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Displaying results 1 to 25 of 134.

  1. Verhandelter Netzzugang
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn

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    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    C 231784
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    B02-1474
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    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
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    02-5024
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    Universitätsbibliothek Osnabrück
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: PE 760 ; PZ 3400
    Series: Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter ; 2002/4
    Subjects: Netzregulierung; Verhandlungen; Wettbewerbspolitik; Natürliches Monopol; Deutschland
    Scope: 83 Bl., b
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. Bl. 77 - 83
  2. Delineating the proper scope of government: a proper task for a constitutional court?
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn

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    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter ; 2000/9
    Subjects: Staatliche Einflussnahme; Verfassungsgericht; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Neue politische Ökonomie; Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse; Theorie; Politische Willensbildung
    Scope: 35 Bl, b
  3. A constitutional framework for private governance
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter ; 2001/4
    Subjects: Privatwirtschaft; Selbstverwaltung; Regulierung; Standardisierung; Staatsrecht; Grundrecht; Berufsverband; Deutschland
    Scope: 37 Bl, graph. Darst
  4. Offene Gemeinwohldefinitionen
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn

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    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    Mag22928
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter ; 2000/16
    Subjects: Gemeinwohl; Theorie
    Scope: 24 Bl, b
  5. Rechtliche Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn

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    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    Mag25597
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter ; 2001/9
    Subjects: Rechtsprechung; Rechtsökonomik; Sozialpsychologie; Systemtheorie; Kultursoziologie; Theorie; Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit
    Scope: 49 Bl, graph. Darst, b
  6. Rechtliche Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht für Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn

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    Universitätsbibliothek Trier
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Series: Preprints of the Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2001,9
    Subjects: Rechtswissenschaft; Interdisziplinarität
    Scope: 49 Bl.
  7. Rechtliche Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht für Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn

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    Universitätsbibliothek Trier
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    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Preprints of the Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2001,9
    Subjects: Rechtswissenschaft; Interdisziplinarität
    Scope: 49 Bl.
  8. European telecommunications law
    unaffected by globalisation?
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    C 230010
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    Universitätsbibliothek Osnabrück
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter ; 2002/3
    Subjects: Telekommunikationsrecht; EU-Wirtschaftsrecht; Globalisierung; Telekommunikationspolitik; International; EU-Staaten; Politikfeldanalyse
    Scope: 29 Bl
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. Bl. 24 - 29
  9. Vertrauen: ein Versuch
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn

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    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Gemeinschaftsgüter: Recht, Politik und Ökonomie ; 1999/12
    Subjects: Reputation; Vertrauen; Rationalität; Theorie
    Scope: 60 Bl, b
  10. Die Grammatik des Rechts
    Funktionen der rechtlichen Instrumente des Umweltschutzes im Verbund mit ökonomischen und politischen Instrumenten
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    ÖR/PN 797 E57
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Universitätsbibliothek Osnabrück
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Gemeinschaftsgüter: Recht, Politik und Ökonomie ; 2000/3
    Subjects: Umweltrecht; Umweltschutz; Umweltökonomik; Rechtsökonomik; Theorie
    Scope: 36 Bl
  11. Marktabgrenzung als soziale Konstruktion
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

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    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    Mag8022
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2003/11
    Subjects: Marktabgrenzung; Kritik; Konstruktivismus; Kognition
    Scope: 26 Bl, b
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. Bl. 21 - 26
  12. How do households allocate risk?
    Author: Engel, Christoph; Fedorets, Alexandra; Gorelkina, Olga
    Published: November 2018
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Individuals often have to decide to which degree of risk they want to expose others, or how much risk to accept if their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German... more

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    Individuals often have to decide to which degree of risk they want to expose others, or how much risk to accept if their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German Socio-Economic Panel with two members from 494 households. Participants have a good estimate of each other's risk preferences, even if not explicitly informed. They do not simply match this preference when deciding on behalf of the other household member, but shy away from exposing others to risk. We model the situation, and we find four distinct types of individuals, and two distinct types of households.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0002-8B3F-C
    hdl: 10419/204696
    Edition: This version: November 25, 2018
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2018, 14
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Estimating heterogeneous reactions to experimental treatments
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: January 2019
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Frequently in experiments there is not only variance in the reaction of participants to treatment. The heterogeneity is patterned: discernible types of participants react differently. In principle, a finite mixture model is well suited to... more

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    Frequently in experiments there is not only variance in the reaction of participants to treatment. The heterogeneity is patterned: discernible types of participants react differently. In principle, a finite mixture model is well suited to simultaneously estimate the probability that a given participant belongs to a certain type, and the reaction of this type to treatment. Yet often, finite mixture models need more data than the experiment provides. The approach requires ex ante knowledge about the number of types. Finite mixture models are hard to estimate for panel data, which is what experiments often generate. For repeated experiments, this paper offers a simple two-step alternative that is much less data hungry, that allows to find the number of types in the data, and that allows for the estimation of panel data models. It combines machine learning methods with classic frequentist statistics.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/204699
    Edition: This version: January 20, 2019
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2019, 1
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Tax morale and fairness in conflict
    an experiment
    Author: Engel, Christoph; Mittone, Luigi; Morreale, Azzurra
    Published: February 2019
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Arguably, for many citizens the perceived expected disutility from sanctions is smaller than the monetary gain from tax evasion. Nevertheless most people pay their taxes most of the time. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes... more

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    Arguably, for many citizens the perceived expected disutility from sanctions is smaller than the monetary gain from tax evasion. Nevertheless most people pay their taxes most of the time. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes even absent enforcement is indeed pronounced. Yet voluntary compliance is reduced if participants learn that income is heterogeneous. The effect is driven by participants with the lowest income. The reduction obtains irrespective of the tax regime. If the tax is proportional to income, or progressive, participants become more skeptical about the willingness of participants with high income to comply.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0003-0BB2-8
    hdl: 10419/204700
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2019, 2
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Does efficiency Trump legality?
    the case of the German Constitutional Court
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: October 2017
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    The US Supreme Court has the power of certiorari. It may pick its fights. As a beneficial side effect, the court may allocate its resources, in particular the time and energy the justices spend on a case, to worthy causes. In economic parlance, this... more

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    The US Supreme Court has the power of certiorari. It may pick its fights. As a beneficial side effect, the court may allocate its resources, in particular the time and energy the justices spend on a case, to worthy causes. In economic parlance, this discretion makes the court more efficient. Efficiency comes at a political cost, though. This discretion also gives the court political power. It may direct its verdict to causes that are politically most relevant, or it may put an issue on the political agenda. Officially German constitutional law does not have certiorari. The Constitutional Court must decide each and every case that is brought. Yet over time the court has crafted a whole arsenal of more subtle measures for managing the case load. This paper shows that it uses these tools to engage in its version of allocating resources to cases. It investigates whether the ensuing efficiency gain comes at the cost of biasing the court's jurisprudence. The paper exploits a new comprehensive data set. It consists of all (mostly only electronically) published cases the court has heard in 2011. While the data is rich, in many technical ways it is demanding. The paper uses a factor analysis to create a latent variable: to which degree has the court taken an individual case seriously? It then investigates whether observed indicators for bias explain this latent variable. Since the paper essentially investigates a single (independent) case, in statistical terms the findings are to be interpreted with caution. The paper can only aim at finding smoking guns.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/174499
    Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2017, 20
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. The proper scope of behavioral law and economics
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: January 2018
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Behavioral law and economics applies the conceptual tools of behavioral economics to the analysis of legal problems and legal intervention. These models, and the experiments to test them, assume an institution free state of nature. In modern... more

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    Behavioral law and economics applies the conceptual tools of behavioral economics to the analysis of legal problems and legal intervention. These models, and the experiments to test them, assume an institution free state of nature. In modern societies, the law’s subjects never see this state of nature. However a rich arrangement of informal and formal institutions creates generalized trust. If individuals are sufficiently confident that nothing too bad will happen, they are freed up to interact with strangers as if they were in a state of nature. This willingness dramatically reduces transaction cost and enables division of labor. If generalized trust can be assumed, simple economic models are appropriate. But they must be behavioral, since otherwise individuals would not want to run the risk of interaction.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/174505
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2018, 2
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 15 Seiten)
  17. Experimental social planners
    good natured, but overly optimistic
    Author: Engel, Christoph; Hippel, Svenja
    Published: November 2017
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Public goods are dealt with in two literatures that neglect each other. Mechanism design advises a social planner that expects individuals to misrepresent their valuations. Experiments study the provision of the good when preferences might be... more

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    Public goods are dealt with in two literatures that neglect each other. Mechanism design advises a social planner that expects individuals to misrepresent their valuations. Experiments study the provision of the good when preferences might be non-standard. We introduce the problem of the mechanism design literature into a public good experiment. Valuations for the good are heterogeneous. To each group we add a participant with power to impose a contribution scheme. We study four settings: the authority has no personal interest and (1) valuations are common knowledge or (2) active participants may misrepresent their types; the authority has a personal interest (3) and must decide before learning her own valuation or (4) knows her own valuation. Disinterested social planners predominantly choose a payment rule that gives every group member the same ?nal payoff, even if misrepresentation is possible. Authorities are overly optimistic about truth telling. Interested social planners abuse their power, except if the opportunity cost of a more balanced rule is small.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/174502
    Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2017, 23
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Defendant should have the last word
    experimentally manipulating order and provisional assessment of the facts in criminal procedure
    Author: Engel, Christoph; Glöckner, Andreas; Timme, Sinika
    Published: November 2017
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    From a normative perspective the order in which evidence is presented should not bias legal judgment. Yet psychological research on how individuals process conflicting evidence sug-gests that order could matter. The evidence shows that... more

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    From a normative perspective the order in which evidence is presented should not bias legal judgment. Yet psychological research on how individuals process conflicting evidence sug-gests that order could matter. The evidence shows that decision-makers dissolve ambiguity by forging coherence. This process could lead to a primacy effect: initial tentative interpretations bias the view on later conflicting evidence. Or the process could result in a recency effect: the evidence presented last casts decisive light on the case. In two studies (N1 = 221, N2 = 332) we test these competing hypotheses in a mock legal case. Legal orders sometimes even expect judges to provisionally assess the evidence. At least they have a hard time preventing this from happening. To test whether this creates or exacerbates bias, in the second dimensions, we explicitly demand experimental participants to express their leaning, after having seen half of the evidence. We consistently observe recency effects and no interactions with leanings. If the legal order wants to preempt false convictions, defendant should have the last word.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/174503
    Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2017, 24
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. How do households allocate risk?
    Author: Engel, Christoph; Fedorets, Alexandra; Gorelkina, Olga
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), DIW Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Individuals often have to decide to which degree of risk they want to expose others, or how much risk to accept if their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German... more

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    Individuals often have to decide to which degree of risk they want to expose others, or how much risk to accept if their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German Socio-Economic Panel with two members from 494 households. Participants have a good estimate of each other's risk preferences, even if not explicitly informed. They do not simply match this preference when deciding on behalf of the other household member, but shy away from exposing others to risk. We model the situation, and we find four distinct types of individuals, and two distinct types of households.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/191627
    Edition: This version: December 2, 2018
    Series: SOEPpapers on multidisciplinary panel data research ; 1000 (2018)
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. The internet and the nation state
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Inst. zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen, Jena

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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    KAP 10751
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    Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
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    2000 SA 115
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Edition: 1. Aufl
    Series: Lectiones Jenenses ; 21
    Subjects: Internet; Wissensgesellschaft; Globalisierung; Nationalstaat; Exit-Strategie; Standortwettbewerb; Internationale Zusammenarbeit; Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik; Theorie; Welt
    Scope: 77 S
  21. Turning the lab into Jeremy Bentham's panopticon
    the effect of punishment on offenders and non-offenders
    Author: Engel, Christoph; Irlenbusch, Bernd
    Published: February 2010
    Publisher:  Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    The most famous element in Bentham's theory of punishment, the Panopticon Prison, expresses his view of the two purposes of punishment, deterrence and special prevention. We investigate Bentham's intuition in a public goods lab experiment by... more

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    Rvgl. 39001: 48
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    StR/PH 8400 E57
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    Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Bibliothek
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    AA: VI Jc: 47
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    Universität des Saarlandes, Rechts- und Wirtschaftwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Sektion Rechtswissenschaft, Europa-Institut, Bibliothek
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    EF 55-10,6
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    The most famous element in Bentham's theory of punishment, the Panopticon Prison, expresses his view of the two purposes of punishment, deterrence and special prevention. We investigate Bentham's intuition in a public goods lab experiment by manipulating how much information on punishment experienced by others is available to would-be offenders. Compared with the tone that Jeremy Bentham set, our results are non-expected: If would-be offenders learn about contributions and punishment of others at the individual level, they contribute much less to the public project. Our results confirm the special prevention effect but show that the deterrence effect is smaller the more information on individual punishment is available. -- Punishment ; Deterrence ; Special Prevention ; Jeremy Bentham ; Experiment ; Public Good

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: PH 8400 ; PH 8240
    Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2010,6
    Subjects: Strafe; Kriminalpolitik; Informationsverbreitung; Öffentliche Güter; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten; Experiment
    Scope: 43 Blatt, Illustrationen, graphische Darstellungen, 30 cm
  22. Essays on the impact of social embeddedness on social preferences, beliefs, and pro-social behavior
    Author: Lenz, Lisa Christin
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln, Köln

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    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Contributor: Sliwka, Dirk (AkademischeR BetreuerIn); Engel, Christoph (AkademischeR BetreuerIn)
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Subjects: Behavioral Economics; Experimental Economics; Social Preferences; Belief-Dependent Preferences
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 216 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Dissertation, Universität zu Köln, 2020
  23. Does the fundamental transformation deter trade?
    an experiment
    Author: Engel, Christoph; Helland, Eric
    Published: September 2020
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Oliver Williamson has coined the term "fundamental transformation". It captures the following situation: before they strike a deal, buyer and seller are protected by competition. Yet thereafter they find themselves in a bilateral monopoly. With... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 62
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    Oliver Williamson has coined the term "fundamental transformation". It captures the following situation: before they strike a deal, buyer and seller are protected by competition. Yet thereafter they find themselves in a bilateral monopoly. With common knowledge of standard preferences, both sides conclude the contract regardless if its expected value exceeds their outside options. We run an experiment to test whether additional behavioral reasons deter mutually beneficial trade. If the risk materializes, another individual makes a windfall profit. She does so by intentionally exploiting the first individual. The first individual is let down, although she has knowingly exposed herself to this risk. Participants sell the opportunity to enter the contractual relationship at a price below its expected value. This effect is driven by risk aversion, and already present if the risk is stochastic. Behavioral effects are heterogeneous. About a quarter of participants exhibit the hypothesized additional deterrent effect.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0006-F3B9-7
    hdl: 10419/230978
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2020, 23
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Crime as conditional rule violation
    Author: Engel, Christoph
    Published: November 2021
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Most of the time most individuals do not commit crime. Why? One explanation is deontological. People abide by legal rules just because these are the rules. In this perspective, the power of normativity is critical. It is supported by experimental... more

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    Most of the time most individuals do not commit crime. Why? One explanation is deontological. People abide by legal rules just because these are the rules. In this perspective, the power of normativity is critical. It is supported by experimental evidence. To an impressive degree, participants even abide by arbitrary, costly rules, in the complete absence of enforcement. Yet do they also do that if they learn that some of their peers violate the rule? The experiment shows that rule following is conditional on social information. The more peers violate the rule, the more participants are likely to do so as well, and the more severely the violation. This main finding replicates in a vignette study. The effect is most pronounced with speeding, weaker with tax evasion, and absent with littering. In the lab, social information has an effect whether it is framed as the incidence of rule violation or of rule following. If they have no explicit social information, participants condition choices on their beliefs. Even merely knowing that they are part of a group, without knowing how others behave, has an effect.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0009-75D6-2
    hdl: 10419/262305
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2021, 20
    Subjects: decision to engage in criminal behavior; normativity; deontological motives; rule following; social context; social information; conditional rule following
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Eye-tracking as a method for legal research
    Author: Engel, Christoph; Rahal, Rima-Maria
    Published: November 2022
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Legal research is a repeat offender - in the best sense of the term - when it comes to making use of empirical and experimental methods borrowed from other disciplines. We anticipate that the field's response to developments in eye-tracking research... more

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    Legal research is a repeat offender - in the best sense of the term - when it comes to making use of empirical and experimental methods borrowed from other disciplines. We anticipate that the field's response to developments in eye-tracking research will be no different. Our aim is to aid legal researchers in the uptake of eye-tracking as a method to address questions related to cognitive processes involved in matters of law abidance, legal intervention, and the generation of new legal rules. We discuss methodological challenges of empiri-cally studying thinking and reasoning as the mechanisms underlying behavior, and introduce eye-tracking as our method of choice for obtaining high-resolution traces of visual attention. We delineate advantages and challenges of this methodological approach, and outline which concepts legal researchers can hope to measure with a toy example. We conclude by outlining some of the various research avenues in legal research for which we predict a benefit from adopting eye-tracking to their methodological toolbox.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-000B-5C1D-F
    hdl: 10419/274056
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2022, 7
    Subjects: methods; eye-tracking; cognition; process tracing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen