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  1. Towards a European constitution
    fiscal federalism and the allocation of economic competences
    Author: Stehn, Jürgen
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Inst. of World Economics, Kiel

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  2. Towards a European constitution : fiscal federalism and the allocation of economic competences
    Author: Stehn, Jürgen
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel

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  3. Towards a European constitution
    fiscal federalism and the allocation of economic competences
    Author: Stehn, Jürgen
    Published: August 2002
    Publisher:  Kiel Institute of World Economics, Kiel

    The paper analyzes one important aspect of the constitutional debate: the allocation of econornie competences between the EU and the mernber states. It takes the theory of fiscal federalism as a starting point for an optimal allocation of economic... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Location:
    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 3 (1125)
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    The paper analyzes one important aspect of the constitutional debate: the allocation of econornie competences between the EU and the mernber states. It takes the theory of fiscal federalism as a starting point for an optimal allocation of economic competences. The main message of the theory is that a transfer of econornie competences from a lower to a higher political level always leads to a negligence of individual preferences and, therefore, can only be economically justified if national policies cause strong spillovers (externalities) to other jurisdictions. Based on this approach, the paper proposes an allocation of econornic conipetences that can serve as an overall. guideline for a European constitution.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/2820
    Series: Kiel working paper ; no. 1125
    Subjects: Wirtschaftspolitik; Policy-Mix; Finanzbeziehungen; Spillover-Effekt; Föderalismus; Internalisierung externer Effekte; Verfassungsreform; Verfassungsökonomik; EU-Staaten; European constitution; fiscal federalism; allocation of competences
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen