Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 25 of 33.

  1. Digital humanities and film studies
    visualising Dziga Vertov's work
    Author: Heftberger, Adelheid
    Published: [2018]; © 2018
    Publisher:  Springer, Cham, Switzerland

    Location:
    Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    ISBN: 9783030028633; 3030028631
    Other identifier:
    9783030028633
    Series: Quantitative methods in the humanities and social sciences
    Subjects: Vertov, Dziga;
    Other subjects: Vertov, Dziga (1896-1954); Data Mining; Data Visualization; Digital Humanities; Dziga Vertov; Film; Formalist Film Theory; Information Design; Information Visualization; Russian formalist; HBJ
    Scope: xi, 311 Seiten, Illustrationen, Diagramme, 23.5 cm x 15.5 cm
    Notes:

    translated from the German language edition: Kollision der Kader. Dziga Vertovs Filme, die Visualisierung ihrer Strukturen und die Digital Humanities by Adelheid Heftberger.
  2. Information aggregation in dynamic markets with adverse selection
    Author: Asriyan, Vladimir; Fuchs, William; Green, Brett
    Published: September 18, 2017
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: September 2017
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 979
    Subjects: Information Aggregation; Information Design; Decentralized Markets; Adverse Selection; Optimal Information Policy; Transparency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Distracted from comparison: product design and advertisement with limited attention
    Author: Johnen, Johannes; Leung, Benson Tsz Kin
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 203
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2078.1/260126
    Series: LIDAM discussion paper CORE ; 2022, 17
    Subjects: Limited Attention; Product Design; Information Design; Market Competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 65 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Pure information design in classic auctions
    Author: Sorokin, Constantine; Winter, Eyal
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, Jerusalem, Israel

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Nicht speichern
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality ; # 742 (July 2021)
    Subjects: Information Design; Bayesian Persuasion; Mechanism Design; Auction; Optimal Allocation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Information nudges and self-control
    Author: Mariotti, Thomas; Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora; Wangenheim, Jonas von
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 330
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: Revised June 2021
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 914
    Subjects: Nudges; Information Design; Present-Biased Preferences; Self-Control
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Bayesian persuasion
    reduced form approach
    Author: Toikka, Juuso; Vohra, Akhil; Vohra, Rakesh V.
    Published: May, 2022
    Publisher:  Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Rechte
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: PIER working paper ; 22, 018
    Subjects: Bayesian Persuasion; Information Design; Mechanism Design; Duality
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Policy announcement design
    Author: Cieślak, Anna; Malamud, Semyon; Schrimpf, Andreas
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  Swiss Finance Institute, Geneva

    We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite... more

    Access:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 544
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to the public to which cluster the state belongs. Optimal communication is more precise when the policymaker's beliefs conform with prior public expectations, whereas it is more vague in the case of divergence. We characterize the policymaker's trade-offs via a novel object—the information relevance matrix—and label its eigenvectors as principal information components (PICs). PICs with the highest eigenvalues determine the dimensions of information with the highest welfare sensitivity and, hence, are the ones about which the policymaker should be most precise

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Edition: This version: December 15, 2019
    Series: Research paper series / Swiss Finance Institute ; no 20, 17
    Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper ; No. 20-17
    Subjects: Public Policy; Central Bank Announcements; Learning; Bayesian Persuasion; Information Design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Belief inducibility and informativeness
    Author: Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Karos, Dominik; Kerman, Toygar
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Graduate School of Business and Economics, Maastricht

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 285
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: [Research memorandum] / Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) ; RM/20, 027
    Subjects: Information Design; Inducible Distributions; Informativeness
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten)
  9. Informing the public about a pandemic
    Author: Véricourt, Francis de; Gurkan, Huseyin; Wang, Shouqiang
    Published: December 15, 2020
    Publisher:  ESMT Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find that governments have an incentive to either downplay or... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 450
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find that governments have an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if the government heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease's economic impact on the population is, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/227756
    Series: ESMT working paper ; 20, 03
    Subjects: Public Health; Epidemic Control; Information Design; Strategic Behavior
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Discrimination in promotion
    Author: Prummer, Anja
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London, London

    Why do women hit the glass ceiling? Women are hired, but then fail to rise through the ranks. We propose a novel explanation for this pattern, namely preference- and belief-free discrimination. In our setting, an employer can increase effort by... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 217
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Why do women hit the glass ceiling? Women are hired, but then fail to rise through the ranks. We propose a novel explanation for this pattern, namely preference- and belief-free discrimination. In our setting, an employer can increase effort by inducing differential value distributions for a promotion across workers, who compete for the promotion by exerting effort. Initially, workers possess the same distribution of valuations. Introducing inequality between workers makes them more recognisable, reducing their information rent, which in turn increases effort. However, higher inequality reduces competition. If value is redistributed, the reduction in information rent outweighs the loss in competitiveness, making discrimination between workers optimal.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/247174
    Series: Working paper / School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London ; no. 905 (June 2020)
    Subjects: Discrimination; Mechanism Design; Information Design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Welfare of price discrimination and market segmentation in duopoly
    Author: Shi, Xianwen; Zhang, Jun
    Published: December 25, 2020
    Publisher:  University of Toronto, Department of Economics4060 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Toronto

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Rechte
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: [Working paper] / [Department of Economics, University of Toronto ; 682
    Subjects: Price Discrimination; Market Segmentation; Information Design; Welfare
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten)
  12. What should a firm know?
    protecting consumers' privacy rents
    Author: Bird, Daniel; Neeman, Zvika
    Published: February 2020
    Publisher:  The Pinhas Sapir Center for Development, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / The Pinhas Sapir Center for Development ; no. 2020, 4
    Subjects: Information Design; Privacy Design; Privacy Rents; Persuasion; GeneticNon-Discrimination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. What should a firm know?
    protecting consumers' privacy rents
    Author: Bird, Daniel; Neeman, Zvika
    Published: August 2020
    Publisher:  The Pinhas Sapir Center for Development, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / The Pinhas Sapir Center for Development ; no. 2020, 9
    Subjects: Information Design; Privacy Design; Privacy Rents; Persuasion; GeneticNon-Discrimination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. What should a firm know?
    protecting consumers' privacy rents
    Author: Bird, Daniel; Neeman, Zvika
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  The Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Tel Aviv University, The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv, Israel

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Rechte
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Foerder Institute for Economic Research and the Sackler Institute for Economic Studies ; no. 2020, 5
    Subjects: Information Design; Privacy Design; Privacy Rents; Persuasion; Genetic Non-Discriminatio
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Informing the public about a pandemic
    Author: Véricourt, Francis de; Gurkan, Huseyin; Wang, Shouqiang
    Published: January 28, 2021
    Publisher:  ESMT Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 450
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease's economic impact on the population is, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/229934
    Edition: Revised version
    Series: ESMT working paper ; 20, 03 (R1)
    Subjects: Public Health; Epidemic Control; Information Design; Strategic Behavior
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Informing the public about a pandemic
    Author: Véricourt, Francis de; Gurkan, Huseyin; Wang, Shouqiang
    Published: February 11, 2021
    Publisher:  ESMT Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 450
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease's economic impact on the population is, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/231370
    Edition: Revised version
    Series: ESMT working paper ; 20, 03 (R2)
    Subjects: Public Health; Epidemic Control; Information Design; Strategic Behavior
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Calibrated click-through auctions
    an information design approach
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk; Duetting, Paul; Paes Leme, Renato; Zuo, Song
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 29
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2285 (May 2021)
    Subjects: Click-Through Rates; Information Design; Second-Price Auction; Calibration; Private Signals; Public Signals; Conflation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Information design in blockchain: a role of trusted intermediaries
    Author: Matsushima, Hitoshi
    Published: January 2020
    Publisher:  Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 766
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: KIER discussion paper series ; no. 1018
    Subjects: Blockchain; Information Design; Verification; Intermediary; Limited Liability
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten)
  19. Optimal transport of information
    Author: Malamud, Semyon; Cieślak, Anna; Schrimpf, Andreas
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Swiss Finance Institute, Geneva

    We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is always... more

    Access:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 544
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is always given by a partition. Second, we take the limit of an infinite signal space and characterize the solution in terms of a Monge-Kantorovich optimal transport problem with an endogenous information transport cost. We use our novel approach to: 1. Derive necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality based on Bregman divergences for non-convex functions. 2. Compute exact bounds for the Hausdorff dimension of the support of an optimal policy. 3. Derive a non-linear, second-order partial differential equation whose solutions correspond to regular optimal policies. We illustrate the power of our approach by providing explicit solutions to several non-linear, multidimensional Bayesian persuasion problems

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Edition: This version: March 3, 2021
    Series: Research paper series / Swiss Finance Institute ; no 21, 15
    Subjects: Bayesian Persuasion; Information Design; Signalling; Optimal Transport
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 72 Seiten)
  20. Selling impressions: efficiency vs. competition
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen; Sorokin, Constantine; Winter, Eyal
    Published: August 26, 2021
    Publisher:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 29
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2300 (August 2021)
    Subjects: Second Price Auction; Con‡ation; Targeted Advertising; Impressions; Two-Sided Private Information; Bayesian Persuasion; Information Design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten)
  21. Selling impressions: efficiency vs. competition
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen
    Published: July 27, 2021
    Publisher:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 29
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2291 (July 2021)
    Subjects: Second Price Auction; Con‡ation; Digital Advertising; Impressions; Bayesian Persuasion; Information Design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Communication via third parties
    Author: Bizzotto, Jacopo; Perez-Richet, Eduardo; Vigier, Adrien
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  [Oslo Metropolitan University], [Oslo]

    We consider a general information design problem in which the task of running a procedure generating information for a continuation game is performed by an agent. A moral hazard roblem therefore emerges in which the principal faces a trade-off... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 675
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider a general information design problem in which the task of running a procedure generating information for a continuation game is performed by an agent. A moral hazard roblem therefore emerges in which the principal faces a trade-off between generating information with an eye to the continuation game, and incentivizing the agent to comply with the procedure designed. We provide a methodology to tackle such problems, and examine the way in which moral hazard affects the optimal procedure of the principal

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: Oslo Business School working paper ; [2020, 6]
    Subjects: Information Design; Moral Hazard; Agency Cost; Information Acquisition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Persuasion by dimension reduction
    Author: Malamud, Semyon; Schrimpf, Andreas
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Swiss Finance Institute, Geneva

    How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the... more

    Access:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 544
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object that we call the "optimal information manifold." We characterize geometric properties of this manifold and link them to the sender's preferences. Optimal policy splits information into "good" and "bad" components. When the sender's marginal utility is linear, it is always optimal to reveal the full magnitude of good information. In contrast, with concave marginal utility, optimal information design conceals the extreme realizations of good information and only reveals its direction (sign). We illustrate these effects by explicitly solving several multi-dimensional Bayesian persuasion problems

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Edition: This version: October 17, 2021
    Series: Research paper series / Swiss Finance Institute ; no 21, 69
    Subjects: Bayesian Persuasion; Information Design; Signalling; Learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 107 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Third-party sale of information
    Author: Evans, Robert; Park, In-Uck
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, [Cambridge]

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VSP 1362
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: Cambridge working paper in economics ; 2233
    Subjects: Information Sale; Mechanism Design; Information Design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. The hold-up problem with flexible unobservable investments
    Author: Krähmer, Daniel
    Published: February 2024
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, [Bonn]

    The paper studies the canonical hold-up problem with one-sided investment by the buyer and full ex post bargaining power by the seller. The buyer can covertly choose any distribution of valuations at a cost and privately observes her valuation. The... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 711
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    The paper studies the canonical hold-up problem with one-sided investment by the buyer and full ex post bargaining power by the seller. The buyer can covertly choose any distribution of valuations at a cost and privately observes her valuation. The main result shows that in contrast to the well-understood case with linear costs, if investment costs are strictly convex in the buyer's valuation distribution, the buyer's equilibrium utility is strictly positive and total welfare is strictly higher than in the benchmark when valuations are public information, thus alleviating the hold-up problem. In fact, when costs are mean-based or display decreasing risk, the hold-up problem may disappear completely. Moreover, the buyer's equilibrium utility and total welfare might be non-monotone in costs. The paper utilizes an equilibrium characterization in terms of the Gateaux derivative of the cost function.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/285340
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 278
    Subjects: Information Design; Hold-Up Problem; Unobservable Information
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen