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  1. The causal effect of trust
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick
    Published: October 2018
    Publisher:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the... more

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    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/192913
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 304
    Subjects: Trust; causality; equilibrium selection; belief distortions; incomplete contracts; screening; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Regulation of Europe's network industries
    the perspective of the new economic theory of federalism
    Author: Bickenbach, Frank
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Inst. of World Economics, Kiel

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  3. Investment specificity, vertical integration and market foreclosure
    Author: Bickenbach, Frank; Williams, Iestyn
    Published: 1996
    Publisher:  Inst. of World Economics, Kiel

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  4. The new institutional economics of antitrust and regulation
    Author: Bickenbach, Frank; Kumkar, Lars; Soltwedel, Rüdiger
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel

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  5. Investment specificity, vertical integration and market foreclosure
    Author: Bickenbach, Frank; Williams, Iestyn
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel

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  6. Regulation of Europe's network industries : the perspective of the new economic theory of federalism
    Author: Bickenbach, Frank
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel

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  7. Blockchain
    the birth of decentralized governance
    Author: Arruñada, Benito; Garicano, Luis
    Published: April 2018
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1038
    Subjects: blockchain; platforms; networks; hold‐up; coordination; relational capital; incomplete contracts; decentralized governance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. The extrinsic motivation of freedom at work
    Author: Tan, Teck Yong
    Published: 2017
    Publisher:  EGC, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

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    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: EGC report ; no: 2017, 15
    Subjects: Freedom at work; incomplete contracts; ratchet effect; strategic ignorance; innovation; asymmetric information
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Complete contracts under incomplete information
    Author: Curello, Gregorio; Lyu, Qianjun; Zhang, Yimeng
    Published: November 2024
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, [Bonn]

    We study a moral hazard model in which the output is stochastically determined by both the agent's hidden effort and an uncertain state of the world. We investigate how the contractibility of the ex-post realization of the state affects the... more

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    We study a moral hazard model in which the output is stochastically determined by both the agent's hidden effort and an uncertain state of the world. We investigate how the contractibility of the ex-post realization of the state affects the principal's incentive to provide information. While detailed information allows the principal to better tailor the effort levels to the revealed states, coarser information enables the principal to base payments on the ex-post realization of states, thereby designing incentive schemes more effectively. Our main result establishes that when the state is contractible, full information is never optimal; however, when the state is not contractible, under certain conditions, full information is optimal.

     
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    hdl: 10419/307311
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 347
    Subjects: Moral hazard; contractibility; information design; complete contracts; incomplete contracts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings
    Author: Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Oexl, Regine
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on effort provision in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate... more

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    Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on effort provision in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principalagent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on the agent's effort provision than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeatedgame effect and a noise-canceling effect is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on effort provision.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/250149
    Series: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2021, 27
    Subjects: Gift exchange; principal agent model; incomplete contracts; random shocks; reciprocity; laboratory experiments; long-term contracts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements
    Author: Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John L.
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Performance ; no. 1867 (August 2022)
    Subjects: hold-up problem; sourcing; incomplete contracts; regionalism
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements
    Author: Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John L.
    Published: August 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We study the welfare impact of rules of origin in free trade agreements where final-good producers source customized inputs from suppliers within the trading bloc. We employ a property-rights framework that features hold-up problems in suppliers'... more

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    We study the welfare impact of rules of origin in free trade agreements where final-good producers source customized inputs from suppliers within the trading bloc. We employ a property-rights framework that features hold-up problems in suppliers' decisions to invest, and where underinvestment is more severe for higher productivity firms. A rule of origin offers preferred market access for final goods if a sufficiently high fraction of inputs used in the production process is sourced within the trading bloc. Such a rule alters behavior for only a subset of suppliers, as some (very-high-productivity) suppliers comply with the rule in an unconstrained way and some (very-low-productivity) suppliers choose not to comply. For those suppliers it does affect, the rule increases investment, but it also induces excessive sourcing (for given investment) within the trading bloc. From a social standpoint, it is best to have a rule that affects high-productivity suppliers. The reason is that the marginal net welfare gain from tightening the rule increases with productivity. Therefore, when industry productivity is high, a strict rule of origin is socially desirable; in contrast, when industry productivity is low, no rule of origin is likely to help. Regardless of the case, a sufficiently strict rule can (weakly) ensure welfare gains.

     
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    hdl: 10419/265955
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9920 (2022)
    Subjects: hold-up problem; sourcing; incomplete contracts; regionalism
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Socially responsible investment
    ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining
    Author: Adachi-Sato, Meg
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Edition: Revised March 4, 2021
    Series: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2021, 20
    Subjects: social responsible investment; esg; multitask; hold-up; incomplete contracts; social impact bonds; sustainability-linked bonds
    Scope: 38 Seiten, 1 ungezählte Seite, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    "This paper was originally titled "Contract duration and socially responsible investment"" - Fußnote Seite 1

    "Revised: March 3, 2022" - Seite 1
  14. Socially responsible investment
    ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining
    Author: Adachi-Sato, Meg
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

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    W 1634 (2021,20 rev. 2)
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Edition: Revised May 6, 2022
    Series: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2021, 20
    Subjects: social responsible investment; esg; multitask; hold-up; incomplete contracts; social impact bonds; sustainability-linked bonds
    Scope: 36 Seiten, 1 ungezählte Seite, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    "This paper was originally titled "Contract duration and socially responsible investment"" - Fußnote Seite 1

    "Revised: March 9, 2022" - Seite 1

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  15. Multinational firms' organisational dynamics
    competition intensity and the ownership decision under uncertainty
    Author: Navarro, Leandro Gastón
    Published: February 25, 2021
    Publisher:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    I analyse firms organisational choices when they face uncertainty about institutional conditions in foreign locations with heterogeneous final good producers and incomplete contracts. As firms learn about the conditions abroad, the increasing... more

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    I analyse firms organisational choices when they face uncertainty about institutional conditions in foreign locations with heterogeneous final good producers and incomplete contracts. As firms learn about the conditions abroad, the increasing offshoring activity increases competition in the final goods market, leading to a progressive vertical disintegration of the supply chains. Initially, the firms that decide to explore offshoring potential choose integration. As competition in final good markets intensifies, the least productive ones among them switch sequentially to arm's length trade. In the fully domestic supply chains, the increasing competition promotes a sequential disintegration of the domestic intermediate input suppliers. I test for the predictions of the model using sectorallevel data for the US manufacturing sectors.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/242389
    Series: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 61
    Subjects: Firm theory; multinational firms; incomplete contracts; global sourcing; uncertainty; sequential offshoring; information externalities; learning; competition; outsourcing; forward and backward integration; FDI
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 104 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Overcoming contractual incompleteness
    the role of guiding principles
    Author: Frydlinger, David; Hart, Oliver
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

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    Language: English
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    Format: Online
    Edition: Revised, August 2019
    Series: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 1016 (09/2019)
    Subjects: incomplete contracts; guiding principles; self-serving biases; reference points; aggrievement; shading; loyalty; equity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten)
    Notes:

    Auch NBER Working Paper No. 26245
  17. Overcoming contractual incompleteness
    the role of guiding principles
    Author: Frydlinger, David; Hart, Oliver D.
    Published: September 2019
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 26245
    Subjects: Unvollständiger Vertrag; Vertragsrecht; Vertragstheorie; incomplete contracts; guiding principles; self-serving biases; reference points; aggrievement; shading; loyalty; equity
    Scope: 38 Seiten
    Notes:

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  18. Information processing
    contracts versus communication
    Author: Blume, Andreas; Deimen, Inga; Inoue, Sean
    Published: July 13, 2020
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics working papers / Eller College of Management ; 20, 06
    Subjects: strategic communication; cheap talk; incomplete contracts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Trust and contracts
    empirical evidence
    Author: D'Acunto, Francesco; Xie, Jin; Yao, Jiaquan
    Published: November 2020
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Trust between parties should drive the negotiation and design of contract: if parties did not trust each others' reaction to unplanned events, they might agree to pay higher costs of negotiation to complete contracts. Using a unique sample of U.S.... more

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    Trust between parties should drive the negotiation and design of contract: if parties did not trust each others' reaction to unplanned events, they might agree to pay higher costs of negotiation to complete contracts. Using a unique sample of U.S. principal-agent consulting contracts and a negative shock to trust between parties staggered across space and over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Not only contract complexity but also the verifiable states of the world contracts cover increase after a drop in trust. The results hold for several text-analysis-based measures of completeness and do not arise when agents are also principals (shareholders) or in other falsification tests. Non-compete agreements, confidentiality and indemnification clauses, and restrictions to agents' actions are more likely to be added to contracts signed in the same locations, same industries, and same years after a negative shock to trust.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
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    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/229532
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8714 (2020)
    Subjects: empirical contract theory; incomplete contracts; cultural economics; beliefs and choice; corporate finance; consulting; textual analysis; non-compete agreements; big five; fraud; accounting; management; organization
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. The organizational economics of school chains
    Author: Neri, Lorenzo; Pasini, Elisabetta; Silva, Olmo
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Although school autonomy is often advocated as a way to improve student achievement, many countries are experiencing a counterbalancing trend: the emergence of 'chains' that bind schools together into structures with varying degrees of... more

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    Although school autonomy is often advocated as a way to improve student achievement, many countries are experiencing a counterbalancing trend: the emergence of 'chains' that bind schools together into structures with varying degrees of centralization. Despite their prominence, no evidence exists on the determinants and effects of differences in the organizational set-up of school chains. Our work aims to fill this gap. We use some of the key insights of the organizational economics of firms to study the organization of school chains. We match survey information on decentralization decisions of procurement activities for approximately 400 chains and 2,000 schools in England to student-, school and market-level administrative records. We find that chains with a larger share of schools whose leadership background is aligned with the chain board's expertise, younger chains, and chains that are closer to the market value-added (productivity) frontier decentralize more. We find instead no association between the value-added heterogeneity of the markets in which chains operate and their decision to delegate. We also investigate the link between the structures of chains and their students' performance. We find no association between decentralization and performance. This is consistent with the intuition that chains choose their organization in ways that maximize output (i.e., students' learning) and so the equilibrium relationship between performance and organizational set-up is flat.

     
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    hdl: 10419/263658
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15442
    Subjects: school chains; school autonomy; organizational economics; incomplete contracts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods?
    Author: Schmitz, Patrick W.
    Published: 24 June 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP19177
    Subjects: public goods; property rights; investment incentives; asset ownership; incomplete contracts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 17 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Socially responsible investment
    ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining
    Author: Adachi-Sato, Meg
    Published: September 28, 2021
    Publisher:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1634 (2021,20)
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Edition: Revised: August 20, 2021
    Series: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2021, 20
    Subjects: social responsible investment; esg; multitask; hold-up; incomplete contracts; social impact bonds; sustainability-linked bonds
    Scope: 42 Seiten, 1 ungezählte Seite, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    "This paper was originally titled "Contract duration and socially responsible investment"" - Fußnote Seite 1

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  23. Contract duration and socially responsible investment
    Author: Adachi-Sato, Meg
    Published: May 11, 2021
    Publisher:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

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    W 1634 (2021,14)
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Edition: Revised: Feb 18, 2021
    Series: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2021, 14
    Subjects: social responsible investment; esg; multitask; hold-up; incomplete contracts; social impact bonds; sustainability-linked bonds
    Scope: 34 Seiten
    Notes:

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  24. Technology transfer in global value chains
    Author: Sampson, Thomas
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Performance ; no. 1826 (February 2022)
    Subjects: technology transfer; global value chains; incomplete contracts; intellectual property rights; imitation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Technology transfer in global value chains
    Author: Sampson, Thomas
    Published: January 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Firm-to-firm relationships in global value chains create opportunities for North-South technology diffusion. This paper studies technology transfer in value chains when contracts are incomplete and input production technologies are imperfectly... more

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    Firm-to-firm relationships in global value chains create opportunities for North-South technology diffusion. This paper studies technology transfer in value chains when contracts are incomplete and input production technologies are imperfectly excludable. The paper introduces a new taxonomy of value chains based on whether or not the headquarters firm benefits from imitation of its supplier’s technology. In inclusive value chains, where imitation is beneficial, the headquarters firm promotes technology diffusion. By contrast, in exclusive value chains headquarters seeks to limit supplier imitation. The paper analyzes how this distinction affects the returns to offshoring, the welfare effects of technical change and the social efficiency of knowledge sharing. Weaker intellectual property rights over input production technologies raise welfare when value chains are inclusive, but have the opposite effect under exclusive value chains.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252049
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9532 (2022)
    Subjects: technology transfer; global value chains; incomplete contracts; intellectual property rights; imitation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen