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  1. Bank leverage, welfare, and regulation
    Author: Admati, Anat R.; Hellwig, Martin
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    We take issue with claims that the funding mix of banks, which makes them fragile and crisisprone, is efficient because it reflects special liquidity benefits of bank debt. Even aside from neglecting the systemic damage to the economy that banks'... more

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    We take issue with claims that the funding mix of banks, which makes them fragile and crisisprone, is efficient because it reflects special liquidity benefits of bank debt. Even aside from neglecting the systemic damage to the economy that banks' distress and default cause, such claims are invalid because banks have multiple small creditors and are unable to commit effectively to their overall funding mix and investment strategy ex ante. The resulting market outcomes under laissez-faire are inefficient and involve excessive borrowing, with default risks that jeopardize the purported liquidity benefits. Contrary to claims in the literature that "equity is expensive" and that regulation requiring more equity in the funding mix entails costs to society, such regulation actually helps create useful commitment for banks to avoid the inefficiently high borrowing that comes under laissez-faire. Effective regulation is beneficial even without considering systemic risk; if such regulation also reduces systemic risk, the benefits are even larger.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0002-8020-8
    hdl: 10419/204695
    Edition: Revised January 14, 2019
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2018, 13
    Subjects: Liquidity in banking; leverage in banking; banking regulation; capital structure; capital regulations; agency costs; commitment; contracting; maturity rat race; leverage ratchet effect; Basel
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten)
  2. Performancemessung und Informationsgehalt in einer Agency-Beziehung mit beschränkter Selbstbindungskraft
    Author: Schöndube, Jens Robert
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  Univ., FEMM, Magdeburg

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Working paper series / Otto von Guericke University, FEMM, Faculty of Economics and Management ; 2003,14
    Subjects: Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Leistungsanreiz; Verhandlungstheorie; Leistungsbeurteilung; Rechnungswesen; Informationswert; Theorie; commitment
    Scope: 33 S, graph. Darst
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    Literaturverz. S. 26 - 28
  3. Present bias in choices over food and money
    Author: Danzer, Alexander M.; Zeidler, Helen
    Published: October 2024
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    This paper investigates time inconsistencies in food consumption based on a field experiment at a college canteen where participants repeatedly select and consume lunch menus. The design features a convex non-monetary budget in a natural environment... more

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    This paper investigates time inconsistencies in food consumption based on a field experiment at a college canteen where participants repeatedly select and consume lunch menus. The design features a convex non-monetary budget in a natural environment and satisfies the consume-on-receipt assumption. Leveraging 3,666 choices of different food healthiness, we find no time inconsistency at the meal level. Utility weight estimates at the dish level reveal that consumers balance healthiness between food categories. Individuals who exert self-control take up a commitment device as soon as available, while non-committers are present-biased. Dynamic inconsistencies in food and money choices are independent.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/307239
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 17415
    Subjects: field experiment; dynamic inconsistency; commitment; food consumption
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Present bias in choices over food and money
    Author: Danzer, Alexander M.; Zeidler, Helen
    Published: November 2024
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    This paper investigates time inconsistencies in food consumption based on a field experiment at a college canteen where participants repeatedly select and consume lunch menus. The design features a convex non-monetary budget in a natural environment... more

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    This paper investigates time inconsistencies in food consumption based on a field experiment at a college canteen where participants repeatedly select and consume lunch menus. The design features a convex non-monetary budget in a natural environment and satisfies the consume-on-receipt assumption. Leveraging 3,666 choices of different food healthiness, we find no time inconsistency at the meal level. Utility weight estimates at the dish level reveal that consumers balance healthiness between food categories. Individuals who exert self-control take up a commitment device as soon as available, while non-committers are present-biased. Dynamic inconsistencies in food and money choices are independent.

     
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    Series: CESifo working papers ; 11454 (2024)
    Subjects: field experiment; dynamic inconsistency; commitment; food consumption
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Commitment and conflict in unanimity bargaining
    Author: Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph
    Published: 25 Jun. 2024
    Publisher:  Heidelberg University, Department of Economics, Heidelberg

    We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each... more

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    We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/301189
    Series: AWI discussion paper series ; no. 749 (June 2024)
    Subjects: bargaining; commitment; conflict; delay; international negotiations; climate negotiations; legislative; multilateral; voting; majority; unanimity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (20 Seiten)
  6. Heterogeneous price commitments
    Author: Hämäläinen, Saara
    Published: April 2023
    Publisher:  Helsinki Graduate School of Economics, Helsinki

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    Language: English
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    ISBN: 9789527543047
    Series: Helsinki GSE discussion papers ; 5 (2023)
    Subjects: Dynamic oligopoly; price dispersion; price monitoring; commitment; price cycles; collusion; limit pricing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Commitment and conflict in multilateral bargaining
    Author: Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph
    Published: August 2023
    Publisher:  Helsinki Graduate School of Economics, Helsinki

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    ISBN: 9789527543122
    Series: Helsinki GSE discussion papers ; 13 (2023)
    Subjects: bargaining; commitment; conflict; delay; environmental agreements; international negotiations; legislative; majority; multilateral; unanimity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Precommitment, transparency and monetary policy
    Author: Geraats, Petra M.; Geraats, Petra
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Dt. Bundesbank, Economic Research Centre, Frankfurt am Main

    Conventional wisdom says that commitment eliminates the inflationary bias of monetary policy. However, this paper shows that the inflation bias can persist even when the central bank commits. A simple model is presented in which the central bank... more

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    Conventional wisdom says that commitment eliminates the inflationary bias of monetary policy. However, this paper shows that the inflation bias can persist even when the central bank commits. A simple model is presented in which the central bank precommits by setting the policy instrument, and the subsequent adjustment of inflation expectations is part of the transmission mechanism. Generally there is still an inflation bias, despite the absence of a time-inconsistency problem. It is caused by uncertainty about the economic disturbances to which the central bank responds. Only perfect transparency about economic information completely eliminates the inflation bias.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    ISBN: 3933747848
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QC 320 ; QK 900
    Series: Discussion paper / Economic Research Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank ; 2001,12
    Subjects: Geldpolitik; Geldpolitisches Ziel; Regelbindung versus Diskretion; Glaubwürdigkeit; Inflation; Inflationserwartung; Risiko; Politische Kommunikation; Vollkommene Information; commitment; inflation bias
    Scope: 27 S, b
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache

    Literaturverz. S. 22 - 23
  9. Fiscal disipline and stability under currency board systems
    Author: Grimm, Oliver
    Published: [2007]
    Publisher:  CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zurich

    In economic discussions, currency board systems are frequently described as arrangements with self-binding character to the monetary authorities by their strict rules and establishments by law. Hard pegs and especially currency boards are often seen... more

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    In economic discussions, currency board systems are frequently described as arrangements with self-binding character to the monetary authorities by their strict rules and establishments by law. Hard pegs and especially currency boards are often seen as remedies to overcome economic and financial turmoils and to return to low inflation. A sustainable debt level closely linked to a disciplined fiscal policy is, however, a premise for medium-term success. We show in a two-period model that the choice of a currency board can increase fiscal discipline compared to a standard peg regime. We derive, furthermore, the conditions for a currency boards to gain a stability advantage compared to a common peg system.

     
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    Language: English
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    hdl: 10419/171509
    Series: Working paper / CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ; 07, 66 (March 2007)
    Subjects: Currency-Board-System; Fester Wechselkurs; Finanzpolitik; Öffentliche Schulden; Inflation; Systematischer Fehler; Zeitkonsistenz; Theorie; currency board; fixed exchange rate; commitment; inflation bias; fiscal discipline; public debt; time-inconsistency problem
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. How delegation improves commitment
    Author: Perino, Grischa
    Published: June 16, 2008
    Publisher:  University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg

    We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. In a model... more

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    We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. In a model where delegation and specific policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown that McCallum’s conjecture holds if optimal ex-ante policies are fixed. However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation is both desirable and improves credibility. While delegation does not increase commitment per se it makes it more attractive and increases investments in credibility. Delegation can therefore serve as a valid commitment device.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/127277
    Series: Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; no. 466
    Subjects: Zeitkonsistenz; Glaubwürdigkeit; Neue politische Ökonomie; Time-inconsistency; commitment; delegation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 12 Seiten)
  11. Forward guidance for monetary policy
    is it desirable?
    Author: Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker
    Published: [2008]
    Publisher:  CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zurich

    In this paper we assess whether forward guidance for monetary policy regarding the future path of interest rates is desirable. We distinguish between two cases where forward guidance for monetary policy may be helpful. First, forward guidance may... more

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    In this paper we assess whether forward guidance for monetary policy regarding the future path of interest rates is desirable. We distinguish between two cases where forward guidance for monetary policy may be helpful. First, forward guidance may reveal private information of the central bank. We argue that vague, non-binding statements may be desirable. Second, forward guidance may be used as a commitment device. In this case, policy forecasts may be desirable in a classic inflation-bias framework but not in a New Keynesian framework.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/171527
    Edition: This version: April 2008
    Series: Working paper / CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ; 08, 84 (April 2008)
    Subjects: Geldpolitisches Ziel; Zinspolitik; Politische Kommunikation; Signalling; Neoklassische Synthese; Theorie; central banks; transparency; commitment; Federal Reserve; policy inclinations; signaling
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten)
  12. The potential of Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) in enhancing the credibility of reform
    the case of the Syrian-European Association Agreement
    Author: Zorob, Anja
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  GIGA, Hamburg

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    Series: GIGA working papers ; 51
    Subjects: Assoziierung; Regionale Wirtschaftsintegration; Signalling; Wirtschaftsreform; Glaubwürdigkeit; Syrien; EU-Staaten; commitment; Selbstbindung
    Scope: 36 Bl
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    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache
  13. Die genetische Entschlüsselung der politischen Ordnung. Jon Elster über Selbstbindung und die Verfassungsprozesse in Osteuropa
    Author: Offe, Claus
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsethik an der Martin-Luther-Univ. Halle-Wittenberg, Halle

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
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    ISBN: 9783860109557
    Series: Diskussionspapier des Lehrstuhls für Wirtschaftsethik an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg ; 07,19
    Subjects: Verfassungsreform; Osteuropa; Politisches System; Verfassungsökonomik; commitment; Selbstbindung
    Scope: III, 22 S., 300 mm x 210 mm
  14. Die genetische Entschlüsselung der politischen Ordnung: Jon Elster über Selbstbindung und die Verfassungsprozesse in Osteuropa
    Author: Offe, Claus
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsethik an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Halle

    Verfassungen beschränken den Spielraum zukünftigen Handelns. Durch Selbstbindung schützen sich Akteure, so scheint es, vor sich selbst, d. h. vor den selbstverursachten Handlungsfolgen, die sie sonst zu bedauern hätten und vor denen sie diese... more

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    Verfassungen beschränken den Spielraum zukünftigen Handelns. Durch Selbstbindung schützen sich Akteure, so scheint es, vor sich selbst, d. h. vor den selbstverursachten Handlungsfolgen, die sie sonst zu bedauern hätten und vor denen sie diese Selbstbindung verschont. So gesehen steigern Akteure sogar ihr Handlungspotential, wenn sie sich selbst binden und dadurch, unbeeinträchtigt durch eigene Fehler, weiter handeln und mit anderen Akteuren in eine beiderseits kalkulierbare Kooperation treten können. Dieser wohltätige Zusammenhang von Selbstbindung und Freiheit ist immer schon am klugen Umgang des Odysseus mit den Verlockungen der Sirenen gerühmt worden. Der Beitrag untersucht am Beispiel von Elsters Analyse der postsozialistischen Verfassungspolitik, dass und warum der vermeintliche Segen einer kollektiven Selbstbindung bei der Gründung einer neuen konstitutionellen Ordnung nur sehr bedingt zur Geltung kommt. Constitutions are constraints on future action. As precommitments, they seem to protect actors from acts that they would have to regret in retrospective. They even seem to enhance actors' potential for continued action and for cooperation with others. This benign link between rational self-binding and freedom to act has always been praised in the case of Ulysses and the Sirens, including in earlier work of Elster himself. Yet in his analysis of the politics of post-Communist constitution-making, a number of doubts emerge concerning the apparent moral and political virtue of the making of collective precommitments. The essay reviews some of the reasons for such doubts and points out some limitations of Elster's sociology of constitution-making.

     
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    ISBN: 9783860109564
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/170294
    Series: Diskussionspapier / Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsethik an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg ; 07,19
    Subjects: Verfassungsreform; Osteuropa; Politisches System; Verfassungsökonomik; commitment; Selbstbindung
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten, 123 KB)
  15. The WTO Government Procurement Agreement as a commitment device
    a first appraisal
    Author: Dengler, Benedikt; Hoekman, Bernard M.
    Published: 20 October 2018
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Series: Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research ; DP13266
    Subjects: commitment; Government Procurement Agreement; public procurement; Trade agreements; WTO
    Scope: 32 Seiten, Illustrationen
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    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  16. Decentralization with porous borders
    public production in a federation with tax competition and spillovers
    Author: Armbruster, Stephanie; Hintermann, Beat
    Published: January 2019
    Publisher:  Universität Basel, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Basel, Switzerland

    We analyze the strategic interaction of regional and federal governments using a model that includes fiscal externalities in the form of inter-regional capital tax competition and technical externalities in the form of inter-regional spillovers. The... more

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    We analyze the strategic interaction of regional and federal governments using a model that includes fiscal externalities in the form of inter-regional capital tax competition and technical externalities in the form of inter-regional spillovers. The federal government aims to correct for these inefficiencies using a transfer system. If the regional governments are policy leaders (such that federal policy is set conditional on regional choices), they will internalize both fiscal and technical externalities but free-ride on the transfer system. Efficiency can be achieved by introducing a second transfer scheme that is independent of regional public production. If the federal government sets its policy first and can commit itself to it, the outcome is efficient only if matching grants are used that are financed outside of the transfer system.

     
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    Language: English
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    hdl: 10419/207094
    Series: WWZ working paper ; 2019, 03
    Subjects: Fiscal federalism; tax competition; externalities; spillovers; commitment; centralized leadership; decentralized leadership
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Management earnings guidance as a commitment device
    Author: Black, Dirk E.; Gipper, Brandon; Stocken, Phillip C.
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth], [Hanover, NH

    This paper examines whether issuing management earnings guidance motivates a firm to raise its level of performance. The failure of management to attain a forecast may reflect poorly on its industry understanding, knowledge of the firm, and... more

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    This paper examines whether issuing management earnings guidance motivates a firm to raise its level of performance. The failure of management to attain a forecast may reflect poorly on its industry understanding, knowledge of the firm, and management capability. Accordingly, we hypothesize and find that management, having issued guidance, are motivated to hone the firm’s production function to raise firm performance. We find that firms alter their operating activities to increase performance rather than manipulating their accruals. The enhancement in firm performance from using managerial earnings guidance as a commitment device is accomplished by reductions in operating leverage and is strongest among firms issuing moderately aggressive forecasts. Inconsistent with concerns that forecasting causes myopia, performance improvements persist for several years

     
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    Series: [Tuck School of Business working paper ; no. 3837650]
    Subjects: management earnings forecast; commitment; performance
    Other subjects: Array
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten)
  18. The limits of commitment
    Author: Bizzotto, Jacopo; Hinnosaar, Toomas; Vigier, Adrien
    Published: 14 May 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Series: Array ; DP17307
    Subjects: commitment; Sequential Games; Stackelberg competition; robustness
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk
    Author: Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet; Renou, Ludovic
    Published: 10 December 2021
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Media type: Book
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    Series: Array ; DP16801
    Subjects: Bayesian persuasion; information design; commitment; cheaptalk; multiple experts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Unilateral practices, antitrust enforcement and commitments
    Author: Polo, Michele; Rey, Patrick
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1316
    Subjects: Antitrust enforcement; commitment; remedies; deterrence
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten)
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    Richtiger Name der ersten Verfasser:in: Michele Polo
  21. Unilateral practices, antitrust enforcement and commitments
    Author: Polo, Michele; Rey, Patrick
    Published: 25 March 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Series: Array ; DP17140
    Subjects: Antitrust enforcement; commitment; Remedies; deterrence
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  22. Myopic fiscal objectives and long-run monetary efficiency
    Author: Gaballo, Gaetano; Mengus, Eric
    Published: 05 June 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Series: Array ; DP17360
    Subjects: Fiat Money; Price level determination; Fiscal-monetary interactions; Seigniorage; commitment; Ramsey plans
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Temptation and commitment
    understanding the demand for illiquidity
    Author: Kovacs, Agnes; Moran, Patrick
    Published: 01 Jul 2019
    Publisher:  The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London

    The vast majority of household wealth in the U.S. is held in illiquid assets, primarily housing, making households vulnerable to unexpected income shocks. To rationalize this preference for illiquidity, we build a life-cycle model where households... more

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    The vast majority of household wealth in the U.S. is held in illiquid assets, primarily housing, making households vulnerable to unexpected income shocks. To rationalize this preference for illiquidity, we build a life-cycle model where households are tempted to consume their liquid wealth but can use illiquid housing as a savings commitment device. The importance of temptation and commitment is identified using data on consumption, liquid assets, and housing wealth over the life-cycle. Our model matches observed portfolio choices and gives rise to a high demand for illiquid housing partially driven by the need for commitment. Preference for illiquidity has important implications for the consumption response to unexpected income shocks. Our model is able to replicate the recent empirical evidence that MPCs remain high in response to large shocks, a finding that cannot be explained by current heterogeneous agent models, but that has great significance for fiscal stimulus targeting.

     
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    hdl: 10419/223262
    Series: IFS working paper ; W19, 18
    Subjects: commitment; housing; liquidity; consumption
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  24. The market for lemons with seller partition
    Author: Gersbach, Hans; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol
    Published: 17 October 2019
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Series: Array ; DP14063
    Subjects: lemons market; partition; signaling; commitment; decoy ballots
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten)
  25. Commitment and conflict in multilateral bargaining
    Author: Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph
    Published: March 2020
    Publisher:  University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg

    We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to attempt commiting to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which allocates to... more

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    We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to attempt commiting to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which allocates to her a share below a self-imposed threshold. Any such attempted commitment fails and decays with an exogenously given probability. We characterize and compare symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria under unanimity rule and majority rules. Under unanimity rule, there are potentially many equilibria which can be ordered from the least to most inefficient, according to how how many commitment attempts must fail in order for an agreement to arise. The most inefficient equilibrium exists independently of the number of players, and the delay in this equilibrium is increasing in the number of players. In addition, more efficient commitment profiles cannot be sustained in equilibrium if the number of players is sufficiently large. The expected inefficiency due to delay at the least and at the most efficient equilibrium increases as the number of players increases. Under any (super)majority rule, however, there is no equilibrium with delay or inefficiency. The reason is that competition to be included in the winning coalition discourages attempts to commit to an aggressive bargaining position. We also show that inefficiencies related to unanimity decision making may be aggravated by longer lags between consecutive bargaining rounds. The predicted patterns are by and large consistent with observed inefficiencies in many international arenas including the European Union, WTO, and UNFCCC. The results suggest that the unanimity rule is particularly damaging if the number of legislators is large and the time lags between consecutive sessions are long.

     
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    hdl: 10419/235002
    Series: Discussion paper series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; no. 679
    Subjects: bargaining; commitment; conflict; delay; environmental agreements; international negotiations; legislative; majority; multilateral; unanimity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (25 Seiten), Illustrationen