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  1. Teams contribute more and punish less
    Published: May 2016
    Publisher:  Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, [Dresden]

    Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods... more

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 550 (2016,2)
    No inter-library loan

     

    Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public good game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that in absence of a punishment option teams contribute more to the public good than individuals. With a punishment option subsequently to the contribution decision team treatments exhibit a less frequent use of anti-social punishment and lower levels of social as well as anti-social punishment. Extreme preferences for punishment are eliminated by the majority decision rule. Overall, team decisions are closer to the social optimum and teams yield higher net payoffs when compared to individuals.

     

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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/146769
    Series: CEPIE working paper ; no. 16, 02
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten)
  2. Adaptation, mitigation and risk-taking in climate policy
    Published: 2011
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    The future consequences of climate change are highly uncertain. Today, the exact size of possible future damages are widely unknown. Governments try to cope with these risks by investing in mitigation and adaptation measures. Mitigation aims at a... more

    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 63 (3320)
    No inter-library loan

     

    The future consequences of climate change are highly uncertain. Today, the exact size of possible future damages are widely unknown. Governments try to cope with these risks by investing in mitigation and adaptation measures. Mitigation aims at a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions whereas adaptation reduces the follow-up costs of climate change. In contrast to the existing literature, we explicitly model the decision of risk-averse governments on mitigation and adaptation policies. Furthermore we also consider the interaction of the two strategies. Mitigation efforts of a single country trigger crowding out as other countries will reduce their mitigation efforts. We show that, under fairly mild conditions, a unilateral increase in mitigation efforts of a single country can even increase global emissions. In contrast, a unilateral commitment to large adaptation efforts benefits the single country and may reduce the global risk from climate change at the expense of other countries. -- climate change ; adaptation ; mitigation ; risk-taking

     

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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/46481
    Series: Array ; 3320
    Subjects: Klimawandel; Umweltpolitik; Immissionsschutz; Politische Entscheidung
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: S., 554 KB), graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Druckausg. erschienen

  3. Nichtkooperative Klimapolitik, Unsicherheit und Teamentscheidungen
    Published: 2015

    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    oek 4555/066
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    D 20780
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QT 000
    Subjects: Klimaschutz; Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit; Gruppenentscheidung; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Simulation; Theorie
    Scope: VI, 156 S., Ill., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Dresden, Techn. Univ., Fak. Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2014