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Displaying results 1 to 25 of 82.

  1. Oase des Glücks
    Gedanken zu einer Ontologie des Spiels
    Author: Fink, Eugen
    Published: 2023
    Publisher:  Verlag Karl Alber, Baden-Baden

    Zu Eugen Finks wohl bedeutendsten Texten gehört "Oase des Glücks. Gedanken zu einer Ontologie des Spiels". Vor dem Hintergrund eines breiten philosophischen sowie sozial- und kulturwissenschaftlichen Interesses am Phänomen des Spiels entwickelt der... more

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    Zu Eugen Finks wohl bedeutendsten Texten gehört "Oase des Glücks. Gedanken zu einer Ontologie des Spiels". Vor dem Hintergrund eines breiten philosophischen sowie sozial- und kulturwissenschaftlichen Interesses am Phänomen des Spiels entwickelt der Freiburger Denker in diesem Buch einen eigenständigen und innovativen Zugang zum Spiel bzw. zum Spielen, der sich als Klassiker der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts erweisen dürfte. Der vorliegende Band zu Finks "Oase des Glücks" enthält diesen grundlegenden Text sowie zahlreiche Interpretationen aus der Feder führender Fink-Forscherinnen und -Forscher. Er führt nicht nur in Finks Überlegungen zum Spiel, sondern auch methodologisch in seinen genuinen phänomenologischen Ansatz ein und zeigt die breite internationale Rezeption wie auch die gegenwärtige Bedeutung dieses Philosophen, der manchmal zu Unrecht im Schatten seiner beiden Lehrer Husserl und Heidegger steht One of Eugen Fink's most important texts is "Oasis of Happiness. Thoughts on an Ontology of Play". Against the background of the interest in the phenomenon of play in philosophy and the social and cul-tural sciences, the Freiburg philosopher develops in this book an independent and innovative approach to play and playing, which is likely to prove a classic of 20th century philosophy. This volume on Fink's "Oasis of Happiness" contains not only this fundamental text, but also numerous interpretations from leading Fink scholars. It introduces not only Fink's reflections on play, but also methodologically his genuine phenomenological approach, and shows the broad international reception as well as the current importance of this philosopher, who is sometimes unjustly overshadowed by his two teachers Husserl and Heidegger

     
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  2. Patents and patent races. Do we need them? How should we behave?
    Author: Stefan, Cristian
    Published: 2016

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    RVK Categories: QP 215
    DDC Categories: 330
    Other subjects: Spieltheorie; game theory; experimentelle Ökonomik; experimental economics; Patentregulierung; Patentanträge; Pharmaka; Patentrennen-Literatur; Patent regulation; patent applications; pharmaceuticals; patent race literature
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 236 Seiten), Illustration, Diagramme
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    Dissertation, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2016
  3. Multi-agent-based simulation XI
    International Workshop, MABS 2010, Toronto, Canada, May 11, 2010 : revised selected papers
    Contributor: Bosse, Tibor (Publisher); Geller, Armando (Publisher); Jonker, Catholijn M. (Publisher)
    Published: [2011]
    Publisher:  Springer, Berlin ; Heidelberg

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Contributor: Bosse, Tibor (Publisher); Geller, Armando (Publisher); Jonker, Catholijn M. (Publisher)
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783642183454
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    RVK Categories: SS 4800
    Series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; 6532 : Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
    Subjects: Computerspiel; Agent <Informatik>; Mehragentensystem; Computersimulation
    Other subjects: Paperback / softback; Professional/practitioner; MABS; agent simulation; agent societies; agent-based simulation; agent-based systems; economic simulation; environment modeling; evolutionary search; game theory; information sharing; multi-agent simulation; multi-agent systems; self organization; social modeling; social simulation; urban modeling; visual programming
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (X, 166 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Patents and patent races. Do we need them? How should we behave?
    Author: Stefan, Cristian
    Published: 2016

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    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
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    RVK Categories: QP 215
    DDC Categories: 330
    Other subjects: Spieltheorie; game theory; experimentelle Ökonomik; experimental economics; Patentregulierung; Patentanträge; Pharmaka; Patentrennen-Literatur; Patent regulation; patent applications; pharmaceuticals; patent race literature
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 236 Seiten), Illustration, Diagramme
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    Dissertation, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2016
  5. How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior
    cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment
    Author: Gill, David; Knepper, Zachary; Prowse, Victoria; Zhou, Junya
    Published: July 2024
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict... more

