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Displaying results 1 to 7 of 7.

  1. Investment specificity, vertical integration and market foreclosure
    Author: Bickenbach, Frank; Williams, Iestyn
    Published: 1996
    Publisher:  Inst. of World Economics, Kiel

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  2. Investment specificity, vertical integration and market foreclosure
    Author: Bickenbach, Frank; Williams, Iestyn
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel

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  3. Platform annexation
    Author: Athey, Susan; Scott Morton, Fiona
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  SIEPR Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford, CA

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Keine Rechte
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / SIEPR Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research ; no. 21, 015 (March, 2021)
    Subjects: Antitrust; platform; merger; monopolization
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten)
  4. Efficiency and equity
    a general equilibrium analysis of rent-seeking
    Author: Heijdra, Ben J.; Heijnen, Pim
    Published: October 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We study the rent-seeking phenomenon using a simple, static general equilibrium model. The economy consists of two sectors, both employing a constant returns-to-scale technology with labor as its sole input. One of the sectors is a monopoly, where a... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63
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    We study the rent-seeking phenomenon using a simple, static general equilibrium model. The economy consists of two sectors, both employing a constant returns-to-scale technology with labor as its sole input. One of the sectors is a monopoly, where a continuum of agents compete for a share of monopoly profits (i.e. rent). Agents are heterogeneous in labor productivity and rent-seeking ability: they face a choice between engaging in (productive) work or vying for a share of the rent (i.e. a contest against other rent-seekers). At the aggregate level, rent-seeking reduces the available amount of labor in the economy and thereby lowers output and welfare (rent-seeking is inefficient). At the individual level, rent-seeking shifts income towards rent-seekers. Consequently, an economy with few rent-seekers tends to have high income inequality: an effect that is exacerbated by the fact that rent is decreasing in the number of rent-seekers (low levels of rent-seeking increase inequity). This tradeoff between efficiency and equity is the primary focus of this paper. We investigate how the distribution of rent-seeking ability and the correlation between labor productivity and rent-seeking ability shape this tradeoff.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248920
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9375 (2021)
    Subjects: rent-seeking; economic waste; inequality; monopolization; contest
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Rent seeking, capital accumulation, and macroeconomic growth
    Author: Heijdra, Ben J.; Heijnen, Pim
    Published: November 2023
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We study the effects of time-using rent-seeking activities on the macroeconomic allocation and the economic growth rate. We formulate a highly stylized three-sector general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of individuals. The production... more

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    DS 63
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    We study the effects of time-using rent-seeking activities on the macroeconomic allocation and the economic growth rate. We formulate a highly stylized three-sector general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of individuals. The production side features one sector producing the capital good and two consumption goods sectors. All sectors operate under constant returns to scale technology with human and physical capital as inputs. One of the consumption goods sectors is a monopoly, where a continuum of agents compete for a share of monopoly profits. Agents are heterogeneous in their (intrinsically useless) rent-seeking ability. In the benchmark model each agent decides during youth on how much time to spend on lobbying activities, education, and production work. An intergenerational human capital externality of the 'shoulders of giants' type ensures that the model features endogenous growth. The rewards to rent-seeking accrue during youth and part of the additional income is saved. Interestingly, a move from a perfectly competitive economy to one involving monopolization and rent-seeking increases the steady-state economic growth rate in the benchmark model. We identify three main mechanisms affecting the growth rate under monopoly and rent-seeking, namely (a) the phase of life at which the rent-seeking booty is received (youth or old-age), (b) the kind of inputs used in the rent-seeking competition (raw time or education level), and (c) the type of growth engine (human or physical capital externality). The conclusions for the benchmark model are robust to changes in the mechanisms for (b) and (c) but not for (a). If rent-seeking rewards accrue during old-age then the move from a perfectly competitive economy to one involving monopolization and rent-seeking decreases the steady-state economic growth rate.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282459
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10771 (2023)
    Subjects: rent seeking; economic growth; capital accumulation; monopolization; wasteful competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Bertrand competition under network externalities
    Author: Aoyagi, Masaki
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Inst. of Social and Economic Research, Osaka

    Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who consume the same good. For a generic specification of... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 198 (884)
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    Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who consume the same good. For a generic specification of consumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium price equals the marginal cost if and only if the buyer network is complete or cyclic. When the externalities are approximately linear in the size of consumption, we identify the classes of networks in which one of the sellers monopolizes the market, or the two sellers segment the market.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/92595
    Series: Discussion paper / Institute of Social and Economic Research ; 884
    Subjects: graphs; networks; externalities; Bertrand; divide and conquer; discriminatory pricing; monopolization; segmentation
    Scope: Online-Ressource (46 S.)
  7. On the relevance of market power
    Author: Kaplow, Louis
    Published: 10/2016
    Publisher:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

    Market power is the most important determinant of liability in competition law cases throughout the world. Yet fundamental questions on the relevance of market power are underanalyzed, if examined at all: When and why should we inquire into market... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Market power is the most important determinant of liability in competition law cases throughout the world. Yet fundamental questions on the relevance of market power are underanalyzed, if examined at all: When and why should we inquire into market power? How much should we require? Should market power be viewed as one thing, regardless of the practice under scrutiny and independent of the pertinent anticompetitive and procompetitive explanations for its use? Does each component of market power have the same probative force? Or even influence optimal liability determinations in the same direction? This Article's ground-up investigation of market power finds that the answers often differ from what is generally believed and sometimes are surprising — notably, higher levels of certain market power measures or particular market power components sometimes disfavor liability. This gulf between conventional wisdom and correct understanding suggests the need to redirect research agendas, agency guidance, and competition law doctrine

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 886
    Subjects: Market power; dominance; monopolization; abuse; antitrust; competition policy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 84 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Forthcoming in Harvard Law Review (March 2017)