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Displaying results 1 to 4 of 4.

  1. Multinational companies, technology spillovers, and plant survival
    Author: Görg, Holger; Strobl, Eric
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin

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  2. Multinational companies, technology spillovers, and plant survival
    Author: Görg, Holger; Strobl, Eric
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  DIW, Berlin

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  3. Sharing R&D investments in cleaner technologies to mitigate climate change
    Author: El-Sayed, Abeer; Rubio, Santiago J.
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano

    This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 125 (2014,41)
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    This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions and that they also pool their R&D efforts so as to fully internalize the spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three stages. First, countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides its level of emissions non-cooperatively. For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, our findings show that the maximum participation in a R&D agreement consists of six countries and that participation decreases as the coalition information exchange decreases until a minimum participation consisting of three countries is reached. We also find that the grand coalition is stable if the countries sign an international research joint venture but in this case the effectiveness of the agreement is very low.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/102007
    Series: Array ; 41.2014
    Subjects: International Environmental Agreements; R&D Investment; Technology Spillovers; Coalition Information Exchange; Research Joint Ventures
    Scope: Online-Ressource (38 S.)
  4. Technology transfer and spillovers in international joint ventures
    Author: Müller, Thomas; Schnitzer, Monika
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    It is often argued that multinationals are reluctant to transfer technology due to the fear of spillovers. We show that this need not be the case if host country policies like taxation are taken into account. Furthermore, we examine the incentives... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (84)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    It is often argued that multinationals are reluctant to transfer technology due to the fear of spillovers. We show that this need not be the case if host country policies like taxation are taken into account. Furthermore, we examine the incentives the multinational and the host country have to engage in an international joint venture. We show why a multinational may agree to enter a joint venture even though this gives rise to spillovers. Surprisingly, we find that a joint venture is sometimes not in the interest of a host country, despite the prospect of spillovers.

     
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93778
    Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 84
    Subjects: Multinationales Unternehmen; Technologietransfer; Joint Venture; Spillover-Effekt; Theorie; Foreign Direct Investment; International Joint Ventures; Technology Transfer; Technology Spillovers; Multinational Firms
    Scope: Online-Ressource ([1], 18 S.)