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Displaying results 1 to 25 of 153.

  1. Bidder behavior in repo auctions without minimum bid rate
    evidence from the Bundesbank
    Author: Linzert, Tobias; Nautz, Dieter; Breitung, Jörg
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg, Frankfurt am Main

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QK 630 ; QB 910 ; QK 630
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum (Frankfurt, Main): Discussion paper ; 03,13
    Subjects: Pensionsgeschäft; Wertpapierleihe; Refinanzierung; Auktion; Zins; Erwartungsbildung; Zinspolitik
    Other subjects: (stw)Repo-Geschäft; (stw)Refinanzierung; (stw)Auktion; (stw)Zins; (stw)Erwartungsbildung; (stw)Zinspolitik; (stw)Deutschland; Monetary Policy Instruments; Auctions; Bidder Behavior; Panel Analysis; Online-Publikation; Arbeitspapier; Buch; Graue Literatur; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: Online-Ressource
  2. Common value auctions and the winner's curse
    Author: Kagel, John Henry
    Published: c2002
    Publisher:  Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J

    Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a... more

     

    Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies s

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9780691016672; 9781282158757
    Subjects: Value; Auctions; Paradoxes
    Scope: Online-Ressource (xvi, 401 p.), ill
    Notes:

    Includes bibliographical references and index

    Bidding in common value auctions: a survey of experimental research / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    First-price common value auctions: bidder behavior and the "winner's curse" / John H. Kagel ... [et al.]

    Winner's curse and public information in common value auctions / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad

    Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: a laboratory study / John H. Kagel, Ronald M. Harstad, Dan Levin

    Revenue effects and information processing in English common value auctions / Dan Levin, John H. Kagel, Jean-François Richard

    Common value auctions with insider information / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? / Colin Campbell, Dan Levin

    Second-price auctions with asymmetric payoffs: an experimental investigation / Christopher Avery, John H. Kagel

    Learning in common value auctions: some initial observations / Susan Garvin, John H. Kagel

    Cross-game learning: experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions / John H. Kagel

    Comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: a laboratory analysis / Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    Bidding in common value auctions: how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse / Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel.

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  3. Bidder behavior in repo auctions without minimum bid rate
    evidence from the Bundesbank
    Author: Linzert, Tobias; Nautz, Dieter; Breitung, Jörg
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  Dt. Bundesbank, Press and Public Relations Div., Frankfurt am Main

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    ISBN: 9783935821636; 3935821638
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QK 630 ; QB 910 ; QK 630
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Discussion paper / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank ; 03,13
    Subjects: Pensionsgeschäft; Wertpapierleihe; Refinanzierung; Auktion; Zins; Erwartungsbildung; Zinspolitik
    Other subjects: (stw)Repo-Geschäft; (stw)Refinanzierung; (stw)Auktion; (stw)Zins; (stw)Erwartungsbildung; (stw)Zinspolitik; (stw)Deutschland; Monetary Policy Instruments; Auctions; Bidder Behavior; Panel Analysis; Online-Publikation; Arbeitspapier; Buch; Graue Literatur; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: 21 S., 30 cm
  4. Cadillac Jack
    a novel
    Author: McMurtry, Larry
    Published: 1982
    Publisher:  Simon and Schuster, New York, NY

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Eichstätt-Ingolstadt
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    ISBN: 0671454455
    RVK Categories: HU 9800
    Subjects: Antique dealers; Auctions; Cadillac automobile; Flea markets
    Scope: 395 S.
  5. The role of domain restrictions in mechanism design
    ex post incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency
    Author: Barberà, Salvador; Berga Colom, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo
    Published: March 2018
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1024
    Subjects: Mechanisms; Interdependent Types; Ex Post Incentive Compatibility; Strategy Proofness; Pareto Efficiency; Preference Functions; Jury Decisions; Allocation Problems; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. The angel's jig
    Author: Poliquin, Daniel
    Published: [2016]
    Publisher:  Goose Lane, Fredericton, New Brunswick

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    Freie Universität Berlin, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Source: Philologische Bibliothek, FU Berlin
    Contributor: Grady, Wayne
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    ISBN: 9780864928672
    Subjects: Older men / Fiction; Auctions / Fiction; Resilience (Personality trait) / Fiction; Orphans / Fiction; Auctions; Older men; Orphans; Resilience (Personality trait); Social conditions
    Scope: 283 Seiten, 21 cm
  7. Putting auction theory to work
    Author: Milgrom, Paul Robert
    Published: 2004
    Publisher:  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

    A comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its applications. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories... more

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    A comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its applications. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 0511164173; 0521536723; 0521551846
    RVK Categories: QH 430
    Series: Churchill lectures in economics
    Subjects: Privatization; Auctions
    Scope: Online-Ressource (xxii, 368 p), ill
    Notes:

    Includes bibliographical references (p. 339-346) and indexes

    Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web

    Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Table of Contents; Preface; Foreword; CHAPTER ONE: Getting to Work; PART ONE: THE MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH; PART TWO: MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS; Bibliography; Author Index; Subject Index
  8. Experimental auctions
    methods and applications in economic and marketing research
    Author: Lusk, Jayson
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    A comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions more

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    Hochschulbibliothek Friedensau
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    A comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 0521855160; 0521671248; 9781139134279; 9781283329767; 9780521855167; 9780521671248
    RVK Categories: QC 110 ; QH 430
    Series: Quantitative methods for applied economics and business research
    Subjects: Auctions; Consumers' preferences
    Scope: Online-Ressource (xii, 304 p), ill, 26 cm
    Notes:

    Includes bibliographical references (p. 279-296) and index

    Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web

    Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Acknowledgments; Contents; Figures; Tables; 1 Introduction; 2 Incentive compatible auctions: theory and evidence; 3 Value theory; 4 Conducting experimental auctions: some preliminaries; 5 Conducting experimental auctions; 6 Data analysis; 7 Valuation case studies; 8 Auction design: case studies; 9 Validity of experimental auctions; 10 The future of experimental auctions; References; Index
  9. Why every economist should learn some auction theory
    Author: Klemperer, Paul
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
    Signature:
    WIR:AJ:700:C397:-2572:2000
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 2572
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Wirtschaftswissenschaft; Theorie; Auctions; Game theory
    Scope: 48 S, graph. Darst., Ill
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 39 - 48
  10. What really matters in auction design
    Author: Klemperer, Paul
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
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    WIR:AJ:700:C397:-2581:2000
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 2581
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Theorie; Auctions; Game theory
    Scope: 28 S
  11. The effect of Bidders' asymmetries on expected revenues
    Author: Cantillon, Estelle
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 2675
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Theorie; Auctions
    Scope: 35, [2] S, graph. Darst
  12. Investment incentives in procurement auctions
    Author: Arozamena, Leandro; Cantillon, Estelle
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 2676
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Öffentlicher Auftrag; Preiswettbewerb; Investition; Anreiz; Dynamisches Spiel; Theorie; Auctions; Government purchasing; Industrial procurement
    Scope: 40 S
  13. Information structures in optimal auctions
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (2991)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 2991
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Asymmetrische Information; Informationsökonomik; Theorie; Auctions; Information theory in economics
    Scope: 43 S., graph. Darst.
  14. Do better informed investors always do better?
    a buyback puzzle
    Author: Boyle, Glenn W.; Ward, Gerald
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 92 (2018,6)
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: Revision
    Series: Working paper / Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business, University of Canterbury ; no. 2018, 6
    Subjects: Auctions; racehorses; buybacks
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten)
  15. The dominance of retail stores
    Author: Ziegler, Alexandre; Lazear, Edward P.
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (9795)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: NBER working paper series ; 9795
    Subjects: Einzelhandel; Auktion; Marktstruktur; Theorie; Auctions; Consumer behavior; Stores, Retail
    Scope: 30 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w9795.pdf - lizenzpflichtig

    Literaturverz. S. 29 - 30
  16. Are structural estimates of auction models reasonable?
    Evidence from experimental data
    Author: Bajari, Patrick L.; Hortaçsu, Ali
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: NBER working paper series ; 9889
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Schätztheorie; Asymmetrische Information; Theorie; Auctions
    Scope: 36, [16] S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w9889.pdf - lizenzpflichtig

    Literaturverz. S. 34 - 36
  17. Bidding rings and the winner's curse
    the case of federal offshore oil and gas lese auctions
    Author: Hendricks, Kenneth; Porter, Robert; Tan, Guofu
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1 (9836)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: NBER working paper series ; 9836
    Subjects: Kartell; Auktion; USA; Förderkonzession; Auctions; Government auctions; Oil and gas leases
    Scope: 44, [7] S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w9836.pdf - lizenzpflichtig

    Literaturverz. S. 31 - 33
  18. Ambiguity, cognitive reflection, and strategic complexity across auctions
    Author: Deck, Cary A.; Paan Jindapon; Melkonyan, Tigran A.; Schneider, Mark
    Published: 3-5-2024
    Publisher:  Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, [Orange, CA]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: ESI working papers ; 24, 04
    Subjects: Ambiguity; Ambiguity Attitude; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 75 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Collusion in repeated auctions with costless communication
    Author: Pinheiro, Roberto B.
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, [Cleveland, OH]

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    Series: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland working paper series ; no. 24, 21 (October 2024)
    Subjects: Collusion; Auctions; Cheap Talk Communication; Repeated Games
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism
    Author: Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Eicke, Anselm; Hirth, Lion; Ocker, Fabian; Ott, Marion; Schlecht, Ingmar; Wang, Runxi
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible consumers with a market-based approach. We conduct a game-theoretical analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism. Our analysis reveals that despite its intention, the capacity-based redispatch is prone to undesirable behavior of market participants. The reason is that the availability payment incentivizes participants to change their energy consumption (generation) behavior. However, this also applies to undesired participants who increase the redispatch requirement through participation. Under certain assumptions, the additional redispatch potential equals the additional redispatch demand it creates. Consequently, the mechanism does not resolve network constraints, while causing costs for the compensation payments. Furthermore, we study three alternative implementation options, none of which resolves the underlying problem. It follows from our analysis that a mechanism can only be promising if it is capable to distinguish between the potential participants to exclude the undesirable ones.

     
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    Language: English
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/298003
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 24, 025 (05/2024)
    Subjects: Energy market; Congestion management; Capacity-based redispatch; Game theory; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Competing models of the Bank of England's liquidity auctions
    truthful bidding is a good approximation
    Author: Grace, Charlotte
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Bank of England, London

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    Format: Online
    Series: Staff working paper / Bank of England ; no. 1061 (February 2024)
    Subjects: Auctions; bid shading; central bank liquidity provision; product mix auction
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 95 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Relative profit auctions
    Author: Morgan, John; Steiglitz, Kenneth; Reis, George
    Published: 2001

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion papers in economics / Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University ; 214
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Theorie; Auctions
    Scope: 23 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:
  23. Combination biddings in multi-unit auctions
    Author: Cantillon, Estelle; Pesendorfer, Martin
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 6083
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Busverkehr; Privatisierung; Öffentlicher Nahverkehr; Theorie; London; Auctions; Bus lines; Combinatorial analysis
    Scope: 73 S.
  24. Economic insights from internet auctions
    a survey
    Author: Bajari, Patrick L.; Hortaçsu, Ali
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; 10076
    Subjects: Internet; Auktion; Auctions; Internet auctions
    Scope: [49] S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w10076.pdf - lizenzpflichtig

    Literaturverz
  25. Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain
    theory and empirical evidence
    Author: Lange, Andreas; List, John A.; Price, Michael K.
    Published: 2004
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, Bibliothek
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    82/766 B-10639
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    Language: English
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; 10639
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Experiment; Auctions; Timber
    Scope: 59 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w10639.pdf - lizenzpflichtig