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    We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However, individuals with better judgment choose zero less frequently, and we uncover a novel dynamic mechanism that sheds light on this pattern. Taken together, our results indicate that fluid (i.e., analytical) intelligence is a primary driver of strategic level-k thinking, while facets of judgment that are distinct from fluid intelligence drive the lower inclination of high judgment individuals to choose zero.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/302685
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 17168
    Subjects: cognitive ability; judgment; fluid intelligence; matrix reasoning; beauty contest; strategic sophistication; level-k; experiment; game theory
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. TSO coordination and strategic behaviour
    a game theoretical and simulation model study based on the German electricity grid
    Author: Flachsbarth, Franziska; Pechan, Anna; Palovic, Martin; Koch, Matthias; Bauknecht, Dierk; Brunekreeft, Gert
    Published: July 2024
    Publisher:  Constructor University Bremen, Bremen Energy Research (BER), Bremen

    The electricity grid includes multiple network areas managed by different operators, with transmission system operators (TSOs) handling high-voltage areas and distribution system operators managing midto low-voltage areas. These areas are... more

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    The electricity grid includes multiple network areas managed by different operators, with transmission system operators (TSOs) handling high-voltage areas and distribution system operators managing midto low-voltage areas. These areas are interconnected and synchronized, creating classical external effects where one operator's actions impact others. Recently, high voltage direct current (HVDC) lines have been introduced, offering operators greater flexibility and control over power flows compared to conventional alternating current (AC) lines, thereby reducing congestion and losses. However, HVDC lines can significantly affect neighbouring grids, potentially leading to strategic behaviour by network operators. This paper examines the strategic use of HVDC lines, using a model-based approach on projected 2030 market data in the German electricity system. It finds that without explicit coordination mechanisms most hours result in incentives for non-cooperative outcomes, with only three hours within one year showing incentives for a cooperative outcome. Despite lower overall system costs with cooperation, asymmetric distribution of cooperation benefits prevents long-term cooperation. Thus, cost-revenuesharing schemes are needed to promote cooperation and balance benefits.

     
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    hdl: 10419/301207
    Series: Bremen energy working papers ; no. 48
    Subjects: TSO coordination; strategic behaviour; game theory; simulation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten)
  7. An exploratory study of how sleep restriction impacts choice in two classic normal form games
    Author: Dickinson, David L.
    Published: February 2018
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC

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    Series: Department of Economics working paper / Appalachian State University ; number 18, 02
    Subjects: Sleep deprivation; game theory; heuristics; experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 11 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. High-frequency trading
    insights from analytical models and simulated agent-based models
    Author: Kalimullina, Lina
    Published: 2018

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10900/87097
    Subjects: Markt; Hochfrequenz; Handel; Spieltheorie; Mikrostruktur; high-frequency trading; market microstructure; game theory; agent-based models; artificial markets; trading strategies
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (xv, 209 Blätter)
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    Dissertation ist erst 2019 erschienen

    Dissertation, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, 2019
  9. Identifying the ranking of focal points in coordination games on the individual level
    Author: Schmidt, Robert J.
    Published: 27 Mrz. 2019
    Publisher:  University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg

    We propose a method to identify the ranking of focal points (Schelling, 1960) on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination, where subjects bet on only one alternative, subjects coordinate by the distribution of points. This... more

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    We propose a method to identify the ranking of focal points (Schelling, 1960) on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination, where subjects bet on only one alternative, subjects coordinate by the distribution of points. This allows them to invest in multiple alternatives and to weigh their choices. As a result, subjects not only reveal which alternative appears most focal to them, but the ranking of the available alternatives with regard to the degree of focality. In an experiment on the elicitation of social norms (Krupka and Weber, 2013), we compare the proposed mechanism with conventional coordination. The data confirms the theoretical predictions regarding coordination behavior and demonstrates that the proposed technique is suited to identify the heterogeneity of focal points on the individual level. Moreover, using Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the proposed mechanism identifies focal points on the group level significantly more efficiently than ordinary coordination. Finally, we point to the possibility to use the mechanism as a simple and direct tool to measure the degree of strategic uncertainty on the individual level.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/207636
    Series: Discussion paper series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; no. 660
    Subjects: coordination; focal points; game theory; methodology; social norms
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (15 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Bounded rationality in Keynesian beauty contests
    a lesson for central bankers?
    Author: Mauersberger, Felix; Nagel, Rosemarie; Bühren, Christoph
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  [Kiel Inst. for the World Economy], [Kiel]

    The great recession (2008) triggered an apparent discrepancy between empirical findings and macroeconomic models based on rational expectations alone. This gap led to a series of recent developments of a behavioral microfoundation of macroeconomics... more

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    The great recession (2008) triggered an apparent discrepancy between empirical findings and macroeconomic models based on rational expectations alone. This gap led to a series of recent developments of a behavioral microfoundation of macroeconomics combined with the underlying experimental and behavioral Beauty Contest (BC) literature, which the authors review in this paper. They introduce the reader to variations of the Keynesian Beauty Contest (Keynes, The general theory of employment, interest, and money, 1936), theoretically and experimentally, demonstrating systematic patterns of out-of-equilibrium behavior. This divergence of (benchmark) solutions and bounded rationality observed in human behavior has been resolved through stepwise reasoning, the so-called level k, or cognitive hierarchy models. Furthermore, the authors show how the generalized BC function with limited parameter specifications encompasses relevant micro and macro models. Therefore, the stepwise reasoning models emerge naturally as building blocks for new behavioral macroeconomic theories to understand puzzles like the lacking rise of inflation after the financial crisis, the efficacy of quantitative easing, the forward guidance puzzle, and the effectiveness of temporary fiscal expansion.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    hdl: 10419/219998
    Series: Economics ; vol. 14, 2020-16
    Subjects: Beauty Contest game; expectation formation; equilibration; level k reasoning; behavioral macroeconomics; game theory; experimental economics
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Parallel markets in school choice
    Author: Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz; Evdokimov, Piotr; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Turhan, Bertan
    Published: June 13, 2021
    Publisher:  Iowa State University, Department of Economics, Ames, Iowa

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    Series: Working paper / Iowa State University, Department of Economics ; number 21007
    Subjects: Matching markets; deferred acceptance; information acquisition; game theory; lab experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Remanufacturing with innovative features
    a strategic analysis
    Author: Cetin, Can Baris; Zaccour, Georges
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  GERAD, HÉC Montréal, Montréal (Québec), Canada

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    Series: Les cahiers du GERAD ; G-2022, 40 (September 2022)
    Subjects: Remanufacturing; innovation; competition; game theory; pricing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Board structure variety in cooperatives
    Author: Hendrikse, George W. J.; Nilsson, Jerker
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), Rotterdam

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 1765/137123
    Series: ERIM report series research in management ; ERS-2022-006-ORG
    Subjects: Internal governance; Board of Directors; Management; decision rights; game theory
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 14 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. A contractarian view on homann's ethical approach
    the vision of "new ordoliberalism"
    Author: Davies, Clem; Franke, Marcel; Kuang, Lida; Neumärker, Bernhard
    Published: July 19, 2022
    Publisher:  University of Freiburg, Institute for Economic Research, Götz Werner Chair of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory (GWP), Freiburg

    Homann's method is a sophisticated theoretical model. As a result, it contains a normative foundation upon which Homann bases his endeavor, as well as numerous conclusions following his positive analysis. We propose extensions to both the normative... more

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    Homann's method is a sophisticated theoretical model. As a result, it contains a normative foundation upon which Homann bases his endeavor, as well as numerous conclusions following his positive analysis. We propose extensions to both the normative and positive aspects of Homann's theory in this article. On a normative basis, we recommend taking into account our approach of New Ordoliberalism. In addition to the prisoner's dilemma, we consider the moral dilemma of the hawk-dove game on a positive footing. Additionally, we also present an experimental design. Die Methode Homanns ist ein ausgefeiltes theoretisches Modell. Es enthält sowohl eine normative Grundlage, auf der Homann sein Unterfangen aufbaut, als auch zahlreiche Schlussfolgerungen, die sich aus seiner positiven Analyse ergeben. In diesem Artikel entwickeln wir Erweiterungen sowohl für die normativen als auch für die positiven Aspekte von Homanns Theorie. Zum Ausbau der normativen Dimension empfehlen wir unseren Ansatz des Neuen Ordoliberalismus zu berücksichtigen. In positiver Hinsicht betrachten wir das moralische Dilemma der Gesellschaft neben der Rekonstruktion im Gefangenendilemma auch im Falke-Taube-Spiel. Weiterhin stellen wir einen Versuchsaufbau hierzu vor.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    hdl: 10419/262011
    Series: Constitutional economics network working paper series ; no. 2022, 01
    Subjects: constitutional economics; game theory; New Ordoliberalism; social contract experiment; strategy-proofness; renegotiation-proofness; Ordnungsökonomie; Spieltheorie; Neuer Ordoliberalismus; Sozialvertragsexperiment; Manipulationssicherheit; Nachverhandlungsstabilität
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten)
  15. Autonomous vehicles
    moral dilemmas and adoption incentives
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Mühlheußer, Gerd
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    In unavoidable traffic accidents, autonomous vehicles (AVs) face the dilemma of protecting either the passenger(s) or third parties. Recent studies show that most people prefer AVs following a utilitarian approach by minimizing total harm. At the... more

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    In unavoidable traffic accidents, autonomous vehicles (AVs) face the dilemma of protecting either the passenger(s) or third parties. Recent studies show that most people prefer AVs following a utilitarian approach by minimizing total harm. At the same time, however, they would adopt an AV only if it prioritizes the passenger(s), i.e. themselves. As AVs exhibit a lower accident risk in the first place, a regulator therefore faces a trade-off: the harm-minimizing behavior of AVs (ex post efficiency) hampers the willingness to adopt them (ex ante efficiency). Using a game-theoretic model, we analyze how the second-best optimal level of AV passenger protection depends on (i) the AV safety advantage, (ii) the intensity of drivers' social preferences, and (iii) their reluctance to adopt AVs. A higher AV safety advantage may either increase or decrease the second best optimal level of passenger protection.

     
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    hdl: 10419/263755
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9825 (2022)
    Subjects: autonomous vehicles; ethical dilemma; trolley problem; adoption of new technologies; game theory
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Evolution of cooperative networks
    Author: Pandey, Siddhi Gyan
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi

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    Series: NIPFP working paper series ; no. 346 (24-August-2021)
    Subjects: coordination game; network formation; game theory; social networks
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Strategic complexity and the value of thinking
    Author: Gill, David; Prowse, Victoria
    Published: May 2022
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Response times are a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games. In this paper, we leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation... more

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    Response times are a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games. In this paper, we leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on average when they face that situation (where we categorize situations according to the characteristics of play in the previous round). We find that strategic complexity varies significantly across situations, and we find considerable heterogeneity in how responsive subjects' thinking times are to complexity. We also study how variation in response times at the individual level across rounds affects strategic behavior and success: when a subject thinks for longer than she would normally do in a particular situation, she wins less frequently and earns less. The behavioral mechanism that drives the reduction in performance is a tendency to move away from Nash equilibrium behavior. Finally, cognitive ability and personality have no effect on average response times.

     
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    hdl: 10419/263491
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15275
    Subjects: response time; decision time; deliberation time; thinking time; complexity; level-k; game theory; strategic game; repeated games; beauty contest; cognitive ability; personality
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Strict incentives and strategic uncertainty
    Author: Carlsson, Hans; Wichardt, Philipp C.
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    This paper proposes a comprehensive perspective on the question of self-enforcing solutions for normal form games. While this question has been widely discussed in the literature, the focus is usually either on strict incentives for players to stay... more

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    This paper proposes a comprehensive perspective on the question of self-enforcing solutions for normal form games. While this question has been widely discussed in the literature, the focus is usually either on strict incentives for players to stay within the proposed solution or on strategic uncertainty, i.e. robustness to trembles. The present approach combines both requirements in proposing the concept of robust sets, i.e. sets of strategy profiles which satisfy both strict incentives and robustness to strategic uncertainty. The result is a set valued solution, a variant of which is shown to exist for all finite normal form games.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/201941
    Edition: This Version: June 10, 2019
    Series: Array ; no. 7715 (June 2019)
    Subjects: game theory; self-enforcing solution; strict incentives; strategic uncertainty
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Competition between offline and online retailers with heterogeneous customers
    Author: Colombo, Stefano; Matsushima, Noriaki
    Published: May 2019
    Publisher:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    We consider the spatial competition between two traditional physical (or offline) retailers and an Internet (or online) retailer where the efficiency of the latter differs from that of the former. We assume consumers are heterogeneous across two... more

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    We consider the spatial competition between two traditional physical (or offline) retailers and an Internet (or online) retailer where the efficiency of the latter differs from that of the former. We assume consumers are heterogeneous across two dimensions: (i) the costs of traveling to either of the offline retailers and (ii) the costs of purchasing from the online retailer. Both dimensions depend on the spatial location of consumers and are independent of each other. We show that the online retailer maximizes its profit at an intermediate level of the consumer disutility of online purchase when its efficiency is low.

     
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    hdl: 10419/230463
    Series: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1056
    Subjects: e-commerce; game theory; horizontal differentiation; vertical differentiation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering
    clash or cooperation?
    Author: Heyen, Daniel; Horton, Joshua B.; Moreno Cruz, Juan
    Published: December 2018
    Publisher:  Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, [London, UK]

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    Series: Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy working paper ; no. 345
    Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment working paper ; no. 313
    Subjects: climate intervention; solar geoengineering; counter-geoengineering; free driver; strategic conflicts; game theory; cooperation; externality; global warming; international environmental agreements
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. The effects of the assign-back provision on R&D
    an application of the guidelines of the European Union, the United States and Japan
    Author: Hatanaka, Kaori
    Published: March 2018
    Publisher:  National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan

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    Format: Online
    Series: GRIPS discussion paper ; 17, 17
    Subjects: license contract; grant-back; game theory
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Investigating the failure to best respond in experimental games
    Author: Alempaki, Despoina; Colman, Andrew M.; Kölle, Felix; Loomes, Graham; Pulford, Briony D.
    Published: November 2019
    Publisher:  CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics, Nottingham

    In experimental games, a substantial minority of players often fail to best respond. Using two-person 3x3 one-shot games, we investigated whether 'structuring' the pre-decision deliberation process produces greater consistency between individuals'... more

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    In experimental games, a substantial minority of players often fail to best respond. Using two-person 3x3 one-shot games, we investigated whether 'structuring' the pre-decision deliberation process produces greater consistency between individuals' stated values and beliefs on the one hand and their choice of action on the other. Despite this intervention, only just over half of strategy choices constituted best responses. Allowing for risk aversion made little systematic difference. Distinguishing between players according to their other-regarding preferences made a statistically significant difference, but best response rates increased only marginally. It may be that some irreducible minimum level of noise/imprecision generates some proportion of sub-optimal choices. If so, more research might usefully be directed towards competing models of stochastic strategic choice.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/228359
    Series: CeDEx discussion paper series ; no. 2019, 13
    Subjects: game theory; best response; strategic thinking; social preferences; stated beliefs
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Explicit solution algorithms for order and price postponement in multiperiodic channel optimization
    Author: Gholami, Reza Azad; Sandal, Leif K.; Ubøe, Jan
    Published: September 2019
    Publisher:  Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen

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    hdl: 11250/2614276
    Series: Discussion paper / Department of Business and Management Science ; 2019, 09
    Subjects: stochastic optimization; bilevel programming; game theory; pricing theory; stochastic demand; time-dependent demand; price-dependent demand
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  24. Solution algorithms for optimal buy-back contracts in multi-period channel equilibria with stochastic demand and delayed information
    Author: Gholami, Reza Azad; Sandal, Leif K.; Ubøe, Jan
    Published: September 2019
    Publisher:  Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen

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    Series: Discussion paper / Department of Business and Management Science ; 2019, 10
    Subjects: stochastic optimization; bilevel programming; game theory; channel coordination; buy-back contracts; price postponement; pricing theory; contract theory
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Cheap-talk communication in procurement auctions
    theory and experiment
    Author: Onderstal, Sander; Yang, Yang
    Published: February 22, 2020
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    In procurement auctions, bidders are usually better informed about technical, financial, or legal aspects of the goods and services procured. Therefore, the buyer may include a dialogue in the procurement procedure which enables the suppliers to... more

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    In procurement auctions, bidders are usually better informed about technical, financial, or legal aspects of the goods and services procured. Therefore, the buyer may include a dialogue in the procurement procedure which enables the suppliers to reveal information that will help the buyer to better specify the terms of the contract. This paper addresses the question of the value added of letting the sourcing process consist of both an auction and a negotiation stage, theoretically and in a laboratory experiment. Our theoretical results suggest that in a setting where the buyer and the suppliers have aligned interests regarding the terms of the contract, allowing the winning supplier to communicate with the buyer after the auction is beneficial to the buyer compared to no communication and ex-ante communication. In a setting where the buyer and the winning supplier have misaligned interests regarding the terms, the buyer benefits from ex-ante communication relative to no communication and ex-post communication. Our experimental data provide strong evidence for the predictions in the aligned-interest setting. In the misaligned-interest setting, we do not observe significant differences between the three mechanisms. Our experimental findings offer several managerial implications for the appropriate design of sourcing processes.

     
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    hdl: 10419/220050
    Series: Array ; TI 2020, 013
    Subjects: Procurement auctions; bidding; cheap-talk communication; negotiations; game theory; experimental economics
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen