. Psychological incentives, financial incentives, and risk attitudes in tournaments
    an artefactual field experiment
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Department of Economics and Finance, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper ; 2014,03
    Subjects: incentives; social comparison; performance feedback; peer pressure; tournament; risk aversion; artefactual field experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource (37 S.), graph. Darst.