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Displaying results 1 to 16 of 16.

  1. Prudential policy with distorted beliefs
    Author: Dávila, Eduardo; Walther, Ansgar
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 29
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2336 (June 2022)
    Subjects: prudential policy; distorted beliefs; leverage regulation; robust optimal policy; monetary policy; bailouts; pecuniary externalities
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. A retrospective on the subprime crisis and its aftermath ten years after Lehman's collapse
    Author: Cukierman, Alex
    Published: 07 December 2018
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (13373)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research ; DP13373
    Subjects: uncertainty; bailouts; banks’ reserves; credit; monetary policy; exit; financial crisis
    Scope: 46 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  3. Exits and bailouts in a monetary union
    Author: Kobielarz, Michał
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  KU Leuven, Department of Economics, Leuven

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: May 5, 2021
    Series: Discussion paper series / KU Leuven, Department of Economics ; DPS21, 07 (May 2021)
    Subjects: monetary union; bailouts; fiscal transfers; exit; sovereign debt
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Sovereign debt in the 21st century
    looking backward, looking forward
    Author: Mitchener, Kris; Trebesch, Christoph
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    How will sovereign debt markets evolve in the 21st century? We survey how the literature has responded to the eurozone debt crisis, placing "lessons learned" in historical perspective. The crisis featured: (i) the return of debt problems to advanced... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63
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    How will sovereign debt markets evolve in the 21st century? We survey how the literature has responded to the eurozone debt crisis, placing "lessons learned" in historical perspective. The crisis featured: (i) the return of debt problems to advanced economies; (ii) a bank-sovereign "doom-loop" and the propagation of sovereign risk to households and firms; (iii) roll-over problems and self-fulfilling crisis dynamics; (iv) severe debt distress without outright sovereign defaults; (v) large-scale "sovereign bailouts" from abroad; and (vi) creditor threats to litigate and hold out in a debt restructuring. Many of these characteristics were already present in historical debt crises and are likely to remain relevant in the future. Looking forward, our survey points to a growing role of sovereign-bank linkages, legal risks, domestic debt and default, and of official creditors, due to new lenders such as China as well as the increasing dominance of central banks in global debt markets. Questions of debt sustainability and default will remain acute in both developing and advanced economies.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235329
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8959 (2021)
    Subjects: sovereign debt; eurozone debt crisis; bank-sovereign doom loops; bailouts; self-fulfilling crisis dynamics; official creditors
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 65 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. China as an international lender of last resort
    Author: Horn, Sebastian; Parks, Bradley; Reinhart, Carmen M.; Trebesch, Christoph
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Kiel Institute for the World Economy, [Kiel]

    This paper shows that China has launched a new global system for cross-border rescue lending to countries in debt distress. We build the first comprehensive dataset on China’s overseas bailouts between 2000 and 2021 and provide new insights into... more

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    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    This paper shows that China has launched a new global system for cross-border rescue lending to countries in debt distress. We build the first comprehensive dataset on China’s overseas bailouts between 2000 and 2021 and provide new insights into China’s growing role in the global financial system. A key finding is that the global swap line network put in place by the People’s Bank of China is increasingly used as a financial rescue mechanism, with more than USD 170 billion in liquidity support extended to crisis countries, including repeated rollovers of swaps coming due. The swaps bolster gross reserves and are mostly drawn by distressed countries with low liquidity ratios. In addition, we show that Chinese state-owned banks and enterprises have given out an additional USD 70 billion in rescue loans for balance of payments support. Taken together, China’s overseas bailouts correspond to more than 20 percent of total IMF lending over the past decade and bailout amounts are growing fast. However, China’s rescue loans differ from those of established international lenders of last resort in that they (i) are opaque, (ii) carry relatively high interest rates, and (iii) are almost exclusively targeted to debtors of China's Belt and Road Initiative. These findings have implications for the international financial and monetary architecture, which is becoming more multipolar, less institutionalized, and less transparent.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/271030
    Edition: First draft: March 2023
    Series: Kiel working paper ; no. 2244 (March 2023)
    Subjects: China; financial crises; sovereign debt crises; bailouts; rescue loans; external debt; official lending; hidden debts; sovereign risk; Belt and Road initiative
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Prudential policy with distorted beliefs
    Author: Dávila, Eduardo; Walther, Ansgar
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  European Systemic Risk Board, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    This paper studies leverage regulation and monetary policy when equity investors and/or creditors have distorted beliefs relative to a planner. We characterize how the optimal leverage regulation responds to arbitrary changes in investors' and... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 611
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    This paper studies leverage regulation and monetary policy when equity investors and/or creditors have distorted beliefs relative to a planner. We characterize how the optimal leverage regulation responds to arbitrary changes in investors' and creditors' beliefs and relate our results to practical scenarios. We show that the optimal regulation depends on the type and magnitude of such changes. Optimism by investors calls for looser leverage regulation, while optimism by creditors, or jointly by both investors and creditors, calls for tighter leverage regulation. Monetary policy should be tightened (loosened) in response to either investors' or creditors' optimism (pessimism).

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789294722379
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265231
    Series: Working paper series / ESRB, European Systemic Risk Board, European System of Financial Supervision ; no 130 (December 2021)
    Subjects: prudential policy; distorted beliefs; leverage regulation; bailouts; monetary policy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten)
  7. Are bank bailouts welfare improving?
    Author: Shukayev, Malik; Ueberfeldt, Alexander
    Published: November 2021
    Publisher:  University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics, [Edmonton, Alberta]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 566
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics ; no. 2021, 10
    Subjects: Fire sales externality; short-term bank funding; endogenous financial crises; bank regulation; bailouts; government guarantees
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Trading for bailouts
    Author: Ahnert, Toni; Machado, Caio; Pereira, Ana
    Published: 16 January 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    LZ 161
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    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17812
    Subjects: feedback effect; bailouts; market informativeness; trading; real efficiency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Avoiding sovereign default contagion
    a normative analysis
    Author: De Ferra, Sergio; Mallucci, Enrico
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, [Washington, DC]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 201
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: International finance discussion papers ; number 1275 (February 2020)
    Subjects: Sovereign default; sovereign contagion; bailouts; Pigouvian taxes
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Bailout dynamics in a monetary union
    Author: Kobielarz, Michał
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  [KU Leuven, Department of Economics], [Leuven]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: February 24, 2023
    Series: Discussion paper series / KU Leuven, Department of Economics ; DPS23, 05 (March 2023)
    Subjects: monetary union; bailouts; fiscal transfers; exit; sovereign debt
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Too-many-to-fail and the design of bailout regimes
    Author: Wagner, Wolf; Zeng, Jing
    Published: May 2023
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    We analyze the design of bailout regimes when investment is distorted by a toomany-to-fail problem. The first-best allocation equalizes benefits from more banks investing in high-return projects with endogenously higher systemic risk due to more... more

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    We analyze the design of bailout regimes when investment is distorted by a toomany-to-fail problem. The first-best allocation equalizes benefits from more banks investing in high-return projects with endogenously higher systemic risk due to more banks failing simultaneously. A standard bailout policy cannot implement the firstbest, as bailouts cause herding by banks. However, a targeted bailout policy that assigns banks to separate bailout regimes eliminates herding and achieves the firstbest. When such a policy is not feasible, targeted bailouts can be implemented by decentralizing bailout decisions to independent regulators. Our results have various implications for the optimal allocation of regulatory powers, both at the international level and domestically.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278505
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 230
    Subjects: systemic risk; too-many-to-fail; optimal investment; bailouts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. A note on allowing state bankruptcy
    Author: Deng, Minjie
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  [Simon Fraser University, Department of Economics], [Burnaby]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 722
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: [Discussion papers] / [Simon Fraser University, Department of Economics] ; [dp 24, 05]
    Subjects: Sovereign bankruptcy; bankruptcy rules; bailouts; state government
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 67 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. China as an international lender of last resort
    Author: Horn, Sebastian; Parks, Bradley; Reinhart, Carmen M.; Trebesch, Christoph
    Published: 2023
    Publisher:  Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), Kiel

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  14. International bailouts
    why did banks' collective bet lead Europe to rescue Greece?
    Author: Mengus, Eric
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Banque de France, Paris

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Nicht speichern
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Document de travail / Banque de France ; 502
    Subjects: Implicit guarantees; bailouts; capital flows; capital controls
    Scope: Online-Ressource (57 S.), graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in franz. Sprache
  15. Size and soft budget constraints
    Author: Crivelli, Ernesto; Staal, Klaas
    Published: 2006
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    There is much evidence against the so-called too big to fail hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of... more

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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    DS 445 (172)
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    There is much evidence against the so-called too big to fail hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93892
    Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 172
    Subjects: bailouts; soft-budget constraints; jurisdictional size; public goods; spillovers
    Scope: Online-Ressource (33 S.)
  16. Bailouts and financial fragility
    Author: Keister, Todd
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey, New Brunswick, NJ

    Should policy makers be prevented from bailing out investors in the event of a crisis? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the policy maker will respond by using public resources... more

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    Should policy makers be prevented from bailing out investors in the event of a crisis? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the policy maker will respond by using public resources to augment the private consumption of those investors facing losses. The anticipation of such a "bailout" distorts ex ante incentives, leading intermediaries to choose arrangements with excessive illiquidity and thereby increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable, however: while it induces intermediaries to become more liquid, it may nevertheless lower welfare and leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis. A policy of taxing short-term liabilities, in contrast, can both improve the allocation of resources and promote financial stability.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/123819
    Series: Working papers / Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey ; 2014-01
    Subjects: bank runs; bailouts; moral hazard; financial regulation
    Scope: Online-Ressource (44 S.), graph. Darst.