Good jobs, bad jobs and redistribution
Abstract: "We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a 'good jobs'...
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Abstract: "We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a 'good jobs' sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by trade unions. We find that whether the government should subsidise or tax investments is crucially dependent on union bargaining strength. If unions are weak, the optimal tax policy implies a combination of investment taxes and progressive income taxation. On the other hand, if unions are strong, we find that the best option for the government is to use investment subsidies in combination with either progressive or proportional taxation, the latter being the optimal policy if the government is not too concerned about inequality and if the cost of income taxation is sufficiently high." (author's abstract)
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An econometric decision model for equalizing regional unemployment in West and East Germany
Abstract: "Reducing disparities among regions within European countries is the aim of European and national structural policies. In particular, a European grant contributes to the German governmental program for equalizing regional unemployment. The...
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Abstract: "Reducing disparities among regions within European countries is the aim of European and national structural policies. In particular, a European grant contributes to the German governmental program for equalizing regional unemployment. The goal is to bring it down to the national average by creating new and/or by safeguarding existing jobs. In the given paper the distribution of available aid among 271 German labor market regions is considered as an econometric decision problem. At first, the dependence of the unemployment rate on the amount of aid is estimated for each eligible region. Using this dependence, the variance of regional unemployment rates is expressed as a function of the regional subsidies. The optimal aid distribution among regions is obtained by minimizing this variance subject to the total budget constraint and administrative restrictions. The optimal figures computed are compared with statistical data for 2000-2002. They show that the regional unemployment in Wes
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International licensing and R&D subsidy
Abstract: "R&D rivalry and optimal R&D policies are investigated in an asymmetric four-stage game that involves international licensing. It is found that a government's R&D policy crucially depends on its domestic firm's bargaining power over the...
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Abstract: "R&D rivalry and optimal R&D policies are investigated in an asymmetric four-stage game that involves international licensing. It is found that a government's R&D policy crucially depends on its domestic firm's bargaining power over the licensing gain. When the firm's bargaining power is greater than one half, the government subsidizes its home firm's R&D investment, while imposes a tax if the firm's bargaining power is less than one half. Additionally, this result does not depend on the status of the firm (the licensor or the licensee). Finally, the effects of two different licensing contracts (fixed-fee v.s. royalty per unit) on governments' optimal R&D policies are investigated." (author's abstract)
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